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ABSTRACT
A VETERAN WELFARE STATE: VETERANS’ BENEFITS, COALITION POLITICS,
AND SOCIAL POLICY CHANGE, 1943-1973
SEPTEMBER 2014
MELINDA RAE TARSI, B.A., WESTERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor MARYANN BARAKSO
America’s commitment to the reintegration of veterans via social policy is not a
recent political development; since the end of World War II, federal and state government
programs have been designed (and redesigned) to successfully transition former military
personnel back into civilian life. Beginning with the 1944 Serviceman’s Readjustment
Act (commonly known as the G.I. Bill), the federal government has taken the primary
role in this reintegration initiative, investing billions of dollars into veterans’ benefit
programs for education assistance, unemployment compensation, and job placement
services. Even as the legislation has been renewed after military conflicts, veterans’
education benefits have remained an integral part of the American social policy landscape
in the post-New Deal era, providing critical tuition assistance for service members
returning to a civilian workforce. As much as we know about the positive effects on
American politics and economy generated by the original G.I. Bill and its successors,
what do we truly know about the way that the legislation has been developed, or how it
fits in with the broader set of (less popular) social policies in American history?

!

$!

I argue that veterans’ education benefits were supported by an unlikely political
coalition (comprised of often diverging interests) that was tenuously united by the
success of the 1944 G.I. Bill. As a result of this coalition’s competing social policy
goals, the development of veterans’ education benefits siphoned political momentum
away from broad-based education aid policies after 1944. Drawing on Congressional
records, hearing transcripts, and archival data from over a dozen national libraries and
private collections, I highlight the strategies of this “veterans’ benefit coalition,” as well
as the ways in which the coalition worked toward expanding veterans’ benefits at the
expense of programs for the entire citizenry (dovetailing with conservative interests to
limit the growth of the American welfare state). The inclusion of this veterans’ benefit
coalition – and its spillover effects – in the broader narrative of American welfare state
development is a critical contribution to understanding America’s “laggard” welfare
system in a comparative context.
KEYWORDS: veterans’ benefits; G.I. Bill; social policy
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
!
In June 2014, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (commonly known as
the G.I. Bill) turned 70 years old, ushering in the opportunity for reflection on the
importance and popularity of the legislation whose hallmark feature was its college
tuition benefits for returning World War II veterans. President Barack Obama remarked
in an op-ed piece that, besides paying for college tuitions, “the GI Bill also transformed
America. With the careers it sparked, the homes it helped our veterans buy, and the
prosperity it generated, it paid for itself several times over and helped lay the foundation
for the largest middle class in history.”1 The G.I. Bill remains a popular fixture in
American political rhetoric and politics more broadly, as the perceptions of the success of
the program continue to inform current opinions. In a recent Gallup Poll, 78% of veterans
reported satisfaction with the program of veterans’ education benefits in American
policy, while only 16% identified themselves as dissatisfied. This outpouring of support
for the program is interesting, though, because the same poll reported that 63% of today’s
veterans have not used the most recent versions of the G.I. Bill benefits at all (and a full
46% in the target 18-to-49 age group claim to have never used these benefits).2 Thus,
even with a marginal current utilization rate, the G.I. Bill is lauded as a viable and
successful social policy program.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Barack Obama, “Op-Ed by President Obama on the 70th Anniversary of the G.I. Bill.” Office of the Press
Secretary, The White House, June 20, 2014. Accessed July 10, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/06/20/op-ed-president-obama-70th-anniversary-gi-bill.
2
Gallup, “Most Veterans are Satisfied with G.I. Bill Education Benefits,” July 3, 2014. Accessed July 10,
2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/172082/veterans-satisfied-bill-education-benefits.aspx?ref=image.
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The G.I. Bill’s distinction as the most popular, broad-based social welfare regime
in American history – created and maintained during periods of flux in American welfare
state development – creates two separate, but interrelated questions. First, who were the
powerful architects of the G.I. Bill’s several reforms, and how were they able to
concentrate support behind increasing federal spending in spite of countervailing political
and economic forces? Secondly, and as an extension of the previous question, to what
extent did the activities of veterans’ education benefit supporters affect the development
of parallel broad-based social policies in development at the same time? The institution
of veterans’ benefits – specifically those focused on economic reintegration through
education, training, and unemployment compensation – presents an important case study
in American politics, allowing us to examine policy change that has remained durable
through various political and economic contexts. In addition, the political actors involved
in advocating for increased veterans’ benefits – and their attendant strategies for
influencing legislators and public opinion – provide an important glimpse into a powerful
lobby that has persisted since the end of World War I. Perhaps most importantly, the
institution of veterans’ benefits has had “spillover effects” into other areas of public
policy, having a distinct influence on parallel universal social policies addressed at
economic recovery and making American education and jobs competitive at the global
level.
The importance of this research question is twofold. First, in identifying the
architects of the G.I. Bill system, this project illuminates the role of a coalition of
political actors – as well as powerful members within that coalition – that were able to
retain control over a particular policy area throughout a time of stark political and
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economic change. Advocates of the G.I. Bill have been incredibly successful in
maintaining the contours of the original program, as well as continuously expanding the
generosity of its provisions in line with new economic realities. Understanding the
unprecedented power of the coalition – as well as the changes it underwent over time –
provides political scientists (and policymakers) with a useful case study for analyzing
how disparate interests may achieve and maintain policy goals. Secondly, this research
highlights how the veterans’ benefit coalition was able to shift American social policy
development during its formative postwar years. Beyond implying a connection between
the two policy spheres, I provide evidence that coalition members, still in service to either
their support for or opposition to the New Deal regime, used veterans’ benefits as a
means to attain their greater social welfare policy ends. The lasting impression of the
veterans’ benefit coalition is not only a strong system of educational support for returning
American veterans, but also a welfare state that – across several policy spheres – was
reined in at critical moments through the coalition’s work. Supporters of the New Deal
utilized the G.I. Bill in an effort to continue to realize Franklin Roosevelt’s vision of
domestic economic intervention, while New Deal opponents saw a way to appease public
pressure for more generous welfare policies with benefits aimed at a politically (and
publicly) popular subset of the population. The study of the veterans’ benefit coalition is
important, then, to understand not only coalition success, but also the full range of actors
and political strategies employed to shape the contours of the laggard American welfare
state.
I argue that the set of political actors mobilized around veterans’ benefits (and
education assistance in particular) was a relatively disparate and conflicted of actors with
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clearly divergent interests across a range of social policies. This “veterans’ benefit
coalition,” as I identify them, was a heterogeneous and fragmented group, yet one that
was highly successful at developing, reforming, and ultimately institutionalizing
veterans’ education benefits, even in the face of strong political pressure and efforts at
retrenchment. Moreover, this coalition was able to have an influence on parallel social
policy development, effectively creating “spillover” effects in areas of policy aimed at
the broader American population. In contrast to the universal American welfare state
(which is depicted as a laggard, especially relative to other industrialized countries), the
veteran welfare state is well developed and comprehensive. Veterans’ benefits in their
current incarnation developed alongside the patchwork construction of the universal
welfare state from the New Deal era, through the Great Society initiative, and even
during conservative retrenchment efforts. Although prominent secondary historical
accounts suggest that the presence of a veteran welfare state is somehow related to
legislation for general social welfare programs,3 there is still no focused analysis of the
ways in which the development of veterans’ benefits and their universal counterparts
interacted at key historical and political junctures. Political scientists have not yet fully
explicated the extent to which the rise of the veteran benefit regime directly curtailed the
emerging American welfare state in its infancy. Proponents of veterans’ benefits argued,
ultimately successfully, that generous benefits for veterans obviated the need for broader
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3

Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Politics of Social Policy in the United States
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, “Redefining the
New Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States,” in The Politics of
Social Policy in the United States, eds. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kathleen J. Frydl, The G.I. Bill (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009); Sar A. Levitan and Karen A. Cleary, Old Wars Remain Unfinished: The Veteran Benefits
System (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Stephen R. Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus
March and G.I. Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era. (New York: New York University
Press, 2010).

4!

!

social protections for the civilian citizenry. As they suggested, with veterans and their
dependents constituting such a large portion of the population, it was unnecessary to
construct or expand universal policies available to all citizens. Veterans’ interest in
expanding veterans’ benefits dovetailed with the VA’s interest in expanding its budget
and policy domain, and with Republicans’ and conservative Democrats' interest in
rewarding military personnel and, more importantly, limiting the growth of the universal
welfare state.
In this project I analyze the political activity surrounding the development of the
four major iterations of the G.I. Bill’s education and unemployment compensation
provisions (in 1944, 1952, 1966, and 1972), drawing on evidence from legislative
hearings and reports; mass periodicals and pressure group correspondence; archival
materials from presidential, legislative, and interest group archives; and secondary
historical accounts of the politics of veterans’ benefits (and social policy more broadly)
during the time period. I pay special attention to the members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition, who brought often diverging interests to bear in their advocacy of education
benefits for veterans. This project explicates the composition of this unlikely alliance and
the extent to which members’ competing interests affected not only the development of
veterans’ education benefits, but also the parallel development of other educational and
reintegration policies around the same time. Additionally, I contend that expanding the
policy feedback model to include heterogeneity in both interest group composition and
feedback effects (to account for “spillover” in other policy areas) would allow scholars a
more complete perspective on the development of social policy – and the American
welfare state writ large – in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

5!

!

The American Welfare State and Veterans’ Benefits in Comparative Perspective
The importance of the G.I. Bill to American social policy development is a
prominent theme in work on American political history, but the broader contours of the
American welfare program are more striking when compared against similar
governmental regimes. America’s welfare state development in comparative perspective
has revealed a substantial split between the US and other developed states, as the former
has been characterized as a “laggard” welfare state when judged by the standards of
Western European welfare systems.4 Scholars have identified various mechanisms for
this stunted welfare growth, focusing on how both institutional and electoral factors have
eroded the potential of the American welfare state. While veterans’ benefit policies may
appear to be a separate policy sphere, they represent an important part of the full
spectrum of the American welfare state; when benefits to veterans are accounted for, the
American system becomes increasingly generous in comparison to its industrialized
peers.5 American veteran benefits have long been a critical element of the regime of
policies at work in domestic politics, and have only recently been recognized as
important for not only driving the early versions of social policy,6 but also for a major
component of its current formulation.7 While the current welfare state scholarship is
instructive in understanding the complex “intercurrence”8 of various concurrent

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990).
Christopher Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths about U.S. Social Policy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
6
Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American
Social Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
7
Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows.
8
For a full description of “intercurrence,” see Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for
American Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). I use the term here to
5
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trajectories, it potentially obscures the important role that veterans’ benefits – and the
politics surrounding their development – have played in shaping the contours of the
current social policy landscape. The role of veterans’ benefits is greater than its bottomline contribution to federal expenditures; rather, the very political process of developing
the veterans’ education benefit system itself influenced the way in which other programs
would take shape.
There are several potential explanations for the laggard American welfare state
that do not include a role for parallel policy development. The electoral incentives for a
bounded welfare state, though most recently identified in the 1970s and 1980s,9 have
their foundations in earlier contestations over the role of labor and capital in American
politics. One reason for the stunted welfare state development has been business interests
to self-regulate benefits policies – dovetailing with conservative interests to prevent the
New Deal policies from instantiating a rampant increase in state size – and which has led
to a regime of limited public intervention and increasingly more private economic
security benefits.10 These combined efforts have led to an anemic public policy regime
that relies increasingly on private benefits to supplant the state provisions for healthcare
and pensions. Another important factor in US welfare development has been the electoral
arrangements of parties that have obscured (intentionally or unintentionally) the attempts
of labor to make inroads into national discussions about income security. Standing in
stark contrast to Western European states, America’s increasingly powerless labor unions
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
generally describe the many “moving parts” of American welfare state development that, taken as a whole,
have contributed to the kinds of shifts in political orders that Orren and Skowronek describe.
9
Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
10
Jacob Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the
United States (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2002). For an overview of the public and private dynamic
beyond Hacker’s examples of healthcare and pensions, see also Christopher Howard, The Welfare State
Nobody Knows.
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were unable to participate in the coalition politics that drove concessions in social policy
provisions in other industrialized states.11 The electoral changes in American politics
have not only presented opportunities for change in social policies; as I explain further,
they also created conditions that allowed veterans’ benefit politics to shape social policy
development.
The institutional structure of the American welfare state has been changed by its
initial forays into economic security policies, through both Civil War veterans’ benefits
and early aid policies for working mothers. These policies created critical target groups of
beneficiaries and also acted as prototype policies for broader schemes of state social
policies.12 However, these initial institutional arrangements presented negative examples
of welfare state arrangements; in the case of Civil War benefits especially, the provisions
were laid bare to abuses of the patronage system and soon formed a bloated and corrupt
system of selective entitlements. Institutions have been more than blueprints for state
development, however; they have also formed less-recognized facets of the welfare state
that contribute to its size (and, some would argue, relative wealth when these “hidden”
elements are taken into account). One such example is the American tax system, the
provisions of which supply homeowners, veterans, and others with substantial tax breaks
and an effective expenditure system unlike those in other industrial countries.13 These
institutional arrangements have allowed veterans’ benefits – as a jurisdictionally distinct,
“parallel” welfare state – the political cover to develop alongside the American welfare
state. While veterans’ benefits appear to be a discrete category of social policy, I argue
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
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that their development had enduring effects on the social policies under development at
the same time. Thus, institutional arrangements have not only limited the growth of the
welfare state; they have also provided the “veteran welfare state” with the space and
bureaucratic power necessary to become an important player in the politics of social
policy.
Of critical importance to many of these accounts of American welfare state
development has been the theory of policy feedback, which has outlined the mechanisms
by which initial changes in policies have reverberated through the rest of the social policy
system over time. While existing research has provided important insights into the
various factors contributing to American social policy development, it has currently
underplayed the importance of veterans’ benefits in explaining the laggard status of the
American welfare state. In the next section, I lay out the current explanations of veterans’
benefit influence offered by policy feedback theory, and offer two specifications to the
model which will provide a more accurate perspective on the importance of veterans’
benefits to American social policy development.

Policy Feedback and the Case of Veterans’ Education Benefits
Policy feedback presents a compelling story of change in public policy literature,
and although it finds its roots in the work of E.E. Schattschneider,14 it was not until the
1990s that political scientists began systematically analyzing and applying the concept to
the political system. Within policy feedback frameworks, policies are afforded agency
insofar as they can change politics through influencing both political behavior (of
individuals and groups), as well as the ways in which policy is created in the future.
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Policy development does not occur in a vacuum; instead, it is contextualized within the
political landscape shaped by policy development over time. Daniel Béland notes, “In the
broadest sense…the concept of policy feedback refers to this impact of previously
enacted policies on future political behavior and policy choices. In other words, policy
feedback is a temporal concept that points to the fact that over time, policy can shape
politics.”15 While the policy feedback model is useful for explaining repeated iterations
of policy developments over time, I argue that some small – but critical – additions to the
model can allow for a better incorporation of other concomitant factors (such as interest
group composition and the types of feedback effects witnessed). By making these
refinements to the policy feedback model – using the G.I. Bill development as illustration
– political scientists may better explain instances of policy development in which
seemingly divergent interests act in concert to achieve similar political ends. In the case
of veterans’ benefits, their place in the social policy literature provides three major types
of mechanisms of policy feedback, explaining interest group power,16 civic
engagement,17 and changes in state capacities.18 While these mechanisms have been
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useful in explaining policy feedback effects through the 1944 G.I. Bill, additional
specifications to the model will be useful for understanding the evolution of veterans’
benefits following the immediate post-WWII period.

Policy Feedback, Interest Groups, and Coalition Politics
One of the most significant contributions that the veterans’ benefit literature has
made to political science is the addition of a case study in how policy feedback can create
strong and durable constituencies that may shape future iterations of the same (or similar)
policies. The policy has a generative effect, acting as the catalyst for the formations of
pressure groups (or alliances of existing groups), which then become political actors in
their own rights. In his articulation of policy feedback, Paul Pierson notes that, “Policies
provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or inhibit the formation or
expansion of particular groups. The incentives stem primarily from the major social
consequences of specific government actions.”19 While policies can influence the
establishment of well-funded pressure groups that can promote the maintenance (if not
expansion of) the policy’s benefits, more recent literature augments this story by
suggesting that program popularity can make even programs for the poor politically
salient to the whole citizenry.20
The effect of policy feedback processes on interest group power is especially
salient in the case of veterans’ benefits, as extant scholarship makes persuasive
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arguments for the power of veterans’ groups in not only successfully negotiating the
political terrain in favor of more extensive benefits,21 but also in the effect of policies on
generating new target groups whose levels of civic engagement are positively affected by
these policies.22 However, the case of the veterans’ benefit coalition offers an opportunity
to add a layer of nuance to the current theory concerning how interests groups utilize the
leverage provided by policies to increase political power.
While existing theories of policy feedback focus on the roles of pressure
organizations, these groups are often treated as discrete entities with homogenous
political goals or mutually preferred methods for obtaining those goals. In the case of
veterans’ benefits, for example, some accounts paint the major veterans’ groups – such as
the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Disabled Veterans of America –
with a broad stroke, portraying them as proponents of veterans’ benefit legislation across
various categories and time periods. Such an account is not in line with some narratives
that identify rifts between the veterans’ groups that go back to their origins and
membership;23 similarly, the opposing interests of business leaders and union leaders
were, at least at the outset, united on the need for veterans’ benefits in education and
training in the original G.I. Bill, although for reasons that would attempt to undermine the
opposing force’s political power among workers.24 The bipartisan support for increased
veterans’ benefits, combined with veterans’ groups, business, and labor support for the
legislation created a heterogeneous coalition of veterans’ benefit proponents whose
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strategic goals were contradictory to that of their fellow coalition members; nonetheless,
the coalition members worked together in developing a relatively resilient institution at
the federal level.
Accounting for the dynamics of political coalitions – composed of both elite and
non-elite actors, as Pierson notes – is critical for identifying the potentially countervailing
forces that shape the design – or redesign – of a particular institution.25 While political
actors form coalitions because it presents a way to maximize small groups’ interests with
relatively minor cost,26 participation can at often times be expensive, especially for those
members of the coalition who want their interests to receive the largest share of
attention.27 The support of a broad coalition can signal to lawmakers that a particular
legislative initiative is not only popular among invested groups, but that it enjoys broadbased popular support as well; to this extent, lawmakers may use coalition diversity or
breadth as a heuristic for the universal appeal of a particular policy proposal.28
The downside of coalitions, however, is twofold. First, they are susceptible to the
free-rider problem, as less invested members can enjoy the benefits of membership and
advocacy resources that are supplied by other members of the coalition.29 Second, and
more instructive for analyzing policy development over time, the fact that coalitions often
arise in a conflict-drive political environment means that they remain susceptible to
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cross-pressures, especially when the members’ shared interest is not reflective of their
primary individual interests.30
I argue that the example of the veterans’ benefit coalition provides a unique case
study to analyze how the composition of the interest group coalition that benefits from
the enactment of a policy can be fractured over time. The bonds that hold an interest
group coalition together may be negatively affected by the policy feedback process, as
reforms to the legislation force schisms in interests to the forefront and may cause
members of the coalition to break away once their individual interests are more important
than the ones reflected in the legislation. While extant theories of policy feedback
hypothesize a homogenous set of political actors that universally benefits from the
extension of benefits to a target population, the model in its current state does not account
for any type of actor arrangement in which the interests pursued are not universal. While
homogenous political groups may indeed become strengthened by political victories
during legislative development, it is the shared interest (manifested in the policy) that
reinforces this type of interest group. When the political actors in question are a coalition
– and one whose members have interests outside of veterans’ education benefits, as well
as ones that come into direct conflict with any extension of government assistance –
political scientists and policy scholars have yet to specify how the policy process
necessarily strengthens the coalition. If anything, the duration of the policy process,
combined with competing interests, may serve to devalue participation in the coalition
and ultimately lead to coalition fracture or even member exit from the group. Such a
change would destabilize the former support system for the policy regime, leaving it
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without critical advocates or vulnerable to attempts at reform that could significantly alter
the policy from its origins.31
Thus, while the policy feedback model presupposes homogenous political actors
that are reified through the enactment of a policy, research on political coalitions suggests
that the veterans’ coalition diversity and diverging interests may leave it susceptible to
coalition fracture (or even breakdown). From this juxtaposition, I make two interrelated –
but theoretically discrete – contentions concerning the composition of the veterans’
benefit coalition:
Contention 1: The veterans’ benefit coalition was heterogeneous, and composed of
diverging political interests.
The veterans’ benefit coalition was comprised of disparate veterans’
organizations, labor unions, postsecondary institutions and their representatives, business
lobbies, Democrat and Republican lawmakers, Presidential administrations, and the
Veterans’ Administration. The sheer diversity in the types of political actors in the
coalition is enough to suggest that their interests were not unified outside of the scope of
veterans’ education benefits; however, their attendant ideological biases and constituent
groups only further exacerbate the potential fault lines in the coalition. Integrating an
analysis of coalition politics into the policy feedback model allows us to further specify
the conditions under which legislative change could potentially strengthen the group (and
induce further participation or compliance), as well as identify which differences could
eventually be too much for the group to overcome.
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Another important component of these coalition politics is the role that individual
coalition members can take at varying points of policy development. While the coalition
was heterogeneous throughout the postwar time period (and through the Vietnam era),
this is not to say that its power was distributed equally among members of the group;
rather, certain members of the coalition were able to leverage the influence of the
coalition and harness its political influence in Congress even when the rest of the
coalition members were not actively striving toward a particular end. The best examples
of this phenomenon are individual legislators on the veterans’ committees of both the
House and Senate. At varying points in G.I. Bill development, these legislators were able
to mobilize support for increasing or diffusing veteran’s education benefits even with
only tepid support from the veterans’ interest groups, VA, White House, or other
coalition members.
The willingness of these legislators to move ahead on G.I. Bill benefits with or
without the express support of the rest of the coalition invites the question: why would
these particular legislators take the inherent risk to develop policies without the directive
of the other coalition members, especially the increasingly powerful veterans’ lobby
groups? While electoral incentives may explain initiative from legislators in particular
districts,32 it is insufficient to provide insight into those representatives without
significant military or veteran populations among their constituents. In concert with the
potential electoral benefits is the broader issue of the way in which veterans’ benefits, up
to WWII and beyond, have been constructed within American politics. From the notion
of “deservingness” originated within the first set of Revolutionary War pensions through
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the WWI-era struggle over the adjusted compensation “bonus,”33 veterans’ benefits have
become a valence issue as America moved from the post-WWII period into the Cold War
era. The fact that veterans’ benefits are so universally popular make them, paradoxically,
less open to public scrutiny or censure; moreover, the “deserving” veteran is contrasted
with the “undeserving” welfare mother or criminal.34 Such widespread support for
veterans’ benefits ensures that legislators can take reasonable risks on the behalf of the
veteran population and be met with little resistance (even without the explicit consent of
the veterans’ organizations or other veterans’ benefit coalition members). Lastly, the
enduring legacy of the New Deal is, I argue, a compounding factor in explaining the
actions of these legislators within the coalition. Whether seeking to extend New Deal
policies for social welfare or limit them through offering veterans’ benefits to the
population in trade for civilian benefits, the architects of the G.I. Bill program reveal
through historical evidence that the specter of the New Deal was still alive and well in the
decades following its inception.
Thus, an explanation of the heterogeneity of the veterans’ benefit coalition also
entails a discussion of the motivations of those actors who do step forward within the
group and attempt to advance legislation without the coalition’s urging. Taken together,
the literature on coalitional development and the explanations for individual legislators’
policymaking attempts suggest that the coalition’s uneven distribution of power left
certain members in more influential roles than others. Such a view also suggests that the
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veterans’ organizations, while cast by legislators and presidents alike as holding the ear
of certain members of Congress, may in fact have taken a backseat to the political
ambitions of a select group of legislators during critical moments of policy development.

Contention 2: The process of developing and reforming the G.I. Bill strained the
alliances between and among members of the veterans’ benefit coalition.
The ideological and political divisions between members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition could be superseded, at least in part, in pursuit of the original goal of postwar
economic development in 1943-1944. The G.I. Bill and veterans’ education assistance
did not, however, end after its original tenure, and instead was reformed and
systematically amended in the following years. The process of legislative reform and the
iterative nature of delineating educational benefits for veterans’ meant that the coalition’s
members’ interests would be once again thrown into conflict as the veterans’ benefits
regime grew. While the policy feedback model presumes that policy change will
strengthen the policy’s proponents (through the increased resources of the policy’s target
population), this effect is based on the assumption that the target population is necessarily
also the constituent population of the interests groups.
Put simply, the policy feedback model assumes that the interest groups will
benefit because their members will be the ones reaping the benefits of the policy change.
Given the disparate interests of the veterans’ benefit coalition – especially with respect to
their support for broad-based social and economic programs – each coalition member
would not necessarily benefit (or at least, not equally) from a strengthened veteran base.
Therefore, between the strain of interests that can no longer be subordinated to the
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universal goal of the coalition and the unequal benefits to groups based on their veteran
membership, the policy feedback model may incorrectly assess the long-term reification
of interest groups involved in the policy process.

Policy Feedback, State Capacities, and Effects on Parallel Policies
Changes in interest group influence, while an important element of the policy
feedback literature, are not the only political changes that can be introduced by policies
over time. Extant scholarship in political science, sociology, and history has addressed
the important role that veterans’ benefits have had in American political development,
and specifically in shifting state capacity and affecting the interactions between various
institutions and actors across the different levels of government.
Policies can help to expand the existing conception of not only what the state is,
but also what it is capable of providing to its citizenry; policies can alter the landscape of
bureaucratic politics such that certain agencies and elite actors can later capitalize upon
this power for future political gain.35 The changes produced by policy developments can
empower bureaucrats to take on the administration of new programs in the future,
especially those that naturally stem from the creation of the current policy. Additionally,
these shifts in the relationship between legislators, bureaucrats, and pressure groups can
realign the way in which policies can lay the groundwork for future expansions of social
policy in the future.36
The case of veterans’ benefits has been a critical one for explaining changes in
state capacities. Beginning with soldiers in the Revolutionary War, the American state
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(however fledgling it was at the time) was committed to making reparations to those
citizens who had taken up arms in service of the nascent union. The first set of
government entitlements can be attributed to these early systems of veteran benefits,
because it represents the first instance in which the American government undertook a
concerted effort to identify and reimburse a particular subset of the population for its
service. Jensen argues, “As the original opponents of Revolutionary officers’ pensions
predicted, selective entitlements fostered the concentration and purposeful application of
central state capacity to privilege particular interest at the expense of more collective
concerns.”37
Similarly, the case of Civil War pensions is acknowledged as an early American
welfare state that would ultimately shape future iterations of similar social policies.
Skocpol contends that the early system of Civil War pensions for Union soldiers
represented the country’s first large-scale attempt at creating social policy. While the
decentralized nature of the benefits system laid it bare to the potential abuse of patronage
politics, the Civil War pension system still acted as a prototype for the possibilities of
American social policy. Though opponents saw the corruption that ravaged the Civil War
pension system in its later years as the result of any attempt on the part of the state to bear
economic risk, Skocpol argues that these benefits instilled an important ethic in American
culture: namely, that of reparations for a deserving population of citizen-soldiers for
whom protections should be offered (if not administered as the Civil War pension system
had been).38 Similarly, The WWI era system of veterans’ benefits saw the distinct
breakup of the former veterans’ benefit system, with the functions of the veterans’ benefit
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structure being split into jurisdictionally distinct bureaus in an attempt to put Progressiveera ideals of objective bureaucracies into action.39 The experience of the G.I. Bill in 1944
would soon overshadow this previous history as a milestone in American social policy
development, and a marked change in the federal government’s reach into economic
insurance for a large portion of the population.
While current policy feedback theories have been critical to understanding how
welfare development occurred as an effect of entitlement programs (such as those for
veterans), the connections between policies in different spheres are less studied.40 The
ways in which policies may not only lay the groundwork for future iterations of similar
policies, but may actually “spillover” into parallel areas (where their influence can be
either a stimulant to a hindrance) is as yet understudied in both political science and
public policy studies. While extant literature suggests that the creation of the original G.I.
Bill may have stunted the development of other social welfare programs (in a “Second
New Deal” attempt),41 less work exists on the extent to which the development of
veterans’ benefit continued to affect the development of parallel programs after the mid1940s. Moreover, rather than thinking about the effects of policy development linearly, a
focus on “spillover” could expand the boundaries of the feedback process to include
contemporaneous changes in parallel fields.
Such an addition would allow the existing literature to account not only for
expanding social programs as a result of prior explorations into policy development, but
also for the ways in which policy development in one area may siphon momentum away
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from that of similar areas. Thinking about public policy in “zero sum” terms, the
development of policy in one area could potentially foreclose policy options in a related
area during the same timeframe; alternatively, the “open window” of policy development
could allow for policy entrepreneurs in related areas to utilize the concurrent policy
development to their advantage.42

Contention 3: Coalition politics caused both “spillover” and “spillback” into related
areas of universal social policy development.
While the policy feedback model assumes that the feedback process is often a
generative one (and frequently positive at that), the reform process may actually lay the
groundwork for interactions with other policy fields.43 Policy entrepreneurs can utilize
open policy “windows” to their advantage, exacting multiple and interrelated benefits
from this fruitful period and achieving more of their individual agendas.44 Moreover,
veterans’ benefit policies, with the express intent of generating economic growth for
veterans and civilians alike, necessarily places them in a potentially transformative
position with respect to parallel social policies. Coalition members’ influence can
“spillover” into related areas, bringing similar provisions of veterans’ benefits into other
policy areas where they can take hold.
Conversely, members’ influence may actually stunt development in related areas
of policy development, either by siphoning political momentum away from those policies
(and toward veterans’ education assistance), or by obviating the need for broad-based
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policies with the extension of veterans’ benefits. Borrowing from the literature on
European integration,45 I use the term “spillback” to refer to efforts to prevent the
liberalization of social policies aimed at addressing education and income security (the
two areas in which veterans’ education benefits were proposed to assist returning service
personnel). By introducing and subsequently reforming veterans’ education benefits,
veterans’ benefit coalition members were able to directly or indirectly restrict the policy
landscape for advocates of more expansive social policy benefits at the national level.
Moreover, coalition members were successful at delineating veterans’ benefits as
a discrete policy regime that, while it could influence other related policies, would remain
nonetheless insulated from changes to the administration of other similar policies. The
VA was able to retain its sole discretionary authority over veterans’ education benefits,
without oversight from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (or later the
Department of Education). The ability of the VA to resist pressures to share its
administrative responsibilities with agencies ostensibly more capable to deal with
particular policy programs suggests that powerful coalition support offset pressure from
interest groups and legislators to make critical reforms to the way in which veterans’
benefits were handled. In addition, the VA’s protected status reveals that the agency may
be more politically salient than it is normally credited with being. Therefore, influences
from the veterans’ education benefit reform process could have effects for similar
universal policies, though the developments of these policies for civilians did not have a
parallel influence on veterans’ benefits. Accounting for these “spillover” and “spillback”
effects in the policy feedback model provides a critical specification for the effects of
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revisions to public policies. Additionally, increasing the potential scope of policy
influence to include parallel policy areas helps identify ways in which policy reform may
be able to drive potentially contradictory changes in other policies in particular political
contexts.

Data and Methods
Analyzing the development of veterans’ benefit programs requires a careful
approach to the use of qualitative data; recent advances in qualitative methods help hone
the analysis of historical materials into an approach that is both rigorous and theoretically
sound. My approach is best defined as a “detailed historical narrative” form of processtracing, based on the typology of George and Bennett.46 Researchers focusing on
intensive revisions to policy regimes have utilized this method of analysis to best address
not only the differences in policy development over time, but to identify the causal
mechanisms at work in particular stages of policy development.47
The basis for this type of historical analysis is often attributed to cross-national
studies in comparative politics,48 though it can be equally useful for analysis intra-state
change in policies. Hacker notes that scholars can disaggregate complex policy regimes
to offer comparisons between policies that appear similar on face, but in reality feature
significant variance that can be attributed to temporal elements (as well as the actions of
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particular political agents). For example, his research compares the public and private
elements of the American healthcare and retirement systems over time; while not offering
cross-national comparisons, his analysis is framed as a comparison of the same policy
regime at different stages (and thus, with significantly different features and institutional
arrangements).49 Similarly, scholars of reform to existing policies take the original policy
and post-reform policies as comparison points, and analyze the political mechanisms that
affected the post-reform outcomes.50
Such an approach is particularly useful in modeling policy feedback cycles,
wherein researchers are most concerned with the particular pathways through which
initial policies affect politics at a later time.51 The major contribution of this method of
“historically detailed process-tracing” is that it allows for a more refined filtering of the
major elements driving institutional and policy change. This approach is in line with the
method of “historical explanation” best exemplified by Roberts.52 While Roberts notes
that historians may take alternative approaches to offering these types of detailed
narratives, the driving concern of such an analysis should be what specific actions or
events precipitated the event or change in question;53 in line with proponents of processtracing in political science, this type of historically-informed isolation of causal processes
provides not only rich detail in potentially understudied political events, but also the
potential alternate explanations for the effects under study. Process-tracing, then, is more
concerned with answering the question of “why?” in policy change over time, than it is
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with comprehensive narratives; though, when analyzing policy development, the
temporal element remains of primary concern.
In each of the subsequent chapters, I identify the causal pathways to each of the
three effects that I hypothesize: the differentiation of the veterans’ benefit coalition; the
degeneration of the coalition; and the side effects on parallel social policies during
formative moments. Using the historical materials and secondary sources, I map out the
process of legislative development for each of the first four G.I. Bills (and specifically
their education benefit provisions). I indentify the key members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition in their actions surrounding the bill’s development, as well as how this process
(and the actions of this particular group) contributed to the cohesion and effectiveness of
the veterans’ benefit coalition. In addition, I isolate the key changes in the veterans’
education benefit policy regime that allowed for the veterans’ benefit coalition to actually
influence civilian social policy development – in ways that were either helpful or harmful
to the expansion of those programs.
To assess the changes in both the veterans’ benefit coalition and its affects on
parallel policies, I utilize archival materials for any discussion of motivations, strategy,
legislative intent, or statements about any of the other members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition that can be used as evidence of activity within the coalition affecting benefit
legislation. I supplement these archival materials with Congressional testimony and
reports that focus on changes to these veterans’ programs, as well as secondary historical
narratives concerning the political climate in which the changes to the benefits systems
were taking place. Moreover, I also include an analysis of major news publications (via
LexisNexis and proprietary archives of individual publications) to indicate the extent to
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which media attention was following particular legislative developments, as well as to
capture any statements made to the press or public by a member of the veterans’ benefit
coalition. A complete table of archival sources can be found in Table 1 (below).
Table 1: Archival Sources Utilized
Presidential Archives
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Legislative Member Archives
Edith Nourse Rogers Collection
Champ Bennett Clark Collection
William Springer Collection
Olin Teague Collection
Elbert Thomas Collection
Institutional Archives
Legislative Studies Center, National Archives and
Records Administration
Personal Collections
William Atherton Collection
Congressional Testimony,
Congressional Quarterly Database
Hearings, and Committee
Correspondence
News Media Coverage
New York Times archives; Boston Globe archives;
LexisNexis database
I focus on the first four iterations of the G.I. Bill following WWII, which were
signed into law in 1944, 1952, 1966, and 1972. Each of these pieces of legislation dealt
expressly with veterans’ education benefits as a result of military service, though various
secondary programs were also often included alongside the education provisions in each.
I constrain the timeframe from 1943-1973 for two key reasons. First, the first four
iterations of the G.I. Bill are the most similar in their program structure (that is, a federal
system of VA-administered payments for higher education); however, there is still
variance across the cases in terms of program provisions and the concurrent social policy
developments that were advancing alongside those of the veterans’ benefits. Selecting
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cases which feature some varying characteristics will allow me to highlight the ways in
which veterans’ benefit coalition influence directly led to the instances of variances
between the pieces of legislation.54
Second, the first four iterations of the G.I. Bill occurred during America’s
Selective Service program, the official conscription regime. After the establishment of
the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, veteran’s benefits were indeed still offered, though
their program structures shifted to voluntary contribution models (as in the 1984
Montgomery G.I. Bill). Restricting my analysis to a pre-AVF military allows me to
control for the variable of voluntary military service, which could have driven the
veterans’ benefit coalition in different directions had their membership been concerned
with programs for individuals who selected military service in an open labor market.

Plan of the Project
In Chapter 1, I begin with the genesis of modern-day reintegration programs: the
1944 G.I. Bill. Immediately following WWII, veterans’ benefits (via the GI Bill)
represented the most impressive social policy legislation in American history, designed to
help returning veterans integrate back into the economy while simultaneously stabilizing
an economy that was still in its recovery stages. Plans for demobilization that began
before the end of the war (and were focused on broad-based social policies) quickly
shifted to a focus on the effective integration of veterans back into the economy. This
chapter identifies a veterans’ benefit coalition and why they were able to shift national
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focus away from what conservative lawmakers touted as an unnecessary expansion of
government (and “more of the same” as the New Deal era) to an exclusive focus on
veterans; moreover, I suggest that the 1944 bill was as much a product of previous
demands from veterans’ groups as it was a response to the demobilization needs of a
post-WWII economy. The G.I. Bill was able to shift legislative attention away from
broad-based education and unemployment insurance policies in exchange for offering a
corrective for a demobilizing American economy (most notably, an influx of semi-trained
labor), through coalition members’ influence over the National Resource Planning Board
and Roosevelt’s acquiescence to veteran groups’ demands.
Chapter 2 focuses on the benefits afforded to Korean War veterans as a product of
the burgeoning national security state as well as the previous experiences with the 1944
G.I. Bill. The Veterans’ Adjustment Act of 1952 featured fundamental changes to both
education assistance and unemployment compensation, and creates a political debate
about the size of the federal government and the organization of its agencies. The
investigation of the Hoover Commission – and its plans to consolidate the veterans’
benefit program and combine it with other civilian federal programs – creates a potential
point for policy change that is ultimately missed on the part of reformers, and helps
illustrate the power of embedded veteran interests. Most importantly, though, the act
ushers in major changes to the American higher education system, as it codifies the use of
accreditation standards for federal education funding, and draws both public and private
post-secondary schools into a heated debate about the market of higher education. The
investigation of the previous G.I. Bill, as well as the fracture of the veterans’ benefit
coalition over the 1952 legislation, creates a field of contestation over Korean War
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veterans’ education benefits, as well as the reliance on educational training over broadbased income security measures for domestic economic development.
In Chapter 3, I focus on the Vietnam era and the effects of major definitional
changes in “veterans” within existing veterans’ benefit legislation. In 1966, the U.S.
undertakes a major shift in its conceptualization of veterans, including those military
personnel who had served exclusively during peacetime under the category of veterans.
This change follows on the heels of the Great Society initiatives and President Johnson’s
attempts to radically reform the American social policy system. While the Veterans’
Readjustment and benefit Act of 1966 enables peacetime veterans to access federal
benefits, conflict arises among the Johnson Administration, veterans’ groups, and key
administrators who disapproved of the new policy as well as the reductions in veterans’
benefits. The fractures that had occurred during the development of the 1952 legislation
continue to act as a wedge between various sets of conflicting members of the veterans’
benefit coalition; moreover, several members of the coalition begin to identify with the
rising conservative backlash (and its attendant racial animus), driving the coalition into
further conflict.
The rise of conservatism and end of conscription is at the center of Chapter 4,
which encompasses the period of 1967-1973. During this era, veterans’ benefits still
increased under both Nixon and Ford, despite administrations’ pressure to hold benefits
levels constant and make reductions to particular programs. Moreover, even though the
Vietnam War G.I. Bill benefits were far less generous than those offered to WWII
veterans, the access rate for these benefits among returning Vietnam veterans was higher
than that of those who had fought in WWII. Even as Republican legislators pushed for
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major cuts to the American welfare state, they remained supportive to the veterans’
benefit system, going to far as to depart from the White House’s position on the
Readjustment Act of 1972. This chapter investigates how educational benefits regained
some of their momentum – even as unemployment compensation came under fire – as
well as how veterans’ benefits maintained a privileged spot among even some of the
more vocal proponents of fiscal austerity measures at the federal level. The veterans’
benefit coalition remains loosely connected through its common goals, but its alliances
are stressed further as the changing nature of war and society’s response upends the
expected responses to veterans’ education benefits and the responsibility of the country
toward former military personnel.
The concluding chapter reflects on the case of veterans’ benefits and the lessons
that it carries for scholars of institutional development, social policy (particularly in the
areas of education and unemployment insurance), and American political development. I
also reflect on programs that could be used as comparison cases, and how research on the
G.I. Bill can help scholars in other policy fields explain changes to monumental policy
legislation over time.
The influence of veteran’s benefits on American social policy development
carries important lessons for scholars of public policy and welfare state development;
however, policymakers across different policy areas can also take heed from (or comfort
in) the narrative of veterans’ benefit development and its influence on comparative social
policies. The ways in which the heterogeneous veterans’ benefit coalition not only
fractured under the strain of repeated veterans’ education benefit reforms, but was able to
then affect other universal social policies’ development trajectories, suggests that

31!

!

political coalitions may have more power than they realize, even when allied with their
political adversaries. Moreover, such an account changes the traditional explanations for
the rise and eventual stagnation of the American welfare state. Affording an explanatory
role to the veterans’ benefit regime and its supporters helps explain the maintenance of a
“veteran welfare state” in the face of efforts at retrenchment and austerity, as well as the
connections between veterans’ benefits and parallel social policies. The story of the G.I.
Bill, its supporters, and its influence on the American welfare state, all suggest a need to
reevaluate our current models of social policy development and our current perceptions
of the American welfare state’s development trajectory in the post-WWII era.
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CHAPTER 2
THE 1944 G.I. BILL, AN UNLIKELY COALITION, AND THE ROOTS OF POLICY
INFLUENCE
!
“Our greatest potential wealth is in the ability and resourcefulness of the young people
who will be demobilized. The structure for their reallocation must be efficient and
complete, but we know that no matter how vast may be the blueprints, how dynamic the
execution of these plans, these young people will soon take this bomb-pocked world on
their able shoulders and carry it far beyond any goal we may envision.”55 – Brigadier
General Frank T. Hines, Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 1945
World War II marked the first American military conflict in which extensive
economic and policy preparations for the postwar economy began before the conflict had
ended (and when, to some extent, the outcome was not guaranteed). In assessing the
realities of the American labor market and need for economic restructuring following the
end of the conflict, President Franklin Roosevelt, legislators, bureaucrats, and policy
entrepreneurs began the painstaking process of designing a set of policy prescriptions that
had no prior model in either magnitude or intention. As policies for returning veterans
took shape, the implications of this unprecedented social policy development were clear:
a sweeping social welfare program like the G.I. Bill would fundamentally change the
relationship between war and American society while establishing a new, discrete welfare
system for the American veteran.56 Federal government funding for postsecondary
education was the most visible feature of the landmark legislation, and the one that not
only strained the relationships of veterans’ benefit supporters, but also have significant
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implications for the American education system and post-New Deal social policy
planning.
The need for preparing for some 16 million veterans to return to American society
became apparent to lawmakers. The educational attainment of military personnel during
WWII had vastly outpaced that of WWI, and shifted the emphasis of education assistance
programs from high school completion programs and short courses to postsecondary
education. At the end of WWI, only two of every ten service personnel had obtained
education at higher than the grade school level; by 1944, that figure had swelled to seven
in ten. Twice as many service members had high school educations upon entering the
military in WWII than had in WWI, and officer educational attainments continued to
outpace that of enlisted personnel.57 The increased levels of educational attainment
among the service personnel returning from war in 1945 – some sixteen million of them –
meant that the plans for comprehensive reintegration of former service members would
necessarily focus on higher levels of postwar education.
While the idea of supporting veterans’ educational goals seems ephemeral in
retrospect, in reality it was part of a broader political construction that originated with
plans to extend Keynesian economic policies into the Cold War era. These generous
social benefits would never come to fruition, and their demise in nascent planning stages
is often attributed to fear of government largesse or fatigue in a post-New Deal era, the
role of the veterans’ benefit coalition and its divisive politics ultimately played a hand in
contributing to removing an extensive income security program regime from the table in
1944.
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The creation of the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (or G.I. Bill) serves as
the starting point for a complex interaction among varying political actors in society. As
Roosevelt pressured executive committees and members of Congress to begin preparing
for veteran reintegration before the end of the war, varying interests soon found
themselves allied behind a similar policy goal. While these interests eventually coalesced
behind the final version of the G.I. Bill, their disparate policy goals outside the realm of
veterans’ benefits meant a constant tension within the coalition. Moreover, the coalition’s
work to advance benefits for veterans was at the expense of broader education and
unemployment compensation policies for the entire citizenry.

Heterogeneity at the Beginning of the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition
The veterans’ benefit coalition – composed of actors and organizations from the
federal government, veterans’ groups, business, and labor – was unintentionally created
through the emerging needs of the postwar economy. As political actors and policy
entrepreneurs grew attentive to the failure of New Deal-era proposals and the increasing
pressure of the veteran population, various elements of the veterans’ benefit coalition
were pulled into tacit engagement with one another in an effort to establish a generous
education assistance program for returning military personnel. The various members of
the coalition, though at first blush appearing to be synchronized in their policy interest of
veterans’ education benefits, were in fact deeply divided on the necessity and propriety of
a distinct system of benefits for veterans. Moreover, members of the coalition were to
some extent pulled into the coalition in defense of their own proprietary goals and
interests, and were not primarily concerned about demobilizing American service
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personnel. The composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition by 1943 would have as
much to do with the eventual structure of the G.I. Bill’s education assistance program as
it would with each member’s navigation of the Roosevelt-era political climate (and the
subsequent alterations to their political interests and methods of attaining their goals for
their constituents).

The Roosevelt Administration
After Hebert Hoover’s strict reaction to the Bonus Expeditionary Force and the
veteran protesters seeking their adjusted compensation, the election of Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1932 signaled a potential political sea change for America’s veterans. No
longer forced to contend with Hoover’s seemingly callous response to calls for
government provisions, veterans turned out for Roosevelt in the general election and
arguably aided significantly in his electoral victory.58 Roosevelt, for his apparent
sympathy toward the Bonus March and for the struggling working classes, did not
endorse a view of the veteran population that held it as distinct or somehow more
deserving of assistance than the rest of the population. Known for contending that
veterans should not enjoy a special set of social rights as a result of their military service,
Roosevelt was not immediately supportive of expanding veterans’ benefits because he
believed that a comprehensive set of social policies would benefit all citizens, veterans
and non-veterans alike. He utilized his expansive executive order discretion to apply
significant cuts to veterans’ benefits following the National Economy Act of 1933,
reminding veterans that, “the regulations issued are but an integral part of our economy
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program embracing every department and agency of the government to which every
employee is making his or her contribution.”59 Although he later rolled some of these
measures back when they appeared to be too draconian in their scope and effects,
Roosevelt’s administration came under fire early in its tenure for what appeared to be a
sharp change in its sympathy toward the veteran population.
Roosevelt’s attitude toward veterans’ benefits grew more amenable during
America’s involvement in WWII, especially as plans for demobilization began in 1938.
Roosevelt actually had an outline of a plan for returning military personnel, which he
discussed in one his “fireside chats” aired on July 28, 1943. In his speech he called for a
“mustering out” plan for former military personnel that addressed various issues of job
training and unemployment compensation. The six points of his outlined initiative
included “an opportunity for members of the armed services to get further education or
trade training at the cost of their Government.”60 The Roosevelt Administration had made
a rather significant change in its approach to dealing with the issue of returning veterans,
one that had been jumpstarted by the political process of attempting to secure broadbased demobilization programs for the entire citizenry. The Roosevelt Administration
would enter into the legislative process having already had its ambitious goals subdued
by the machinations of other members of the veterans’ benefit coalition. Indeed, the one
agency in which the Roosevelt Administration had likely entrusted an undue amount of
political potential (the National Resources Planning Board) would soon prove to be a
source of disappointment.
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The importance of the executive branch to the veterans’ benefit coalition did not
rest solely in the Oval Office: one of the most important elements of the executive branch
in the G.I. Bill’s development started as a very unlikely source of political potential. The
Natural Resources Planning Board began in 1939 as a centralized agency for the
assessment of the postwar American economy. The Board’s original charter was focused
on analyzing America’s strengths in natural resource production, and identifying the
latent potential for production both at home and abroad. The board and the Federal
Security Agency were two of the victories that Roosevelt won in his attempt at executive
reorganization.61 The NRPB also acted as a safe-haven for some of Roosevelt’s
staunchest supporters and New Deal allies, the most prominent of which was his uncle,
Frederic Delano. While Delano had not garnered significant public attention in his role as
chair of the National Planning Board under the Department of the Interior, his experience
in business and planning did help shape the contours of the New Deal era work programs.
Delano brought with him his vice chairman, political scientist Charles Merriam, whose
credentials in public policy were also desirable for the NRPB’s slated goals.62
William Haber, a professor of economics at the University of Michigan, headed
the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies. Administrators from the Farm
Security Administration, American Public Welfare Association, Department of Labor,
and Federal Security Agency, and VA administrator also contributed to the group’s
research. The culmination of the NRPB’s efforts was Security, Work, and Relief Policies,
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released in December 1941.63 By and large, the NRPB recommendations in 1941 focused
on public works programs supplemented by educational assistance for young Americans;
this as prior attempts at public works like the Civilian Conservation Corps and Works
Progress Administration ended several months later in 1942.64 The NRPB
recommendation that the full regime of all public aid policies fall under the
administrative authority of one agency – effectively layering in more federal control over
social policies and furthering government largesse – was immediately rebuked by
Southern legislators.65 In its 1941 report, the NRPB did not include veterans’ benefits in
their discussion of public aid at all; rather, the report focused solely on programs directed
at the entire citizenry.66
Moreover, the NRPB recommendations that did not delineate between civilians
and veterans (and instead recommended programs to benefit the entire postwar labor
force) were in contrast to the growing emphasis placed on reintegrating military
personnel as a necessary precondition to American economic recovery. Kathleen Frydl
argues that, “in giving an early voice to postwar aims, the Board sounded as ambitious as
it did detached from wartime demands. Such boldness had a welcome home in the United
Kingdom, where the Nazi bombs raining over Britain had diminished the distinction
between military personnel and civilians.”67 Charles Merriam, who sat on the Board from
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its first iteration as the National Planning Board in 1933, expressed publicly that he
believed the NRPB recommendations to have served as the basis for the UK’s Beveridge
plan of postwar reconstruction. Although the Beveridge Plan was released prior to the
NRPB’s report, Merriam noted that the ideas that were so harshly criticized in the
American plan found support in the UK.68 The NRPB recommendations seemed to
connect back to the beginnings of the slowly-dissolving programs of the New Deal era,
and the plans were met with a complete lack of funding for federal work programs.69
However, the NRPB soon changed its tack and turned its focus to the personnel
aspect of demobilization, drafting a report on demobilization of the armed forces
following the end of the war.70 Merriam argued that the NRPB’s reports served as the
“basis” of the G.I. Bill that was “adopted enthusiastically by Congress.”71 Whereas
previous reports had focused more on the general population, the NRPB’s
recommendations soon narrowed on the sixteen million returning service personnel as the
prime target for government assistance.72 Based on recommendations from the
Conference on Post-War Adjustment of Personnel (chaired by Floyd Reeves, a professor
of education and administration, then at the University of Chicago), the NRPB called for
the full slate of unemployment compensation, vocational training and rehabilitation, and
educational assistance that would later be featured in the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill was to
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help veterans in “picking up the broken threads of interrupted education,” and a means to
help them successfully enter the labor force after their compulsory service.73
Although the NRPB report initially represented the best chance for Roosevelt to
extend his New Deal policies into the early 1940s, the inability of the board to
successfully position work assistance programs as viable responses to the postwar
economic planning debate only further hampered any hope that the New Deal coalition
had in restoring the efforts of the “alphabet agencies” like the WPA. The NRPB
recommendations would be one of the most important points at which coalition members
were able to limit the field of viable policy options for postwar economic planning, even
for a Congress that was ready to take decisive action.

Congress
Although New Deal policies had thrown ideological divides into sharp relief
during the prewar period, the need for reintegration policies brought both Republicans
and Democrats to the table in Congress. At issue was how both sides would reconcile
their competing perspectives on federal intervention, as well as the extent to which
income security policies would feature prominently for a demobilized society. As with
the broader veterans’ benefit coalition, the Congressional allies of veterans would come
from opposing sides of the aisle, but with a common goal of providing educational
benefits for returning military personnel. Their own personal agendas regarding the New
Deal, combined with the widespread popularity of assisting veterans upon their return,
made for similar policy goals among legislatures, even as their individual perspectives on
social welfare policy differed widely.
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One of the most critical figures in the House was Rep. John Rankin, a Mississippi
Democrat whose racial animus was well-known his political dealings. Rankin chaired the
House Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation (the precursor to the modern-day
Veterans’ Affairs Committee), and was known for being amenable to veterans’ benefit
issues in general. However, his concern with a potential readjustment program lay
squarely in the question of state control: how would a major federal economic
intervention for returning veterans affect southern states’ autonomy?74
Another important player in the House was Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers, a
Massachusetts Republican who had worked with disabled veterans in the Red Cross.
Although Rogers despised New Deal largesse and federal intervention, she was especially
concerned with issues related to veterans (most notably healthcare concerns, although
later her interests would extend to broader issues of reintegration).75 Thus, two of the
most important advocates for veterans within the House were united against a major
federal intervention in social policy, though for different reasons. Rankin’s concerns were
focused on the potential national-level administration of a major social welfare program
(even if it was directed only at a “deserving” subset of the population), while Rogers’
concerns were with reining in the potential for another New Deal era response to threats
of large-scale unemployment and the need for skilled workers in a new labor market.
The list of power players in the Senate regarding veterans’ legislation was more
difficult to determine. Legislation concerning veterans’ benefits was split among the
Finance and Labor and Public Works Committees in the Senate; without a devoted
standing committee, different portions of veterans’ benefits were often assigned to either
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committee. However, Elbert Thomas (D-UT) was on both the Military Affairs and
Education and Labor Committees. Thomas was a former professor of political science at
the University of Utah, and had been nominated by the Utah Democratic State
Convention to challenge (and ultimately defeat) Reed Smoot in the 1932 election.76 A
loyal supporter of Roosevelt and the New Deal initiatives, Thomas was also the chair of
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, and characterized by a calm and steady
attitude that would stand in marked contrast to more bombastic legislative personalities
(like Representative John Rankin).77
Thus, while the House held conservative Democrats and Republicans prepared to
assist veterans for reasons more amenable to conservative voters, the main driver in the
Senate was a New Deal Democrat with prior experience in education policy and labor
policy (having supported the establishment of the National Labor Relations Board).
Despite their opposing agendas, these Congressional leaders figured prominently in the
policy process surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill. Moreover, the distinct differences between
and among these legislators highlights the competing interests at work in the veterans’
benefit coalition. Legislators across the aisles would soon find themselves aligned with
the powerful veterans’ organizations, which had their own agendas regarding how
veterans should be treated upon their return, as well as how the federal and state
governments should construct the policy regime to support these reintegration plans.
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The Veterans’ Organizations
As the plans for the postwar economic recovery programs began to take shape, the
veterans’ groups were poised to make large demands of legislators and Roosevelt – and
potentially achieve their goals. The ability of the groups to mobilize a large and relatively
captive membership (some of which was cross-listed among more than one veterans’
group, depending on prior military service) was one element of their political power. The
rest of it lay squarely within the American Legion’s legislative prowess, relative
efficiency, and the dearth of truly competitive plans in late 1943 and early 1944. The
veterans’ groups would soon emerge as one of the most important – if not the most
critical – member of the veterans’ benefit coalition, and the ones whose policy proposals
would eventually help drive a wedge in between many of the other members.
The political strength of the veterans’ groups became most apparent during the
interwar years, as veterans of WWI struggled to deal with the same economic pressures
as the rest of the country and began to mobilize for adjusted compensation, or what
popularly became known as a “bonus.” Though framed by opponents as an extra
incentive for military service, the Legion, VFW, and other veterans groups framed the
adjusted compensation as repayment for the opportunity cost of military service borne by
WWI veterans. Veterans’ groups were able to mobilize alongside Progressive reformers –
the same ones who earlier had decried the excesses and corrupt administration of the
Civil War benefits system – and influence key Congressional supporters to push an
adjusted compensation measure through the legislature. The Bonus March, in which
veterans (mobilized by various veterans organizations) camped out in Washington D.C.
in protest, only furthered to establish veterans as an important social and political group
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within American society. The politics of the bonus were critical to the establishment and
success of these organizations, as they further reinforced their political efficacy. The
mobilization for the bonus was even able to bring together the more conservative Legion
with other veterans’ groups in an alliance supporting further benefits for veterans.78
The American Legion, founded by a group of officers who had served in the
American Expeditionary Force, was established in 1919 with the expressed purpose of
providing a vehicle for the mobilization of WWI military personnel:
The American Legion was in no sense a ‘spontaneous expression
of purpose by those millions of Americans who helped crush
autocracy.’ On the contrary, it is evident that it was intended to
circumvent any such spontaneous organization on the part of exservice men. An organization of ex-service men seemed inevitable
at the close of the War. The morale of the American army after the
armistice was unsatisfactory. A small group of high ranking
military officers in the American Expeditionary Forces was called
together to devise ways and means to overcome this lack of
morale. The American Legion not only promised a means to
improved morale through providing an avenue of wholesome
diversion for ex-service men but it also provided an organization
along lines acceptable to the prevailing leadership.79
The Legion, then, was from its inception a more elite-driven organization than its fellow
veterans’ groups, having been created by the officer class and representing some of the
most powerful business leaders after their return from military conflict. Throughout its
early years, the Legion continued to galvanize its membership around the issue of
veterans’ benefits, using existing federal and state benefits as inroads to criticize
government care of veterans and lobby for more generous benefits.80 The Legion would
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emerge during the legislative battle over the G.I. Bill as one of the most powerful
lobbying groups in the country, and would ultimately add construction of the G.I. Bill –
as well as the passage of the veterans’ education assistance program – to its credits.
The membership of the American Legion in 1943 – at some 1,750,000 members –
established it as the largest of the major veterans’ organizations. Content with Rankin’s
leadership in the House, the Legion was willing to let the Committee on World War
Veterans’ Legislation (the predecessor to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs) handle the
development of veterans’ benefits for returning service personnel.81
Likewise, the smaller Veterans of Foreign Wars (at about 500,000 strong) was
willing to place its faith in Rankin’s committee. VFW Commander in Chief Charles
Schoeninger remarked in testimony before the committee that, “Enemies of veteran
legislation have often accused this committee of being too far out in front of the Congress
and the people in approving the obligation of public funds for veteran benefits.”82 At their
national encampment in September 1943, the VFW had adopted a ten-point plan for the
reintegration of World War II veterans into the American economy. Their second point
included federal educational aid to honorably discharged military personnel who could
not complete their education due to their military service. Interestingly enough, the VFW
called for independence of the VA for medical, vocational, and disability programs for
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veterans, but made no specific recommendation as to whether the agency should also be
in charge of the education assistance program.83
Veterans groups continued to remain politically salient through the debate
surrounding the G.I. Bill as well, and were instrumental in the legislation’s creation and
content. The process of developing the Bill would, however, throw their minor
differences into harsh relief, as the groups’ membership bases and interests collided
during the legislative process. Moreover, the groups’ politics – namely, those of the
American Legion – would be the catalyst for major disagreements about how the
veterans’ education assistance program would work on the ground. The veterans’ groups
would ultimately side with conservative Democrats and Republicans – as well as business
lobby groups – to help curtail the influence of pro-New Deal legislators and executive
agencies (like the NRPB). Moreover, the groups would provide the necessary political
muscle to maintain the VA’s sole discretionary authority and administration of the
veterans’ benefit regime, even as calls for alternative administrative arrangements came
from various actors and institutions. The veterans’ groups, then, were poised to be one of
the most important – and divisive – members of the veterans’ benefit coalition as the G.I.
Bill came into development.

The Veterans’ Administration
As WWII drew to a close, the VA was facing its first demobilization crisis as a
unified body. Following the pension corruption of the Civil War era, the VA had been
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split into discrete agencies that dealt with pensions and war risk insurance separately
through the end of World War I. By 1931, however, the Veterans’ Bureau had been
reintegrated into a single unit, with the hopes that a unitary processing system would help
allay much of the backlog and claim mismanagement that had plagued the administrators
of the modest WWI veterans’ benefit programs.84
Though recently reformed, the VA was not insulated against the New Deal-era
governmental realignment. Roosevelt had attempted, in fact, to remove the centralized
control of the VA to the proposed Department of Welfare in his original 1937 executive
reorganization plan. However the failure of Roosevelt’s “packing” attempt and alienation
of conservative Democrats from the party established a strong opposition to any further
encroachment of executive power on the Roosevelt Administration’s behalf.85
Additionally, the threat of the VA being transferred into a new Department of Welfare set
the veterans’ organizations on the defensive, and they lobbied heavily against any
proposed changes to the independence of the VA. 86
The VA was able to maintain its independence by virtue of the veterans’ groups
being so invested in the agency’s success (as their mouthpiece to not only the President,
but Congress as well). In fact, by June 1943, Administrator Hines was seeking more
influence for the Veterans’ Administration than what the White House was willing to
offer. In a memo to Roosevelt, Bureau of the Budget Director Harold Smith noted that
Hines was pressing for “full military status” for the VA, in line with the Departments of
the Army and Navy. The Administration tried to placate Hines by offering to station
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active-duty personnel at VA hospitals as workers (thereby allowing Hines a supervisory
position over active military personnel), but Hines ignored the offer. Smith offered to
Roosevelt to let Hines “take his problem to Congress without any commitment as to its
relation to your program.”87

Organized Labor
Though under-referenced in the discussion about the G.I. Bill, the role of
organized labor was an important one during the debate about postwar veterans’ benefits.
While both labor unions and veterans’ groups looked ahead to swelling membership, both
also had to be concerned about the changing political contexts in which they would soon
have to exert power. While veterans’ groups concerned themselves with VA autonomy
and securing a comprehensive set of benefits for their anticipated constituencies,
organized labor had other concerns; namely, how would the unions utilize postwar
veterans’ benefits to increase their influence in the American workforce, and could they
leverage the new veteran population to their advantage in this initiative?
Leadership within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) recognized the
growing importance of an alliance (or at least the semblance of one) with the returning
veteran population; taking any position on veterans’ benefits that would appear to run
counter to the liberalization of education and employment services would paint labor
unions as “callous to the sacrifices and needs” of the returning service personnel.88
Indeed, labor’s apparent antipathy toward the American war effort in the past – and the
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increasing reliance on the heuristic of military service as the only acceptable form of
contribution to the wartime economic effort – placed it in a precarious position as
national attention turned toward expanding the veterans’ benefit regime.
To help establish the beneficial connection to the veteran population, CIO
president Philip Murray and members of the executive committee formed the CIO
Veterans Committee in 1943. The committee was especially concerned with
disseminating information on employment guidelines to CIO affiliates, but would later
become more vocal in Congressional testimony on the G.I. Bill.89 In addition, the
utilization of white veterans from the South to campaign on behalf of the CIO’s Southern
Organizing Committee (SOC), a membership and organizing drive (called “Operation
Dixie”) designed to increase the CIO’s presence within Southern industry. As the SOC
director Van Bittner noted, “at least if a young man had spent three or for years in the
South Pacific, in Europe or in Asia…nobody could accuse him or them of attempting to
destroy American because they happened to be members of the CIO organizing staff.”90
The necessity behind securing veteran support lay at the heart of the strategy behind the
CIO’s “Operation Dixie,” though the campaign was effectively stalled by 1946 as the
more radical and communist elements were purged from the SOC and CIO more broadly.
Though CIO leadership thought that an increased share of the veteran population could
make up the difference of the purged radical element, the failure of Operation Dixie to
establish the CIO’s presence in southern industrial sectors would eventually be tied (at
least in part) to the inability of leadership to successfully mobilize the veteran workforce
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in the South.91 This failure on the part of the CIO to gain membership (and moreover,
credibility at the national level among a leery American public) was a direct result of the
process of developing the G.I. Bill benefit program: a costly investment for the CIO and
American labor more broadly.
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was differently situated as the process
of veterans’ benefit reform gained national attention. AFL leadership was characterized
as more conservative, or certainly less progressive when compared to that of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) especially after William Green succeeded
Samuel Gompers in its leadership.92 Like the CIO, the AFL had begun an aggressive
campaign to recruit new members in the South; however, unlike the CIO, the AFL was
less concerned with racial segregation in areas and factories, and often turned a blind eye
to discriminatory practices while it attempted to build membership.93 While the CIO
struggled with the extent to which it could allow the practices of Southern states to divide
its potential members, the AFL sidestepped questions of racial equality and continued
increasing its membership base through aggressive campaigning. The AFL would soon
find itself on the outskirts of social policy development as the government turned a blind
eye to the domestic labor force and concentrated its attention on the returning service
personnel – exactly as the veterans’ organizations and others in the veterans’ benefit
coalition had planned.
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The Coalition at the Outset
Overall, the veterans’ benefit coalition was comprised of several sets of political
actors and institutions with a wide range of interests and ideological commitments
entering the postwar planning phase. Though New Deal fatigue would indeed be a
driving political factor throughout deliberations about how to address the demobilization
of the American war effort, the internal politics of the veterans’ benefit coalition remains
a critical explanation for the ensuing political debate over the 1944 G.I. Bill. The
conflicted nature of the coalition, combined with its inability to converge on both the type
of veterans’ benefits needed and the best method through which those benefits would be
administered, established powerful fault lines within the coalition as 1939 drew to a
close. The coming battle over the G.I. Bill would deepen the extant divides between
members of the coalition, with many of the disagreements turning on the role that the VA
would play in the administration of the benefits, as well as the ways in which the benefits
could potentially aggravate racial animus in the southern states. It would ultimately be the
process of creating the G.I. Bill that would allow certain members of the coalition to
make major political gains, while sowing the seeds for explosive interactions for years to
come.

The Strain of Policy Development
Although the veterans’ benefit coalition appeared to be working toward a unified
goal, the legislative process surrounding the creation of the G.I. Bill soon exposed
friction within the coalition. The various interests that were invested in the passage of
veterans’ education benefits were still beholden to their respective constituencies, and as
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such were restrained in their ability to potentially advocate for particular provisions
within the legislation. The one member of the coalition that seemed to have a blank check
from its membership to pursue the G.I. Bill was the American Legion. The role of the
Legion especially would highlight the imbalance of power in the coalition, as the
American Legion moved to center stage in bringing the bill to Congress.
Henry Colmery, a past National Commander of the Legion, would be one of the
driving forces behind the legislation. A former lawyer and veteran, Colmery gained
friendship with Representative Edith Nourse Rogers during a debate over appropriations
for a veterans’ hospital.94 Colmery and fellow Legion member (and former Commander)
John Stelle drafted the basis for the G.I. Bill during a Legion-enforced sequestration in
December 1943 and January 1944, and whose connections to the World War Veterans’
Committee would help expedite the bill’s passage. The Legion drafted the “Bill of Rights
for G.I. Joe and G.I. Jane,” a comprehensive piece of legislation that addressed education,
medical benefits, disability and unemployment compensation, and various other types of
government subsidies (such as housing and farm aid) for returning service personnel.95
The Legion mobilized the recent psychological research emerging at the time, which
suggested that veterans would be unable to successfully return to the workforce unless
they received proper training; worse yet, these veterans might actually be more of a harm
to society than a benefit.96 Framing the debate about reintegration in terms of a
forthcoming crisis was one of the major ways in which the Legion was able to gain both
popular and legislative attention. Similarly, the shift in rhetoric towards the “deserving”
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postwar hero meant that military personnel would be lauded for their achievements while
domestic workers who had taken part in the war effort (including union labor) would be
relegated to inferior positions in the postwar society.97
The Legion’s framing had immediate consequences for the tenuous alliance
among the veterans’ groups. The Disabled American Veterans (DAV) – which identified
itself as the “smallest of the large organizations, but largest of the small organizations”98
– immediately took a stand against the Legion’s framing of the need for postwar
education. The DAV decried the method by which the Legion collapsed the issues of
disabled veterans with able-bodied veterans, thereby markedly expanding the VA’s
jurisdiction (not to mention its potential program oversight). By effectively framing all
veterans as being in need of the same types of services that had heretofore been limited to
those disabled through military service, the Legion exploded the concept of the
“deserving veteran” and have legislators an inroad for expanding the veterans’ benefit
regime far beyond its prior scope.99
Similarly, the VFW did not fall immediately in line with the Legion in supporting
the omnibus legislation. The Legion was concerned that the education assistance benefits
were too easily conflated with adjusted compensation, the official term for the “bonus”
that had become so politically volatile just a few years’ prior.100 Moreover, the VFW
claimed that the Legion bill’s “omnibus” quality did not render it a panacea for postwar
economic revitalization, and that such legislation might actually negatively impact the
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disabled veterans already being serviced by the VA.101 The Legion’s initiative in drafting
the veterans’ benefit legislation did not draw the veterans’ groups closer together;
paradoxically, the common goal of securing better living and working conditions for
former military personnel actually drive a wedge in the veterans’ benefit coalition. The
individual group interests could not be subordinated to the common goal of omnibus
legislation, and as such the fractures in the coalition began to emerge at the outset of the
legislative battle over the bill.
The veterans’ groups, during their debates both before Congress and in the media,
began to worry about the ability of the VA to hold onto its administrative authority over
the benefit regime. Although the Federal Security Agency was one of the few of
Roosevelt’s political endeavors that narrowly escaped the crackdown against the 1937
executive reorganization, it was still on thin political ice at the beginning of the
legislative process surrounding the G.I. Bill. In September 1943, a column in the
Washington Post that had speculated about the VA being absorbed into the FSA sparked
an immediate reaction from the Legion. National Commander Roane Waring wrote to
Roosevelt’s secretary Stephen Early in an attempt to verify the rumor, stating that the
“expressed mandates of the American Legion down through its years of existence are
directed to the independence of the Veterans’ Administration from any other agency, and
to its responsibility to the President and Congress direct.”102 In a memo to Budget
Director Harold Smith, Early referenced the Legion’s concerns and added, “I hop there is
no truth to this rumor…to my opinion something should be said, particularly if the rumor
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is without basis or fact. The Legion is entitled to this information, I believe.”103 Early
reassured Waring that the VA would retain its independence apart from the FSA, and that
there were no intentions to bring the VA under the umbrella of the FSA in the future.104
The veterans’ groups, despite their in-fighting and disagreements about the ways in
which the government should address veterans in the postwar era, seemed to understand
that holding on to the VA’s influence in government – and its independence from other
agencies – was the most potent force they had to affect political change.
The House began hearings on the Legion Bill in January of 1944, and continued through
March of the same year. Title II of the legislation focused on the education assistance for
non-disabled veterans, and it was at this point that the Legion stressed the economic
implications for the broader citizenry (and not just the returning service personnel).
Testifying before Congress, Legion National Commander Warren Atherton stressed that
there would be a “very, very great problem of fitting eleven or twelve million service
men and women back into the economic structure of the country.”105
Edith Rogers, a staunch Republican from Massachusetts who rallied against the
largesse of New Deal programs, questioned the ability of the VA to handle to education
assistance claims in addition to the predicted increase in medical and disability claims.
Rogers asked Legion National Commander Warren Atherton (before the House World
War Veterans Legislation Committee) if the VA could handle the program better than an
alternative department. Atherton made the Legion’s previous preference clear when he
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claimed that the VA would not only have the best experience in administering the
education program, but that splitting up the education assistance program from the other
veterans’ benefit policies would lead to confusion, mishandled claims, and even
competition among the VA and other agencies “to try to handle more of this and more of
that.”106
Warren Atherton, the Commander of the Legion, railed against Rankin, who he
claimed was stalling the report of the G.I. Bill out of committee due to his disdain for the
unemployment compensation provisions of the bill. Atherton noted that others who had
not served in the military during the war – both the “loyal war worker” and the “draft
dodger” – would be able to lay claim to unemployment protections while the veteran
could not find employment opportunities.107
For the CIO – and labor unions in general – one of the most difficult areas to
navigate was the racial animus of the Southern states and the resulting effects that these
pro-segregation politics had upon labor’s ability to mobilize. While unions sought to
capitalize on the resurgence of veterans back into the American labor market (and
potentially a better trained and more educated labor force at that, due to the potential
benefits of the G.I. Bill), the Jim Crow South presented intense obstacles for organizing
at the local level. This difficulty in determining the best course of action for mobilizing
Southern workers – combined with the opposition of business leaders
Interestingly, by this point the Roosevelt Administration was well in line with the
pervasive call for a generous education assistance program for veterans, though perhaps
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was not ready to extend the timeframe as far as the veterans’ groups would have liked.
After his July 1943 fireside chat laid out the general premise of the need to educate
veterans, Roosevelt elaborated on his plans in a speech to Congress on October 27 of the
same year. In his address, Roosevelt called for up to one year of college assistance for
returning service personnel, with a “limited number” holding special aptitude receiving
up to two or three years of education assistance.108 Interestingly, White House Special
Counsel Samuel Rosenmann did not note the discrepancy between the more generous
Legion bill and that offered by Roosevelt in his earlier speeches. In a memo to Roosevelt
comparing the Administration’s preferred provisions and those contained in the G.I. Bill
as passed, Rosenthal only noted that, “the president…recommended the enactment of
legislation providing post-war educational opportunities for service personnel.”109
However, in a memo to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosenmann noted that the Bill carried
out Roosevelt’s recommendations “with a few exceptions.”110
Rosenmann

did

not

highlight

the

discrepancy

between

Roosevelt’s

recommendation for the duration of benefits and those outlined by the Legion (and which
eventually made it into the G.I. Bill), but it is important to note that Roosevelt’s original
guidelines for the education assistance benefits were significantly expanded through the
efforts of the Legion and its supporters. Far from being a way to recover lost time in
postsecondary education or to take advantage of so-called “refresher” courses being
developed for returning military personnel, the benefits as enacted by the G.I. Bill meant
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a wholesale funding of college education was available for millions of American
veterans. Such an extensive program was not originally outlined by the Roosevelt
administration, and the White House did not appear willing to attempt to constrain the
benefit package back to its original vision once the legislative battle had begun.
In a letter to Senator Elbert Thomas, American Council on Education President
George Zook noted that demobilization plans that included the higher education sector
would indeed have comprehensive effects for the country’s economic development. Zook
noted, “In a very real sense the problem is, therefore, not only one of helping those young
people whose education has been interrupted or shortened by service in the armed forces,
but also one of national interest.”111
The American Council on Education had, in fact, been anticipating the integration
of higher education aid into demobilization plans for some time. Although education
assistance had not been a provision of prior programs for veterans following military
conflicts, the Council was clearly anticipating that postsecondary schools would play a
role in the forthcoming reintegration planning. In the summer of 1943, the Council
solicited the opinions of its member institutions through a formal survey, and collected
responses from over 230 colleges and universities (split evenly between private and
public institutions). The consensus of the questionnaire results suggested that the
Council’s membership were receptive to some program of federal aid at the individual
level, and that (unremarkably) the postsecondary schools were reluctant to accommodate
the influx of students using any type of institutional subsidies. The Council’s stated
position was that it would support investment at the federal level in the veteran
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reintegration effort through education assistance, but that it would prefer if state- and
local-level accreditation procedures were in place to ensure that reputable institutions
were in receipt of the funds.112 At the same time, the Council was also reporting to the
NRPB an equally vague set of recommendations that placed the onus for postwar
education training funds on the federal government, without specifying a particular
method of administration or delineation of eligibility criteria. Moreover, the suggestions
were based on a small program in the state of Wisconsin, which had awarded modest
stipends to WWI veterans who were state residents and seeking education assistance after
high school.113
In October 1943, Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT) introduced S. 1509, “The
Servicemen’s Education and Training Act of 1943.” The bill called for postsecondary and
vocational training aid for veterans who had served at least six months since the
beginning of WWII, and included a modest subsidy of $50 per month to cover lodging
and other expenses related to undertaking a college or vocational degree. Most notably,
the bill was silent on the subject of administration of the veteran education assistance
program, and did not refer to a specific agency in reference to implementation or
oversight.114 The senator had been meeting with representatives from both the American
Council on Education and certain postsecondary schools,115 and the bill represented the
ideals of demobilization that were quickly taking hold at the national level. Thomas
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introduced his legislation to the committee, and attempted to wrap up the hearing on the
proposal by mid-December.116
A backlash against the bill immediately followed, coming from a multitude of
angles and which would eventually squelch the Thomas bill (to the satisfaction of both
the veterans’ groups and some of the postsecondary institutions). Initially, some
vocational schools and training facilities expressed concern over the Thomas bill’s lack
of stipulation of agency control, claiming that it would effectively present Roosevelt with
a “blank check” to the federal government, rather than leaving the power to administer
the program in the hands of the states and localities (for which groups like the American
Vocational Association and National Council of Chief State School Officers expressed a
preference). Perhaps most importantly, the vocational and state schools were concerned
that the Thomas bill would provide the leeway needed for Roosevelt to either create a
new agency to administer the veterans’ education benefit program, or place power over
the program in the hands of an agency with no experience in higher education program
administration.117
Though the Thomas bill was destined to come into direct conflict with the
Rankin- and Legion-backed plan emerging from the House, the resistance on the part of
educators to the Thomas bill foreshadowed coming conflicts about the administration of
the education assistance program. As May began, the House entered into deliberations
about the G.I. Bill and the question of administering veterans’ education benefits more
broadly. The question of state administration loomed large as the hearing opened, and
immediately drew a line in the House between two distinct groups: those who wanted the
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VA to administer a veterans’ education assistance program, and those who (for a variety
of reasons) stood opposed to the agency having control over the policy program. Rankin
argued on behalf of the VA, noting that he was “in favor of keeping the rights of the
States and keeping as many bureaucrats out as possible.”118
One veterans’ group that was not completely aligned with the stated goals of the
fellow veterans’ organizations was that of the Disabled American Veterans. As the House
continued deliberations on the legislation, DAV national director Millard Rice warned
that the proposed legislation would “overload” the Veterans’ Administration. Because the
agency would be vested with not only disability claims (as was the primary interest of the
DAV), but also the education program (and associated programs for reintegration, Rice
argued that the VA would not be able to keep abreast of the large influx of claims that
would soon materialize. “The Veterans Administration,” Rice claimed presciently,
“would shortly become a badly overloaded ‘administrative monstrosity.’”119
The Legion would emerge with the major victory. Addressing fellow former
members of the Legion, then-National Commander Warren Atherton claimed, “The
Legion and Auxiliary have had very little recognition of the great service they rendered to
the Nation and the Veterans of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, through the self-help
provisions of the G.I. Bill. Few beneficiaries know who made it possible for them to start
a new life.”120
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Spillover, Spillback, and the Influence of Veterans’ Benefits on Social Policy
The End of the New Deal Era Hope: A Focus on Veterans, Not Citizens
The process of developing the G.I. Bill led to a new focus on the American
veteran within both government and society. The Legion had consciously framed the
veteran as a hero in need of increased attention and governmental support, and in doing
so had created a privileged class of citizens as well as a more powerful lobbying
coalition. A solicitor in the White House Office of Special Counsel noted in a memo to
Roosevelt advisor Samuel Rosenmann that the G.I. Bill would help strengthen the ability
of the veterans’ organizations (specifically the Legion, VFW, and DAV) to assist in the
mustering-out process when military personnel returned home.121 The G.I. Bill would be
the beginning of veterans’ groups’ influence in politics as they became an integral part of
maintaining, administering, and reforming the veterans’ benefit regime through the
autonomy offered by the VA.
In a letter to White House Special Counsel Samuel Rosenmann, VA
Administrator Frank Hines notes that Roosevelt’s approval of the G.I. Bill “rounds out
the Government’s program, in so far as veterans’ benefits are concerned, for restoring out
service men and women as nearly as possible to the status they would have occupied
except for [military] service...”122 Indeed, the G.I. Bill stand in stark relief to the New
Deal era programs which had focused on universal social benefits and large-scale income
security initiatives. The G.I. Bill, though by appearances a piece of legislation narrowly
targeted to benefit a subset of the population, took the place of broad-based policies for a
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postwar economy in the years following the end of the conflict. Despite the National
Resource Planning Board’s recommendations for more work-assistance programs, or the
campaigns by the labor unions to increase the presence of the American worker, the
eventual outcome of demobilization planning was legislation constructed to
simultaneously benefit sixteen million people while foreclosing parallel policies for the
rest of the country.
Roosevelt, as expected, garnered praise from the veteran population for the
passage of the G.I. Bill which was, as Senator Bennett Champ Clark claimed, “received
with acclaim and due appreciation not only by the veterans of all wars, but by the
mothers and fathers and loved ones on the home front in the present conflict.”123 After
returning from a country-wide tour, VA Administrator Frank Hines sent a memo to
Roosevelt (via Roosevelt’s close friend and advisor, Edwin Watson) that he was
“optimistic on the political prospects” because “the veterans…are all for the
President.”124 The development of specified policies for veterans would serve to increase
the education and social mobility of an entire generational cohort – one that would use its
increased resources and civic skills to become heavily involved in politics and
associational life.125

Changes to Higher Education Policy
Professors hypothesized that postwar higher education would actually be more
efficient, due to universities’ needs to handle the exigencies of mobilization and the
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permeation of war’s effects into the classrooms. One educator argued that “the premium
put on speed in training for war functions has resulted in the squeezing out of water and
vapor from courses of study.”126 Post-secondary schools did in fact adapt to the onslaught
of veterans, but not without a period of painful growth that threw into sharp contrast the
higher education system’s inability to meet the needs of a large influx of students. As
returning veterans crowded classrooms and dormitories, schools revamped curricula and
focused on more “practical” or applied degrees tailored to a mature veteran student.127
Wilbur Cohen – who would later become the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, predicted that the veterans’ benefit regime would not only continue to be
generous in comparison to that of other countries, but that the entitlements in the
programs would continue to be liberalized as time went on.128 Indeed, the veterans’
education assistance program would become codified and renewed with each of
America’s military engagements. It would be future iterations of the legislation that
would create even more changes in American higher education, as the provision of
payments directly to universities under the 1944 G.I. Bill would become a point of
contestation for reformers in the early 1950s.

The Rise of the Veterans’ Administration
Perhaps the most important effect of the G.I. Bill’s codification of a generous
veterans’ benefit system is the durable shift in the role of the VA in American politics.
From the debates about how to structure the education assistance program to the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126

Louis Wirth, “Postwar Political and Social Conditions and Higher Education” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 231 (January 1944), 154-162. 155.
127
Frydl, The G.I. Bill.
128
Wilbur J. Cohen, “The Federal Government’s Program for Ex-Servicemen,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 238 (March 1945), 64.

65!

!

questions about state versus federal administration of all veterans’ benefits, the proposal
to locate the power over veterans’ benefits into a singular agency moved to the forefront
as the most politically viable option, if not the most logical for benefit administration.
In a memo from Solicitor Edward Odom to White House Special Counsel Samuel
Rosenmann, Odom notes that the administrative provisions of the legislation are,
according to the House committee, “not intended to be the last word on the subject.”129
Indeed the VA’s standing was not completely ensured by the signing of the G.I.
Bill, though the legislation and its attendant swell in policy provisions would soon elevate
the VA to a major political player in the years to come. VA Administrator Frank Hines
argued, ultimately unsuccessfully, for a seat at Cabinet meetings to Roosevelt. In
declining to invite Hines to participate, Roosevelt said, “it would be unwise to further
increase the number of persons attending the cabinet meetings. You know how those
things go.”130 In coming reforms to the G.I. Bill, though, the VA would successfully
guard against Congressional attempts to dismantle the agency and remove the
administration of the veterans’ education assistance program out from its purview. The
VA would eventually prove durable in not only its sphere of influence, but capable of
utilizing a powerful lobbying network to maintain its policy regime.

Conclusion
The G.I. Bill remains a critical moment for American social policy development,
and for good reason: the watershed legislation ushered in sweeping changes to American
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education and social mobility more broadly. However, the roots of the G.I. Bill are often
understudied by political scientists, leaving an incomplete story that highlights the
Legion’s mobilization or Roosevelt’s initial resistance, but little else. The fact is that the
creation of the veterans’ benefit coalition which emerged before the 1944 G.I. Bill was an
important political turning point, and one whose politics would affect veterans’ policies
and related social welfare policies.
The heterogeneity of the coalition is notable, especially in light of the policy
feedback model’s predictions concerning interests surrounding issue-specific policies.
The disparate interests held together by a desire for generous readjustment assistance for
military personnel highlighted the growing importance of the veterans’ lobby, the
missteps of labor in attempting to grow its ranks (especially in the South), and the
motivation of Congressional leaders to join the legislative process early to secure their
particular interests with respect to program design and administration.
Beyond the differing perspectives and interests in the coalition, the process of
policy development helped create further schisms between and among coalition
members. The White House especially was forced to move away from broad-scale
postwar planning and instead to focus much of its investment ability on programs for
returning veterans. These changes caused Roosevelt to shift away from his earlier, more
egalitarian view concerning the ability of veterans to claim benefits above and beyond
what a civilian would be able to. Moreover, the process highlighted rifts within the
veterans’ lobby, as the American Legion soon emerged as the most influential
organization among the three major groups at the time. Lastly, the struggles across party
lines would pit supporters and opponents of the New Deal against one another, with fears
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of federal intervention in the economy and race relations driving conservatives towards a
tacit acceptance of the legislation (but only within their preferred, state-level
administrative design).
The legislative process driven by a fractured coalition would serve as the starting
point for the next iteration of the G.I. Bill. The coalition members could not have known
then that the way in which they shaped the contours of the veterans’ education benefit
system would act as a catalyst for policies focused on the next American veteran cohort.
Indeed, the 1944 G.I. Bill set the stage for a new version of the veterans’ benefit
coalition, and a new political strategy for maintaining the generosity of the education
benefit program – as well as the control of the program by the VA.
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CHAPTER 3
THE KOREA G.I. BILL, COALITION FRACTURE, AND ENDURING EFFECTS ON
HIGHER EDUCATION

The case study of the 1944 G.I. Bill provides clear evidence of the existence and
political power of the veterans’ benefit coalition, as well as its widespread political
influence. Not only was the coalition able to band together in the face of questions about
demobilization policy and the size of the federal government; it was also able to unite
disparate political actors behind a common goal of education and training programs for
returning service members. The coalition members were not only able to achieve the
establishment of an unprecedented education program; they were able to do so in a way
that protected their own interests in the process. Moreover, the spillover and spillback
effects of the original G.I. Bill were the results of concentrated efforts on the part of
coalition members to fundamentally alter the national focus in matters of economic
stabilization after World War II. The original G.I. Bill did more than act as a critical
vehicle for veteran reintegration following the war; it would establish veteran education
benefits as a policy regime in American politics, and one that created conditions that
shaped the next version of the legislation in 1952. The Korea G.I. Bill is a function of a
complex set of interactions between the 1944 G.I. Bill’s established success, individual
legislators’ actions, and a rift in the veterans’ benefit coalition that created the conditions
necessary for a major shift in American higher education policy.
The 1944 G.I. Bill appeared to establish a precedent for future renewals of the
legislation and the establishment of benefits for veterans of future American military
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conflicts; in a newspaper interview, the Administrator of the Department of Veterans’
suggested that the Bill’s success refocused national attention on human readjustment after
military conflict. The American people as a whole, he argued, benefitted from the
establishment of the G.I. Bill’s education program because of the influx of trained and
able professionals – across a variety of fields – that were now driving American
economic advancement.131 The G.I. Bill was not only the culmination of an important
political process, but would also serve as the starting point of cycle of benefit program
revisions that would affect social policies in the future.
The original legislation provides the starting point for investigating the way in
which the policy process involved in creating similar legislation at a later point can
fundamentally alter the political landscape at the time. The next iteration of the G.I. Bill
in 1952, the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (or “Korea G.I. Bill”) would soon
supplant the original version as the primary vehicle for the reintegration of American
service members. The 1952 Bill was motivated not by the fear of demobilization that had
marked the creation of the original Bill – the postwar prosperity had “frightened away the
ghosts of the 1930s who haunted those responsible for the 1944 G.I. Bill”132 – but rather
by the relative economic prosperity and perceived success of the original legislation.
While the creation of the 1944 Bill helped establish the veterans’ benefit coalition as a
cohesive actor in social policy, the 1952 Bill would soon test the bonds holding the
coalition members together. Furthermore, the passage of the Korea G.I. Bill would
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introduce changes to both the bureaucratic power structure and the higher education
system that would indelibly alter both in the future.
This chapter focuses on the development of the Korea G.I. Bill and the ways in
which the political process surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill conditioned the political
outcomes following the Bill’s renewal in 1952. Using the policy feedback model outlined
previously I examine the extent to which the veterans’ benefit coalition’s members’
interests remained politically at odds with one another, as well as what strain (if any) the
bill’s renewal placed upon the coalition’s fragile bonds. The ways in which the political
process surrounding the Korea G.I. Bill was able to negatively affect the veterans’ benefit
coalition’s bond – as well as how the coalition, or what was left of it, was able to directly
or indirectly influence parallel social policy development at the time – are indicative of
the power of the policy feedback model.
Specifically, I argue that the development of the Korea G.I. Bill, which came out
of the backlash against – and subsequent investigations into – the original G.I. Bill set the
stage for clashes among various members of the original veterans’ benefit coalition.
Interestingly, the veterans’ lobby groups took a backseat in this legislative battle,
allowing individual legislators to advance their respective versions of Korean War
education benefits. The fact that the groups were not necessarily major players in the
development of the 1952 legislation meant that Congressional members were able to craft
the legislation according to their particular goals and party agendas. The reforms
recommended by the House committee investigating the original G.I. Bill’s management
included a major overhaul to the system of federal payments: giving the student-veteran
tuition stipends directly, and doing away with the direct provision of tuition assistance
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funds to the institutions. The idea behind this change was to remove the potential for
abuse of the system on the part of education institutions that came under fire for various
types of fraud and system abuse. This change soon rankled the elite leadership of private
educational institutions who, seeing what was essentially a voucher system as a falsely
competitive system (in which they would never be able to fairly compete against lowercost, public institutions), mobilized against the new funding provisions in a break from
the rest of the veterans’ benefit coalition.
The ramifications of the Korea G.I. Bill are not limited to the breakdown of the
veterans’ benefit coalition, however; rather, the same stress on the coalition that was
created by the public/private divide over tuition payments spilled over into the higher
education sector more broadly. The Korea G.I. Bill marks the first time in American
history that accreditation is preferred as a means of assuring quality in higher education;
the provisions surrounding accreditation requirements came directly from the legislative
debate concerning the ability of the VA to assure that federal funding was being provided
to reputable postsecondary institutions. The requirement of accreditation for G.I. bill
funding after 1952 was a direct result of the development of the veterans’ benefit
legislation, and one driven by the same members of the veterans’ benefit coalition that
attempted to win generous benefits for service members returning from the conflict in
Korea.
The analysis of archival evidence suggests that this fracture in the veterans’
benefit coalition over the abuses of the 1944 legislation – as well as the best way to
inoculate the reformed legislation against a similar fate – also helped facilitate spillover
effects into the field of higher education policy. The education benefits in the 1952
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legislation – though similar in intent and design to those in the earlier bill – featured a
distinct administrative system meant to correct the abuses that had wracked the 1944 bill.
By making tuition assistance payments directly to veterans (who would then use these
payments as vouchers to attend whatever postsecondary institution to which they were
accepted), and stipulating that only accredited institutions could be in receipt of federal
funds through the G.I. Bill, the veterans’ benefit coalition created lasting effects for the
higher education system. The reliance on accreditation as a substitute for federal
standardization of curricula or degrees was instantiated in the 1952 legislation, setting a
precedent for accreditation as a necessary precondition to the receipt of federal funding
(via a student’s enrollment).
Moreover, the case study of the Korea G.I. Bill shows the first signs of a
remarkable trend in changes to state capacity following the reform of the original G.I.
Bill. The VA had been a target of investigation and harsh criticism in the years following
the original legislation, as its management, backlog of claims, and inattention to
education institutions’ fraudulent practices were brought to light in popular reports and
Congressional hearings. Though the VA was targeted by members of the veterans’
benefit coalition as part of the problem surrounding the original legislation, the agency
was able to insulate itself from substantive change as a result of the legislative reform.
Furthermore, calls to remove the education program from under the umbrella of the VA –
which to that point had been a centralized administrative hub for all of the programs
involving America’s veterans – were largely ignored or dismissed by legislators. Though
various agencies and officials recommended that the Department of Education – and not
the VA – have control over veterans’ education benefits, the VA was able to retain its
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jurisdiction over the veterans’ education benefits system, establishing an enduring
precedent that continues to inform veteran benefit politics through the present day.

The Post-WWII Political Climate and the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition
Despite the success of the veterans’ benefit coalition in securing the education
provisions of the G.I. Bill, the coalition membership would not remain similarly united
within the context of emerging policies in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In fact, the
evolving American national security state and questions concerning the necessary size of
the federal apparatus (especially relative to that of the states) would continue to be the
point upon which many of the coalition members would diverge in their individual
interests. The political landscape at the time, though perhaps ideologically disposed to the
idea of a “vital center” in regard to international affairs,133 was still fragmented as debate
over the increasing federal structure – and remnants of both the New Deal and the World
War II agency controls – continued to rage.
Harold Lasswell’s warning of an impending “garrison state”134 – in which
military leadership would overshadow civilian control and drive domestic policy toward
an increasingly totalitarian extreme – was echoed by Republicans, though for different
reasons than Lasswell had laid out in his original argument. While Truman was
committed to balancing the budget in the post-WWII years, Republicans became
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1949).
134
Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 41(1941), 455-68. For more
on Lasswell’s argument, see also idem, “The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence,” in ed. Harold D.
Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (New York, 1947), 146-57; and
idem, “Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State,” The China Quarterly 11: 64349. See also Aaron L. Friedberg, “American Antistatism and the Founding of the Cold War State,” in eds.
Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, Shaped by War and Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2002).

74!

!

concerned that there had not been a balanced budget in over 16 years by 1947, and that
Truman’s reluctance to restrict social spending – combined with his apparent willingness
to rein in Pentagon requests for defense appropriations above what he and his Budget
Bureau director, James E. Webb, considered reasonable for the current national security
climate. Republicans and conservative Democrats pressed strongly for tax cuts for
individuals (arguing that it would stimulate investment), while the rest of the Democratic
Party rallied behind Truman as he planned incremental expansions of the New Deal
benefits policies (such as Social Security). The budget battle, split cleanly across party
lines, placed social welfare policies at the center of a struggle over how to balance the
needs of an interventionist international power with that of a recovering domestic
economy.135
Stress along party lines was also being exacerbated by Truman’s “Fair Deal”
policies regarding race and racial integration, and the subsequent shift from “prewar” to
“postwar” Democrats.136 After Truman’s desegregation of the military by executive order
in 1948, the values of minority inclusion and equality that had been purported to be at the
center of the New Deal policies (though in practice were not actually an integral part of
many of the New Deal provisions) were more substantively represented in the
Democratic Party’s ideological bent.137 As the Democratic Party became more concerned
with tolerance and addressing previously underrepresented groups, it further pushed away
conservative Democrats who were opposed to federal intervention into the states’
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management of racial issues.138 The original G.I. Bill brought the racial animus of
southern Democrats to the forefront, as the party had fought for state-level administration
of the Bill’s programs (to prevent federal intervention into unemployment insurance
programs and higher education systems). As Katznelson notes, “The GI Bill’s remarkable
bounty thus could be directed to the country’s poorest region while keeping its system of
racial power intact.”139
As far as the political membership of the veterans’ benefit coalition was
concerned, their loyalties fell squarely along the scrimmage lines drawn by concurrent
debates in domestic politics. Rogers, for her support of increasing veterans’ benefits and
her concern for the veterans’ healthcare system, remained opposed to New Deal policies
which she argued only served to needlessly expand the size of the federal government.140
Representative John Rankin (D-MS) similarly fell in step with conservative Democrats in
his vehement defense of segregation, as well as his willingness to continue the mission of
the Dies Special Committee and amending the House rules to establish the Un-American
Activities Committee.141 Rogers was also supportive of Rankin’s establishment of the
HUAC and was a close personal friend of Senator John McCarthy.
In terms of the political landscape, then, the members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition were routinely being pitted against one another in struggles over the size and
funding of the national security state as well as the Democrats’ increasing interest in
minority politics and issues of civil rights abuses. Notably absent from this lead up to the
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development of the 1952 G.I. Bill were the veterans’ groups. Despite their overwhelming
presence in creating the 1944 legislation, by the early 1950s the groups were not eager to
advance particular proposals for the veterans returning from Korea. Their hesitance,
outlined later in their Congressional testimony, was a stark contrast to their previous
vocal support of the original G.I. Bill. The lack of similar legislative momentum on the
part of the veterans’ groups concerning the 1952 legislation meant that individual
legislators moved to the forefront of the veterans’ benefit coalition, and ultimately
decided the direction of the final legislation.
Moreover, the disagreements over the federal budget – combined with Truman’s
attempts to continue slowly increasing the size and scope of New Deal-era social welfare
programs – meant that legislators were already keenly attuned to the issues of austerity
and budget balancing, especially in a context in which the defense budget’s share was
increasingly eclipsing that of other programs. The desire to rein in unnecessary social
spending – and to ensure that America had indeed capitalized on the investment that it
had made in its World War II veterans – set the stage for an investigation into the original
G.I. Bill and the extent to which veterans’ benefit coalition members could prove its
utility years after its enactment.
Investigating the Original G.I. Bill
Following the legislative success of the original G.I. Bill (including the legislative
provisions which further liberalized plan benefits in 1945), it appeared that the bill would
soon provide significant dividends to the American economy as veterans flooded colleges
and took part in various vocational programs. While the education benefits in the G.I. Bill
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proved popular to both veterans and civilian public opinion alike,142 the size and scope of
the program soon drew critical attention as the administration of the program came under
investigation. After several years in operation, the Bill would soon become the focal
point for a Congressional investigation, as well as a potential template for how the federal
government should – or should not – involve itself in the higher education system in the
years to come.
By July 1951, as the original G.I. Bill’s education benefits program neared its
deadline for new applicants, the investment that the federal government had made in
returning military personnel was gaining public attention. Out of the entire G.I. Bill
omnibus legislation – including low-interest home loans, increased outlays for
hospitalization and medical care, and provisions for unemployment compensation –the
education program amounted to nearly $14 million, $3.5 million of which was on direct
tuition payments to institutions alone. Approximately 8,000,000 former service members
utilized G.I. Bill benefits during the time period from July 1944 through July 1951; at its
peak in 1947, veterans represented nearly 49% of all college and university students, with
nearly 50% of veterans accessing G.I. Bill education benefits in that same year.143
Despite its widespread popularity and success, significant issues began to emerge
in the administration of veterans’ education and training benefits, and concern grew about
the money invested in the program and reported fraud across the country. Investigation
into the previous GI Bill was led by Representative Olin Teague (R-TX), as chair of the
House Select Committee to Investigate Educational, Training, and Loan Guaranty
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Programs under the GI Bill. Though public opinion among those in the education sector
was generally favorable, concerns grew as the program hemorrhaged approximately $2
billion per year in mismanagement and potential abuses in the payment system for
institutions of higher education.144
The committee ran hearings in several cities across the country, soliciting
testimony from veterans’ groups, colleges, contractors, and veterans themselves – all
stakeholders in the original legislation. Veterans testified about their inability to secure
due benefits and the disruption caused by dishonorable for-profit schools and contractors.
Veterans testified about being recruited into institutions with dubious qualifications, and
being offered degrees in fields like bartending, that proved ultimately far less useful than
degrees from accredited postsecondary institutions. The “fly-by-night” schools that
infiltrated the education market following the enactment of the original G.I. Bill proved
to be only one of the more discouraging developments; further allegations against
postsecondary institutions added fuel to the fire. Charges that schools intentionally
inflated their enrollment numbers to collect more federal funding from the VA were also
leveled, and legislators became concerned that the potential benefits to the original G.I.
Bill program might become overshadowed by the corrupt practices that invaded the
system (especially due to its administration, which relied heavily on VA and states’
oversight of their postsecondary schools).145
The committee ultimately recognized the extreme deficiencies in the
administration of the G.I. Bill program in its report to Congress, but still recommended
the extension of benefits to Korea veterans and a revision of the existing veterans’ benefit
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program. While the committee expressed concern over the reports of corruption in the
G.I. Bill system, they also expressed a desire to facilitate the reintegration of Korean War
veterans in the same way that those from World War II had been helped.146 The positive
aspects of the G.I. Bill program – combined with House committee recommendations to
restructure the payment plan and ensure school quality through requirements for
accreditation – would ultimately find themselves not only at the center of the reformed
G.I. Bill legislation, but also at the starting point of a deep rift evolving in the veterans’
benefit coalition.
The Korea G.I. Bill in Development
As the U.S. entered into a military conflict in Korea, some legislators called for an
immediate revision of the G.I. Bill to accommodate the veterans of the current conflict.
Teague and others in both the House and Senate were, however, not interested in
applying the same pre-conflict planning strategies to the situation in Korea as had been
done towards the end of WWII. In July 1950, shortly after what was then a “police
action” in Korea began, Teague expressed reluctance to begin hashing out details for a
Korea G.I. Bill before the full scope of the conflict was revealed.147 The veterans’ groups
were uncharacteristically united on a hesitant approach to Korea G.I. Bill benefits,
preferring to wait until the conflict developed further before making legislative action. By
August, several extension bills to the original G.I. Bill had been introduced in the House,
but had languished as neither legislators nor veterans’ groups were anxious to move on
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them while monitoring the conflict. One extension bill was introduced by a New York
representative as an active of protest against the Truman Administration’s intervention in
Korea.148
Rankin made plans for House committee hearings on proposed Korea veteran
benefit legislation, setting the meetings to begin in February. For all his previous support
for veterans, was a noted segregationist who opposed extending benefits to African
Americans; although he failed in a special senate race in Mississippi in 1947, he
continued to remain a prominent force in the House.149 He noted that new legislation
would likely provide almost all (if not duplicate) benefits to Korea veterans as it had to
those of WWII; the New York Times noted that, “Congress seldom turns down veterans’
legislation.”150
The Truman Administration’s stance on extending veterans’ benefits was
measured; while generally supportive of extending benefits for the reintegration of Korea
veterans, there was resistance within the administration to an equally broad-based
program of education benefits. The Bureau of the Budget recommended a modified plan
in January 1951, advocating a formula that relocated some of the onus of college
payments onto the veteran, offering to pay half tuition only if there was evidence
suggesting that education had been interrupted or impeded by an eligible person’s service
in the Korean conflict. Assistant Director Elmer Saats outlined in a memo to Rankin that
“the veteran should have a financial stake of his own” in his education, and therefore
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should have his education only partially subsidized by the federal government.

151

Similarly, communication from within the Federal Security Agency indicated that the
administration was bracing itself for a potential landslide of veterans exiting school into
an unstable labor market, and speculating on the ability of the current social safety nets to
meet this need.152 The administration was undoubtedly preparing for a crush of veterans
onto the labor market even before the U.S. entered the Korean conflict, and the
immediate calls for Korea G.I. Bill benefits likely accelerated their policy development
process.
The version of a new G.I. Bill offered by the Bureau of the Budget would allow a
maximum government payment of $300 for tuition and fees, in comparison to the full
tuition (up to $500) offered by the original GI Bill. Additionally, the duration of
schooling would be shortened and eligible veterans would need to show combat
participation. This desire for combat participants alone to benefit from a G.I. Bill was
echoed by the VFW; Omar Ketchum, the organization’s Director, stressed in a letter to
Rankin that only those personnel eligible for combat ribbons should be granted the
education provisions of a new version of the GI Bill.153 The discussion of combat
participation would soon fall out of the debate over the bill, as new legislation was
introduced in both the House and Senate that treated Korea veterans the same way as
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those of WWII (specifically, in defining eligibility by days spent on active duty, as
opposed to verified participation in combat).
In August 1951, Senators George (D-GA) and Kerr (D-OK) introduced legislation
to revise the previous G.I. Bill while extending similar benefits to veterans of the conflict
in Korea. They acknowledged that the previous legislation had fallen prey to
noncompliance and corruption, but argued that their more restricted plan would “provide
more adequate safeguards against excessive expenditure of public funds.”154 H.R. 5040
and S. 1940 emerged during the second half of 1951 as viable plans for extending the
education benefits present in the original GI Bill to those involved in the Korean War.
The recommended BOB provisions remained; namely, that the term of enrollment be
shortened, that tuition payments were to be reduced, and that veterans must be able to
prove that their education had been interrupted by their term of service. In reviewing the
two proposed pieces of legislation, Saats noted that an extension of veterans’ benefits
would necessarily require an assessment of the purpose and utility of veterans’ benefit to
the American public, both economically and socially. Referencing the adjusted
compensation “bonus” and insurance payouts of World War I veterans, Saats commented
that the WWII policies had been much more generous – and thereby successful – in
reintegrating soldiers into civilian life. He did caution, however, that revising these
benefits with each conflict would create establish a set pattern of entitlements for each
military engagement in the future, arguing that:
The concept of readjustment for the millions of veterans of
World War II, whose lives and expected means of
livelihood were interrupted by military service, was a great
advance….However, additional legislation in this field
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should take into account the further strides which we have
made in the United States in providing greater opportunities
for education and vocational training, and for freedom from
want when early disability or death strike down the wage
earner in the family. General programs in which veterans
participate may well be of greater value than programs
designed only for veterans,” [emphasis added].155
Saats’ comment on the availability of general welfare programs at both the state and
federal levels designed to compensate for disability or death of the main wage earner in
the household (presumably husbands and fathers), signals resistance in the executive
branch to lay the groundwork for a perpetual system of veterans’ benefits that would be
expected for any military engagement. This connection foreshadows the influence that
the development of the Korea G.I. Bill would have on related areas of social policy – and
how its very reach and scope could drive a wedge through the coalition that had
supported its predecessor.

The Fracture of the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition
The original G.I. Bill was supported by a coalition that included a diverse set of
political actors, including veterans’ organizations (though at times competing in their
message), legislators from across the aisles, business, labor, and postsecondary
institutions.156 While the coalitions’ competing interests had been subordinated to the
interest of the 1944 G.I. Bill, the revision of the legislation for Korea veterans began to
stress the tenuous connections among the group members. Two major rifts flourished
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during this time period, stressing the connections between and among members of the
veterans’ benefit coalition as they debated the merits of the G.I. Bill legislation. The first
major divide came between the veterans’ organizations, whose conflicting approaches to
veteran benefit policy were pushed the forefront as Congressional leaders developed the
Korea G.I. Bill legislation. The second split was the divide between public and private
educational institutions moved to the forefront, as issues of tuition payments would
fundamentally change the complexion of veterans’ benefits, as well as the VA’s
relationship with the colleges.157

The Public/Private Divide in Postsecondary Education
Prior to the hearings in the House, Rankin had solicited feedback from various
education administration and veterans’ groups about the proposal for a Korea G.I. Bill.
The messages from education administration leaders were unified on the point of offering
benefits to veterans; despite the challenges faced in administering the previous program,
the education associations were still supportive of the program (and the rapid increase in
college students – and indirect federal investment – that accompanied them). The
National Veterans’ Educational Association in a 1952 letter restated its preference for the
1944 entitlement guidelines (one year per year served, up to four years total). The NVEA
also recommended that administration over veterans’ benefits be turned over to the states,
with the VA serving the role of adviser and solely concerning itself with determining
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eligibility and oversight of the nationwide program.158 By allowing state-level oversight
of the educational benefit program administration, the NVEA suggested that the Korea
G.I. Bill program would be devoid of the mismanagement and corruption that had
characterized the 1944 legislation. Allowing state agencies the power to evaluate their
own institutions of higher education and make the deciding call on the extent to which
those schools were eligible for the receipt of federal funding would, in turn, free VA
administrators to manage the broader contours of the program at the national level.
While some education officials called for an end to VA authority, the real schism
developing in the veterans’ benefit coalition began to emerge on the public/private divide
in higher education. Before the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee’s hearing on
the proposed legislation, Teague commented that, in investigating the G.I. Bill, “there
were very definitely two types of private schools: One group that was interested in
education and another that was more interested in dollars.”159 Private postsecondary
schools’ concerns about enrollments as a result of direct payments to the veteran were at
the heart of their resistance to the new Korea G.I. Bill, and this provision mobilized the
schools as a faction within the veterans’ benefit coalition (ultimately pitting them against
their prior interests in supporting the earlier G.I. Bill).
The breakdown over the direct payment to veterans came to a head in the House
when the Springer Amendment (which would provide for payments to schools, rather
than individual veterans) was introduced. The private schools soon found their champion
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in the rather unlikely ally of William Springer (R-IL), a new Republican representative
from Illinois’ twenty-second district (which had been solidly in Republican control for at
least a decade), and whose interests advocacy generally ran toward those of agriculture
and farm subsidies.160 A Navy veteran himself, Springer would soon become embroiled
in the center of the rift in the veterans’ benefit coalition, driving a wedge between higher
education officials and ultimately accusing the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee of
skirting procedural rules in favor of heavy-handed politics.
In response to news that the Korea G.I. Bill would offer direct payments to
veterans as a means of skirting the thorny issue of direct payments to postsecondary
institutions, Fred Fagg, President of the University of Southern California, began to
mobilize fellow private school presidents through a letter-writing campaign.161 Fagg and
others were in favor of maintaining the original indirect payment plan as established in
the 1944 legislation, an aspect of the program that had come under intense scrutiny
during the Teague Committee investigation. The group reflected concerns that direct
payments to veterans’ would privilege public schools with lower tuitions, effectively
biasing veterans against attending private schools (especially when tuition payments
would be $200 lower for Korea veterans than for World War II veterans).
Fagg’s letter campaign found its advocate in Springer, who heeded Fagg’s socalled “emergency committee’s” call to action (and remained the only real advocate for
the private school officials in either the House or Senate). The Illinois representative soon
crafted what became known as the Springer Amendment, an addendum to H.R. 7656 that
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would restore the direct-payment provisions for postsecondary institutions and remove
any type of voucher or stipend system for veterans (for tuition payments only; any roomand-board stipends meant to assist veterans in attending school would remain untouched
by the Springer Amendment). The private schools’ opposition to the new payment
provisions was not mirrored by any public school representatives, who remained silent on
the issue in their Congressional testimony. Rather than rally against the private
institutions, the public postsecondary schools appeared to leave the debate up to Congress
to resolve; no similar countermovement against the private schools’ requests was
acknowledged either in the Congressional Record or in any Congressional committee
hearing transcripts.
This divide between public and private universities represents a sharper fracture
in the veterans’ benefit coalition than even the growing rift between the veterans’ groups.
While the Legion, VFW, and DAV, among others, were reluctant to come to the table as
a unified front in dealing with Congressional leadership (especially in the wake of the
Teague Committee’s investigation into the mismanagement of the original G.I. Bill
funding), their disagreements had manifested themselves in a similar fashion during the
development of the 1944 legislation. To the extent that the veterans’ groups has disagreed
before on issues of veterans’ benefits, their conflict was feeding back into itself from the
previous legislation’s political process. The divide between the public and private
postsecondary institutions was, however, driven by a vocal minority in one sector of the
coalition (the private schools). When the interests of the private schools was threatened
by the direct-payment provision, the previously unacknowledged differences between the
private and public universities (with respect to their treatment under the G.I. Bill payment
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program) were suddenly important enough to force the private schools to attempt to alter
the legislation in furtherance of their own private interests.
Despite the “emergency committee’s” attempts to contact other representatives,
the Springer Amendment generated little discussion in the House. On May 26, Rankin,
Teague, and Rogers162 (R-MA) pushed for a closed rule on the proposed Korea G.I. Bill.
By invoking closed rule, the Veterans’ Affairs Committee members were effectively able
to restrict the addition of amendments to the legislation, and set a limit of no more than
two hours of debate on the House floor.163 Springer fought back zealously on the floor,
contending that, “If there was ever a gag rule that was imposed upon any particular piece
of legislation which was so vital to a certain group of people in the Armed Forces, it is
the action of these people trying to pass this bill under a suspension of the rules.”164
Springer charged Teague with running the House veterans’ committee as if it were his
own private enterprise, to which Teague made a point of order establishing a lack of
quorum and effectively ending Springer’s time to contest the legislation (within the
shortened debate timeframe of the closed rule).165
In the Senate, the testimony was more subdued and reflected concerns not about
the ability to attract the veteran who now had his or her own subsidy in hand, but rather
distancing legitimate private schools from those for-profit institutions that sprang up
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during the previous G.I. Bill. Bernard Ehrlich of the National Federation of Private
School Associations argued that the competition that would naturally develop among
public and private schools as they attempted to attract veterans was actually beneficial for
veterans, ultimately driving the education market toward higher standards and better
practices.166 Springer pushed back, once again attempting to gain favor on the Springer
Amendment by introducing it into consideration before the Senate; though supported
there also by representatives from the University of Southern California and Macalester
College,167 the amendment failed to gain legislative support.
Despite the opposition of the private school “emergency committee” and
Springer, Truman signed the bill into law in June 1952. The VA endorsed the provisions
of the new legislation; Deputy Administrator O.W. Clark, in a letter to Rankin, reiterated
the agency’s support of the new direct-payment provision for tuition benefits and
reiterated his belief that such a system would inevitably assist the VA in better managing
the “many diverse types of institutions [and] amounts representing tuition and fees.”168
Despite the reactions to the bills payment provisions and accreditation requirements, it
appeared to have the tacit acceptance of the veterans’ benefit coalition – though not
without a significant struggle on the part of the private postsecondary schools that had
rallied behind the unlikely figure of Springer. Although Springer was ultimately unable to
successfully ensure that the new bill made tuition payments directly to the schools as the
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“emergency committee” had wanted, Springer’s vocal opposition to Teague, Rankin, and
others in the House was a warning of impending further breakages within the veterans’
benefit coalition.
The recommendations of the Teague committee formed the basis of the 1952
Korea G.I. Bill in its final (passed) version, and represented a different sentiment than the
original legislation. Far from the fearful and speculative claims of veteran unrest and
mass poverty that animated the debate over the 1944 G.I. Bill, the 1952 Korea G.I. Bill
was motivated as much by veteran contentment and relative economic prosperity as it
was the political machinations of the veterans’ benefit coalition. While the bill was
intended to help Korea veterans reintegrate into society, its political effects reached far
beyond the jurisdictional boundaries that separated veterans from civilians. The revisions
to the bill would soon affect the way in which the federal government assesses the quality
of postsecondary education. Moreover, the process of reforming the Korea G.I. Bill
would put the VA’s bureaucratic power on display, its relative insulation and durability
apparent as it deflected any potential changes to the administration of veterans’ education
benefits under the proposed legislation.

Spillover from the Korea G.I. Bill
The breakdown in the relationship among members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition – precipitated by the legislative debate over the new iteration of the G.I. Bill –
was not the only major effect of the original G.I. Bill or the process surrounding its
reform. The changes to state capacity that resulted from a policy development process –
the “spillover” effects into a related area – involved the accreditation standard for
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postsecondary education. Additionally, the ability of the VA to successfully emerge from
the investigation into the G.I. Bill with its power intact suggests that the Korea G.I. Bill
marks a further entrenchment of the VA’s power over a parallel set of social policy
programs – ones that would become increasingly difficult to attempt to merge with the
universal policy sphere.
One way in which the policy feedback process between the WWII and Korea G.I.
Bills affected state capacity was by reifying the postsecondary education accreditation
system. The experience of the 1944 G.I. Bill had shown legislators, bureaucrats, and
veterans that all postsecondary institutions were not created equal: as the number of forprofit institutions grew in response to a need for schooling (and a demobilized population
used its newfound benefits), veterans soon learned that not all institutions were reputable.
The Teague committee heard testimony from many veterans who claimed they had been
swindled by “fly-by-night” institutions that provided little in the way of education. While
accreditation had been in practice during this time, it was not until the Korea G.I. Bill that
the system was entrenched at the federal level.
Through the Korea G.I. Bill, the federal government established a precedent for
federal aid to higher education on the basis of accreditation. Though there was no move
toward a federal system, and the new legislation did not require that tuition benefits could
only be used at state-accredited institutions, the federal government did begin
maintaining a list of accredited postsecondary institutions for public reference. The list
was conceived of as a guide for potential student veterans, in hopes that they could
sidestep some of the less reputable institutions in making their decisions on higher
education after their service had ended. In making the accreditation statuses public,
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legislators believed that any corrupt institutions would soon be forced to close their doors
as student-veterans directed their tuition stipends toward the accredited institutions.169
Moreover, the legislation used accreditation as proof of educational quality, or a
way to ensure that veterans’ education benefits would not be wasted at an institution that
lacked a solid reputation.170 The new reliance on accreditation as a standard of education
pushed accreditation agencies to become accountable to the VA in endorsing schools that
would be considered “worthy” of indirect government aid. While there was no push for
any type of standard federal assessment of postsecondary institutions or their curricula,
there was a concerted effort on the part of lawmakers to utilize the existing accreditation
structure to validate the receipt of federal funds under the Korea G.I. Bill. The
accreditation system would serve to legitimate not only the funding of a particular
institution, but would help strengthen the entire administration of this new G.I. Bill to
insulate it against the abuses that had wracked its previous version.171
While the changes to the accreditation system were not a wholesale federalization
of the process, the shift in reliance on accreditation agencies’ approval as a prerequisite
for government aid was established during the Korea G.I. Bill. By placing the
accreditation process at the forefront of the fight against unqualified postsecondary
education, the Korea G.I. Bill set an important precedent for using accreditation to signify
a school that is worthy of indirect aid payments. Nowadays, accreditation is used as a
condition for federal student financial aid, and although this standard was not codified in
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the Korea G.I. Bill, the important first steps of utilizing accreditation as a standard for
student aid were established during this time.
The second major change in state capacity was not necessarily a marked departure
from the status quo, but rather a story about effects that were not felt at the bureaucratic
level; that is, the ability of the VA to remain insulated from the G.I. Bill’s critiques
despite being its sole administrator at the federal level. This critique of the VA would
soon become a hallmark of the testimony of higher education groups, as their experiences
in dealing with the VA during the previous G.I. Bill presented questions about which
government agency was best equipped to deal with issues arising from an active
education benefits program. Ralph McDonald of the National Education Association of
the United States (NEAUS), in a letter to Rankin at the request for feedback on the
proposed changes to the education benefits, expressed displeasure at the VA’s
administration of veterans’ education benefits, claiming that “the administration has been
in the hands of persons who, because of their experimental background, were not in a
position to know much about the administration and finance of colleges and universities
in this country…As the law now stands, the Federal agency with which educators are
accustomed to deal in most matters involving the Federal Government’s participation in
educational programs is completely eliminated.”172
Russell Thackrey, the Executive Secretary of the Association of Land-Grant
Colleges and Universities, wrote to Rankin that the VA’s power to review its policies
regarding education benefits administration and decide if and when reforms were
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necessary turned the VA into “judge and jury,” effectively removing any kind of
legislative oversight into the veterans’ benefit system.173 NEAUS renewed its criticism of
the VA in a letter to Rankin, urging that the administration of the veterans’ education
benefits program be vested in the Department of Education and state education boards.174
Various education lobbying groups expressed opposition to proposed veterans’ benefit
legislation that would continue to locate the authority over the veteran education program
in the hands of the VA. Despite the Teague committee’s investigation into the G.I. Bill
administration, the VA emerged relatively unscathed from this legislative oversight, able
to effectively deflect critiques of its administration by laying blame on faulty education
institutions and “fly-by-night” schools that denigrated the reputation of the G.I. Bill
program.
The support for maintaining the VA’s administrative authority over the veterans’
benefit program came from both the administration and legislators (even those who were
outspoken critics of state expansion and the New Deal programs). In a letter to Rankin,
Bureau of the Budget Director F.J. Lawton objected to the proposed restructuring of the
veterans’ education program to involve Comptroller oversight. Lawton argued that the
Bureau saw “no compelling reason for this departure from established precedent,” noting
that the major interactions between the veteran and the VA would be simplified under a

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173

Letter from Russell Thackrey to John Rankin, July 20, 1950, reprinted in “Education and Training and
Other Benefits for Veterans Serving on or After June 27, 1950,” Hearings before the Committee on
Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of Representatives, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1950), 913.
174
Letter from Willard E. Givens to Senator John Rankin, February 7 1952, reprinted in “Education and
Training and Other Benefits for Veterans Serving on or After June 27, 1950,” Hearings before the
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of Representatives, (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1952), 1194.

95!

!

plan with direct payouts to the veteran (rather than the schools).175 The administrator of
the Federal Security Agency, John Thurston, expressed his agency’s opposition to this
proposed maintenance of the VA structure in administering the program. Thurston noted
that the FSA – which had a vested interest in bringing veterans’ education benefit
legislation under the same mantle as the other social programs that it supervised – would
prefer if the veterans’ education benefit program could be at least partially managed by
the Department of Education (then the Office of Education). Thurston noted that this
reorganization would not divest the VA of its power in veterans’ benefits writ large, but
rather would assist the VA by offering the OE’s expertise and experience in education
policy.176 Despite the various calls for the VA to relinquish at least part of its influence
over the administration of the Korea G.I. Bill, there were no attempts on the part of
Congress or the White House to officially support divesting the VA of its responsibility
in the field of veteran education policy.
Additionally, the recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of
the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) supported the
existing structure of the veterans’ education benefit program within the VA, and
recommended that the tuition program be kept under the control of the VA (rather than
moved to the Department of Education).177 The debate over the VA’s control of the
education benefit program was, with the exception of testimony on behalf of several
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interest group representatives before the House, largely absent; even the Teague
committee’s recommendations following the investigations into the original G.I. Bill
offered little in the way of criticism on the role of the VA in overseeing the corrupted
program.
The VA, then, was able to maintain its authority over the veteran education
benefit program even in light of previous accusations of mismanagement and poor
administration; moreover, the blame for the breakdowns in the system was placed on
postsecondary institutions. Additionally, the direct payments laid out in the Korea G.I.
Bill reduced the program structure to being solely between the VA and individual
veterans, allowing the agency to not only make direct payments to veterans but also to
investigate and resolve any problems in the administration of its programs. It seemed
that, despite calls for changes in program administration, the VA would retain the ability
to be “both judge and jury,” despite recent investigations into the agency’s faults.
One explanation for this insulation could lie in the VA’s ability to build
institutional credentials through its administration of the G.I. Bill, such that it became
seen as the only viable agency within which a complex set of veterans’ benefits could be
housed. This concept is best articulated in Carpenter’s theory of bureaucratic autonomy,
which suggests that agencies build up leverage by controlling a particular policy sphere,
such that moving that policy’s administration is not considered a viable alternative to
legislators.178 The testimony of administration and legislative officials suggest that they
preferred to keep all veterans’ benefit programs within the jurisdiction of the VA, rather
than splitting programs up under the control of different agencies. The way in which the
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original G.I. Bill fed back into the development of the Korea G.I. Bill – and the fact that
the VA was able to emerge from this process with its power still intact – suggests that
there may be reification of existing power structures as a result of policy development.
Additionally, the case of the VA may provide further evidence that agencies can gain
power that allows them to then affect changes in parallel policy spheres, rather than
exclusively focusing on changes within the same policy area.
Conclusion
The 1952 Korea G.I. Bill is more than an isolated example of a policy that was
affected by its own previous incarnation; rather, it provides an important example in
which to test a more expansive approach to the policy feedback model. In expanding the
policy feedback model to include heterogeneous groups whose composition and internal
strength vary over time (and as a direct result of repeated interactions with one another on
the same types of legislation), I argue that the veterans’ benefit coalition demonstrates
that policies can feedback negatively to the detriment of their original supporters. The
experience of reforming the original G.I. Bill – beginning with the investigation into the
mismanagement of education benefit funding and culminating in the legislative debate
surrounding the format of the new legislation – forced the individual coalition members
to once again subordinate their own individual interests to that of the greater good. When
the private schools’ interests in attracting and retaining students were threatened via the
direct payment provision as proposed, the private schools broke rank and sought out
legislative support for reestablishing the same payment program as had existed in the
earlier legislation. Though the private schools did not necessarily exit the coalition
(thereby constituting a complete break in the coalition), their opposition to the legislation
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generally accepted by the rest of the members suggests that the strain of reform was too
great to maintain the fragile connections within the veterans’ benefit coalition.
Moreover, the coalition’s actions in reforming the G.I. Bill spilled over into other
policy areas. First and most visibly, the requirement of accreditation embedded in the
1952 Bill instantiated the concept of accreditation as a substitute for federal
standardization of higher education. By utilizing the regional and subject-specific
accreditation agencies’ approval as preconditions for the receipt of federal funds under
the G.I. Bill, the VA could be assured a smaller risk of the misallocation of funds or the
misuse of funds by non-reputable institutions. The federal government’s endorsement of
accreditation agencies’ approval – and the reluctance to establish a federal accreditation
system – were codified in the 1952 Bill, setting the stage for the reliance on accreditation
as a condition for federal aid receipt under the financial aid system in the years to come.
Finally, the ability of the VA to hold onto the veterans’ education benefit program
management – despite calls from various agencies and officials for the removal of the
system into more capable or experienced hands – is a testament to the hidden strength of
the VA in establishing its sphere of influence. The VA was able to retain the
administration of its education programs and prevent any part of its benefit program
structure from being annexed by another federal agency (or being decentralized fully to
the state level). The VA, then, was able to insulate itself from countervailing political
forces, and was ultimately strengthened by the process of revising the 1944 G.I. Bill into
the 1952 legislation.
Overall, the Korea G.I. Bill presents an important case study in assessing the
ability of policies to affect politics at a later time. The coalitional politics involved in the
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promotion of veterans’ benefits were not only affected (negatively) by the process of
reforming the original G.I. Bill; they in turn pushed the ramifications of the legislation
into other areas of social policy and state capacity. The policy feedback model’s
specifications for how interest groups and state capacity are both affected by the policy
process deserves update in light of the case study of the Korea G.I. Bill; expanding the
model to account for more types of feedback is useful not only for understanding the first
reform to a piece of legislation, but for understanding various subsequent reforms as well.
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the Vietnam Era, and the ways in which the
1966 G.I. Bill further extended the effects of the 1952 legislation, while creating its own
distinct political affects in that era.
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CHAPTER 4
A GREAT SOCIETY WITH A ‘PECULIAR PROBLEM’: PEACETIME VETERANS
AND THE 1966 COLD WAR G.I. BILL

Although the veterans’ benefit coalition had provided the momentum behind the
1944 and 1952 G.I. Bills, the relative power of this set of political actors appeared tied to
the exogenous shock of American military engagement. As the war in Korea drew to a
close, it seemed that the question of how to best address the reintegration of veterans had
been answered in the political struggle over the 1952 bill; after all, the legislation would
provide a parallel education benefit system to the precedent-setting program that had
been utilized by World War II veterans. As America entered a period of relative
peacetime (insofar as no other large-scale military engagements loomed on the horizon),
the question of how to address the peacetime veteran would soon move to the forefront of
veterans’ benefit discussion. This group of veterans was, as Republican National
Committee leader Bradley Taylor wrote, “in a class set aside – they are different and
what has made them different is a little pice [sic] of paper that said ‘greetings from the
President’…they are set into a nother [sic] class within the nation.”179 How would
America address the reintegration of the so-called “peacetime veteran,” and in what ways
would this period of policy reform compare to the development of the previous veteran
education benefit systems in its effects on parallel policies?
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In this chapter, I argue that the 1966 Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act –
also known as the “Cold War G.I. Bill” and which extended education benefits to Cold
War era military personnel – marks an important turning point in not only the politics of
veterans’ benefits, but of social policy development more broadly.180 The legislation
passed in the absence of the strong support of the veterans’ groups or colleges that had
been the driving force behind the legislation of 1944 and 1952. Additionally, the
executive branch was, from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration, opposed to
the extension of education benefits to veterans’ that had not been in conflict; even the
more sympathetic Johnson Administration would have preferred to focus more on
universal postsecondary education than on reintegration benefits for veterans. In the case
of the Cold War G.I. Bill, it would be the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs (and its
allies in the Senate) that would secure passage of the legislation after nearly seven years
of constant appeals to the President, Congress, and the broader public. Thus, it would be
individual legislators who would activate the coalition’s support – however tacit – for
peacetime veterans’ benefits and ultimately negotiate its separation from similar
programs aimed at universal higher education programs.
The country faced a “peculiar problem” with regards to the peacetime veteran: he
was still under compulsory service obligations, but did not share in the wartime
experiences that previous draftees had encountered.181 Moreover, the 1952 election that
had placed Eisenhower in the White House – though with Democrats in control of the
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Congress – marked a decided electoral shift away from the support for Democrats’ brand
of social policy development throughout the Roosevelt and Truman eras. Though the
system of Selective Service remained in effect, the lack of military conflicts did not elicit
the same urgency from political actors (from either side of the aisle, or even within some
of the larger veterans’ groups) to establish broad-based education programs for returning
military personnel. Politicians seemed to agree that an “opening up of the government’s
coffers” need not immediately follow compulsory service182
Alongside the call for education benefits for peacetime veterans was President
Lyndon Johnson’s plan to revitalize the public sector and increase the quality of life in
the country through a series of targeted government programs.183 The development of the
1966 Cold War G.I. Bill falls in line with the legislative trajectory of the 1965 Higher
Education Act, and the two pieces of legislation were effectively aimed at overlapping
audiences (especially as a peacetime draft maintained a fighting force of over 2 million
people through the beginning of the 1960s, who were unable to secure deferments for
education or other socioeconomic reasons) (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1: Size of the U.S. Military Post-Korea184
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This chapter focuses on the development of the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill as a
function of a very different veterans’ benefit coalition than the one that had successfully
secured the passage of the 1952 G.I. Bill. While the development of the 1952 bill created
a fracture in the veterans’ benefit coalition between public and private postsecondary
institutions – with the private schools concerned about their enrollment in comparison to
the less costly public schools – the 1966 legislative process was far different. The
peacetime veterans’ education benefit had (at best) lukewarm support from veterans’
organizations and political parties, and outright opposition from not one, but three
different presidential administrations. The driving force behind the veterans’ benefit
coalition would come from the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs (and, to a lesser
extent, allies in the Senate). In line with my first contention, I argue that the powerful
combination of individual legislator incentives (due to concerns about voting patterns
among veterans), combined with the popularity of veterans’ benefits regardless of the
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perceptions of the military conflict in which the veterans were involved, allowed for a
select few members of Congress to overreach their positions within the coalitions and
move forward on education benefit legislation in the face of uncertainty or inactivity
within the group.
The evolution of education benefits for peacetime veterans would test not only the
strength of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but the ideational attachments to the social
construction of the American veteran that had persisted through the Korean War.
Changing the political landscape for the peacetime veteran would continue to fracture the
veterans’ benefit coalition, even as it entered the debate about these education benefits
without a uniform stance on the legitimacy or even necessity of postsecondary education
for all former military personnel, regardless of their experience in military conflicts.

A Coalition of Diverging Interests? The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition in the
Post-Korea Era
While the debates concerning the 1952 G.I. Bill were undertaken by a veterans’
benefit coalition generally reified by the legislation’s development, the period of reform
surrounding the 1952 bill was not as constructive to the veterans’ benefit coalition. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the process of reform undercut the coalition by creating schisms
along lines of public and private postsecondary institutions. Moreover, the 1952
legislation had solidified the Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the House as a powerful
component of the coalition, and one that appeared to fall in lockstep with the veterans’
organizations’ demands. By 1959, however, the differences among the veterans’
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organizations was thrown into stark contrast as their legislative agendas featured distinct
mismatches on the issue of education.
Moreover, the House and Senate Committees were not homogenous in their
support for extending veterans’ benefits, and were not motivated by the investigatory
hearings that had been generated by the 1944 bill (and which, I argue, helped solidify
support for the 1952 legislation). Additionally, the support of the President – which had,
until Eisenhower, been relatively firmly in place behind the extension of benefits to
veterans – was now no longer guaranteed, regardless of party affiliation. The veterans’
benefit coalition closed out the 1950s in a state of disjuncture, no longer united behind a
response to an ongoing conflict, and grappling with the policy consequences of an
ideological shift in how America would define a “veteran.”

The Vietnam Era Coalition and Divided Interests
Though the veterans’ benefit coalition remained concerned with issues of veteran
medical care and the treatment of veterans’ dependents, the issue of education benefits
(parallel to those that had been established for veterans of both WWII and the Korean
War) would soon occupy space on the agenda. The discussions over these particular
benefits would draw in the members of the coalition into a heated debate about policy
priorities, fairness to veterans of different conflicts, and government responsibility to the
peacetime veteran who did not see the kind of combat that his predecessors had
experienced.
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Veterans’ Organizations
Though veterans’ groups had been united behind the reforms to the 1944 G.I. Bill
that would become the Korean G.I. Bill, their tenuous joint commitment to veterans’
education would begin to falter at the end of the 1950s. As attention turned to healthcare
and disability rehabilitation, the reintegration of veterans seemed to focus largely on
physical ailments and helping to reduce the unemployment rate among former military
personnel. The issue of postsecondary education for veterans would soon cause conflicts
among the major veterans’ groups, with their opposition to the issue – either through
silence or outright direct contestation – becoming a wedge that would further divide the
groups. The differences in the attention that the groups paid to the issues in their national
resolutions – presented annually before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs –
highlights the disparities in each group’s agenda and their uneven support of extending
G.I. Bill benefits to the newest cohort of veterans (see Table 2, below).185
Table 2: Veterans' Organizations and Support for Peacetime Veteran Education Benefits

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

American Legion

+

AMVETS

+

Disabled American
Veterans
Veterans of Foreign
Wars
Veterans of WWI of
the USA

+

+
-

1966

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

Explicit group support in legislative agenda for Congress
Explicit group opposition in legislative agenda for Congress

The American Veterans of WWII (AMVETS) was one of the only groups that
actively sought educational benefits for peacetime veterans, appearing before Congress in
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1960 to request that the G.I. Bill model of education benefits – though with a different “1
day of benefits per 1 day of service” model – be extended to veterans who had entered
the service after 1955.186 Theirs was the only veteran group to consistently make explicit
remarks in support of educational benefits for peacetime veterans from 1960-1966,
arguing that the “new breed of veteran” deserved to have the same types of educational
opportunities as those from previous eras, despite the potential cost to the federal
government.187 AMVETS leadership argued that “the education and lives of the young
men serving today are interrupted and their preparation to compete in the Great Society
disrupted,” without the remedy of an extended veterans’ education benefits system in
place.188 The AMVETS consistent organizational support for the extension of peacetime
education benefits throws into sharp relief the varying levels of opposition that all but one
of the other veterans’ organizations held for a peacetime G.I. Bill.
The Disabled Veterans of America (DAV) maintained consistency in its message
that the most critical constituency of veterans were those with physical or mental
limitations created by military service. As such, the DAV had, in previous debates about
the 1944 and 1952 G.I. Bills, called for more emphasis on disabled veterans and publicly
opposed investing in broad-based education initiatives that would only serve to siphon
money and attention away from the disabled veterans. The leadership of the DAV put it
succinctly: “In discussing prospective benefits for current members of the Armed Forces,
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it comes to mind that attempts are being made to bring GI educational and other
programs within the scope of the sweeping welfare activities of the Great Society.”189
The DAV refused to speak in support of education benefits for peacetime veterans,
pressing members of Congress to place more of an emphasis on programs to provide
education and vocational training for those who had sustained injured during their service
in Korea and in WWII.
Unlike the DAV, the VFW was routinely supportive of the Cold War G.I. Bill in
their national resolutions, consistently adding the extension of G.I. bill benefits to their
platform throughout the first half of the 1960s, although never adding testimony before
Congress to strengthen – or even draw attention to – their position. Thus, the VFW’s
support can be considered relatively symbolic, as it blended its support for education
benefits in alongside a variety of other measures for vocational training and
rehabilitation. Interestingly, in 1965 – as the debates over the peacetime G.I. Bill were
coming to a head – the VFW adopted language in their national resolution that would
limit potential pool of beneficiaries of any education program to only those who had been
in active combat.190
The Veterans’ of World War I renewed its protest against the increasing attention
paid to the new veteran cohorts at the expense of legislation directed toward older
veterans. In a 1960 Congressional hearing, the group’s national commander expressed his
opposition to the continued neglect of the WWI veteran, asking, “What were the
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opportunities offered for furthering his education, suddenly become so necessary in a
world upside down to prewar concepts and requirements? None…the now fast-aging
veteran of the First World War gladly paid the soaring taxes made necessary by war in
addition to striving for those benefits in favor of the boy who was to return.”191 The
group remained steadfast in its unwillingness to continue advocating for benefits that its
own members would never receive in the future, and had never been offered when they
had left the military.

The Parties
Similarly, neither of the two political parties seemed to place veterans at the
forefront of their party agendas on a post-Korea political system, giving short shrift to the
issue of veterans’ reintegration through the beginning of the 1960s. Though individual
legislators like Senator Ralph Yarborough and Representative Olin Teague remained
powerful forces in the veterans’ benefit coalition, the broader party organizations did not
echo this strong advocacy in the arena of veteran’s benefit programs at the national level
(nor did their presidential candidates in either the 1960 or 1964 elections).
The 1960 Democratic Party platform featured a small section on veterans’ affairs,
pledging to continue expanding coverage for veterans with service-connected disabilities
and maintaining the healthcare system. Additionally, Democrats pledged to
“continue…educational benefits patterned after the G.I. Bill of Rights,” though did not
specifically mention whether such benefits would be extended to peacetime veterans or
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only those who had been involved in military conflict. During the same year, the party
proposed a system of national grants and scholarships at the federal level to assist young
people with obtaining postsecondary education, citing the benefits of a well-educated
American youth.192 The 1964 party platform, however, did not make mention of specific
plans for the extension of any veteran education benefits, though it did reference
legislation passed in 1963 which nearly tripled the amount of federal aid available to
students, from $50 million to $142 million.193 Notably, of the Democratic presidential
candidates from 1952-1964 (Stevenson, Kennedy, and Johnson), not one made any
mention of veterans in any of their national convention addresses.194 Though veterans did
make it into the Democratic Party platforms of the 1960s, there was no extension of the
initial drive for either the 1944 or 1952 G.I. Bills present in the party’s messages.
Republicans, in comparison, were more focused on the role of veterans’ benefits
as economic reintegration, as opposed to a portal for more education funding. In 1960,
the Republican Party pledged to improve veterans’ reemployment rights, with no mention
of educational programs or benefits. They also pledged to stand behind the maintenance
of the VA as a separate agency. In the realm of higher education, they did mention
support for federal aid programs, but pledge to keep funding and control over all forms of
education delegated to the state level.195 The 1964 platform made only minor references
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to veterans, and focuses on veterans’ preferences in employment and disability and
medical care. In higher education, the GOP proposed a system of tax credits for those
with higher education costs, as well as aid to states and a limited federal student aid
program to assist with postsecondary school costs.196
This reluctance of either party to reiterate the message of the veterans’ benefit
coalition has several potential explanations. One rationale centers on the minor recessions
of the 1950s – in 1949-1950, 1953-1954, and 1957-1958 – that together placed Congress’
focus squarely on unemployment and inflation issues. These economic downturns would
have drawn focus away from issues of education and toward more immediate questions
of economic policy. Thus, at the time when the question of veterans’ benefits was
beginning to gain traction among some interested veterans’ groups, the parties’ policy
priorities were not amenable to questions of veteran education.197 Another potential
explanation is that the peacetime draft allowed for a great deal of deferments – for
education, childrearing, etc. – that the reintegration needs of military personnel became
less salient as those who could achieve high levels of education and professional training
were already opting out of military service.198 Neither of these explanations, however,
account for why neither party would at least entertain valid policy proposals from a loyal
voting constituency.
The best explanation for this lack of attention comes in the form of the ideological
shift that the Democrats begin to undergo after 1952 (which John Gerring refers to as the
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“universalist epoch”199) and the concomitant reaction from the Republican Party in the
wake of Eisenhower’s win. As the Democrat’s platform shifted from New Deal era
policies to a focus on “the American public” (and less on individual minority groups),
singling out veterans as a target population was less aligned with this new strategy.
Similarly, the GOP’s parallel focus on the “populism of the right” (as Gerring argues)
meant that it eschewed a public emphasis on special interests in favor of supporting
“American values” held in common by the entire citizenry.

Veterans’ Affairs in the House and Senate
At the outset of the discussions concerning the Cold War G.I. Bill, several
holdovers from the development of the 1952 legislation remained in powerful positions in
Congress. While having such support would appear to mean a more influential role for
veterans’ education benefits in the legislative agendas of the late 1950s, the issue of
peacetime veterans’ education benefits was actually met with intense resistance from
various members of the veterans’ benefit coalition. The task of championing this benefit
reform would fall to various members of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and
the Subcommittee on Veterans’ Affairs (within the Committee on Labor and Public
Works) in the Senate.
In the House, Olin Teague (D-TX), who had been a major force behind the 1944
G.I. Bill investigations as well as the 1952 Korea G.I. Bill’s development, headed the
Veterans’ Affairs committee. The House Committee generally presented a unified front
on veterans’ issues, allowing the veterans’ organizations latitude in shaping each year’s
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legislative agenda (via annual testimony and review of the five largest groups’ national
resolutions). The House remained poised to move on peacetime veterans’ benefits,
insofar as their committee membership remained largely intact and featured several highranking representatives from both sides of the aisle.
The issue of peacetime veterans’ education benefits was introduced in Congress
in 1959, via legislation proposed in the Veterans’ subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare. Member of the subcommittee Lister Hill – a Democrat
from Alabama – was also chair of the full committee, and had been an advocate of the
1952 Korean War G.I. Bill. Similarly, the subcommittee contained Ralph Yarborough, a
vocal advocate for veterans who would ultimately take the lead in pressing forward with
the legislation until it was passed in 1966. Though the subcommittee setup seemed to
favor the enactment of powerful veterans’ legislation, it would not become its own
standing committee until 1970, leaving veterans’ benefit issues split between Labor and
Public Welfare, and Finance. This bifurcation of the veterans’ issues agenda would
plague Senate leaders as they attempted comprehensive action on various issues, and
leave them especially vulnerable to a powerful LPW committee (even with Hill at the
helm). Additionally, Congress would be met with strict opposition from the Eisenhower –
and later, Kennedy and Johnson – administrations, stunting the ability of the
subcommittee to even report out various versions of the legislation. Though the Senate
appeared fertile ground for increasing veterans’ benefits, it appeared that it would not be
able to match the opposition of the White House.
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The Executive: The Presidents and the VA
The Eisenhower Administration’s last year in office would be the target of the
first round of appeals for broader veterans’ benefits. The Bradley Commission had
recommended in 1956 that education benefits for veterans after the Korea War cohort be
opposed, since they would increase spending on a social program with no direct relation
to a military conflict.200 In private legislative meetings with advisors, Eisenhower
stressed the need to rein in spending and to reject any provisions for veterans that had not
served in either of the World Wars or in Korea, contending that doing so would be a
reversion to New Deal era policies.201
The Kennedy Administration kept largely silent on veterans’ benefits, giving the
semblance of agreement with the Eisenhower Administration and the Bradley
Commission’s recommendations. The Administration, similarly, did not concede ground
to the veterans’ groups’ demands for more benefits, either. In responding to appeals from
the National Director of the American Association of University Veterans (based at West
Virginia University) to provide educational benefits for the peacetime veterans, White
House Assistant Special Counsel Lee White noted that other scholarship programs will
meet the needs of the newest cohort of veterans. Holding the line of the Administration in
their overall reluctance to engage in an expansion of veterans’ education benefits, White
stated, “We do not oppose expansion of educational and training opportunities for
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peacetime ex-servicemen, but believe that these should be provided by programs
designed to increase the opportunities for all of our qualified young people.”202
It would not be until the Johnson Administration that the veterans’ benefit
coalition would meet a President that tacitly accepted – if not explicitly endorsed – its
place in their ranks. Johnson’s Great Society plans would dovetail to some extent with
the goals of reintegrating veterans, though the two goals would eventually come into
conflict as his plans for higher education reform necessarily included discussions of
education former military personnel.
Although the VA had been instrumental in advancing the interests of veterans’
groups during the development of the 1952 G.I. Bill, the agency was initially stridently
opposed to the idea of peacetime veterans’ benefits (beyond service-connected disability
programs). The VA’s strict criterion for the “deserving veteran” emerged as early as
1957, when the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs requested comments on a
measure that would extend Korea G.I. Bill benefits to those service members who had
voluntarily joined the military during January 1955, in the 30 days between the end of
active combat (in the DoD’s assessment) and the beginning of the benefit program. This
group, VA officials argued, had only willingly joined the armed forces in an attempt to
extract potential benefits from the military while not actively participating in the conflict
as other members had.203
The VA’s resistance to awarding benefits to peacetime veterans extended well
into the following decade, mirroring the Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to
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increase VA spending for the express purpose of reintegrating veterans who had not
experienced combat.204 Most of the VA’s concerns stemmed from the potential drain on
resources that a peacetime veterans’ benefit program would produce, which
administrators feared would overload the benefit system and create further delays and
backlogs. Interestingly, the VA’s assertions of its own administrative capacity had been
fervent just a few years earlier as it argued for retaining control over the veterans’
education program (despite legislative and interest group calls for its transfer to Health,
Education, and Welfare).
The efforts on the part of the VA to retain their jurisdiction over the entire set of
veterans’ benefits offered at the federal level left HEW somewhat sidelined in the debates
about further changes to the G.I. Bill’s eligibility. The agency could only weigh in on the
potential effects on higher education policy, as well as the precedent that peacetime
veterans’ benefits might set. In a letter to Teague upon request of the House Committee
on Veterans’ Affairs, one HEW administrator expressed concern that extending
peacetime veterans’ benefits was not in the national interest, and that doing so could
fundamentally alter the way in which the government distributed loans to college students
in the future.205 The agency especially questioned the format in which the veteran’s
benefits would be extended to service personnel, and whether changing the method of
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payment from tuition vouchers to types of grants or scholarships would have effects on
how aid would be extended to civilian students.
Overall, the veteran’s benefit coalition members remained divided in their
expressed interests as individual lawmakers and interest groups began to put serious force
behind a peacetime G.I. Bill. The most aggressive supporters would be found in
leadership positions in the House and Senate, and not among the veterans’ groups or VA
as had occurred during the previous iteration of legislative development following the
Korean War. The fact that coalition members were not wholly supportive of the extension
of peacetime benefits – and in some cases, were vocally opposed to the establishment of
these provisions – sets the stage for a future schism in the coalition and a potential for
these interests to overshadow attempts at cooperation.

Attempting to Cooperate
While veterans’ benefit coalition members retained diverging (or at least,
unaligned) interests in terms of a peacetime G.I. Bill, individual members of the coalition
attempted to advance various proposals to continue education assistance to veterans. In
1959, Ralph Yarborough began advocating for a “Cold War G.I. Bill,” that would have
similar positive effects on national educational attainment and employment that the
previous bills had offered.206 He did so without the majority of the veterans’ groups
offering explicit support on the measure, and also to a Senate Labor and Public Works
Committee that vocally opposed what appeared to be a “blank check” to the VA for the
foreseeable future.
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In an editorial, Yarborough argued for the adjusted compensation model of education
benefit extension, and even as a corrective for the inequality amongst those who had been
drafted for service (especially that those who were wealthy enough to attend college
would be not only exempt from service, but have that much more of an advantage in
postsecondary education than their peers serving in the military). In an editorial
responding to a column claiming the equitable nature of military service, Yarborough
argued, “I doubt that cold war veterans and their families will appreciate the force of your
subtle argument that, even though we may select for military service those of lesser
financial standing, on discharge ‘the best of these’ may compete ‘equally’ with the more
wealthy for their education.”207 Yarborough’s claims would be met with resistance from
both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, as neither was willing to increase
spending on veterans’ benefits beyond those in health and disability compensation.
Teague, at the helm of the Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the house, was already
prepared for an uphill struggle against the White House. He noted the lack of references
to veterans or veterans’ benefits programs in the 1961 State of the Union address (and
what he perceived to be silence on the subject of veterans during the 1960 presidential
campaign) to his committee.208 He interpreted this lack of rhetoric as opposition to his
committee’s active agenda, one that was becoming increasingly shaped by veteran’s
organizations who found sympathetic legislators willing to advocate on their behalf in the
committee. Teague told members of the committee and veterans’ organizations, in
looking ahead to veterans’ benefit programs for those service members who had joined
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after 1955, “We will have a tough job.”209 With a veteran’s lobby that was divided on the
issue of extending education benefits to peacetime veterans, Teague’s committee (though
internally united) was left in position of flux on peacetime veterans’ benefits through the
early 1960s. Despite the diverging interests of the veterans’ groups and the difficulty that
Yarborough and others were having in the Senate, the House committee was poised for
action – though admitting that their demands would not be met with positive reactions
from the White House.
Similarly, the VA remained unwilling to yield to lawmakers in appeals for
support for increased veterans’ education benefits. They provided repeat testimony in
House and Senate hearings that the extension of these benefits would be harmful to their
broader agenda and constituency, and mirrored presidential opposition to increased
spending for veterans who had not been in combat. By 1964, though, the Johnson
Administration’s influence would push the VA to make a deliberate turn towards support
for tuition and aid programs for veterans, and the agency would ultimately cooperate with
Teague, Yarborough, and others in advancing the legislation forward. At the outset of the
legislative process, however, the VA was unwilling to yield to legislative drives for the
expansion of the benefits program.
The lack of cooperation between and among members of the veterans’ benefit
coalition is due in large part to the lack of cohesion on the issue of peacetime G.I. Bill
benefits. Without a unifying goal for coalition members, the strain of cross-pressures
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began to corrode the fragile structure of the coalition,210 driving members back into their
own vested interests and out of important strategic arrangements around their common
issue. Thus, the previous success of reforming the 1944 G.I. Bill was not sufficient to
reify the coalition for further iterations of the reform process, as their individual interests
eventually overshadowed their previously shared position. Moreover, the definitional
questions about veteran status threw the coalition into debate over what constituted the
“American veteran,”211 and a lack of consensus among members (and varying degrees of
support for a more inclusive definition from across the coalition), further prevented
unified action on the part of coalition members. In this way, the veterans’ benefit
coalition’s divisions left it immobilized until the mid-1960s, as individual members found
support in the administration and (eventually) among veterans’ organizations.

Reform Strains the Coalition: The 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill
In earlier chapters, I argue that previous iterations of the G.I. Bill legislation
strained the coalition through their reform process (which forced to the surface the
conflicting interests of coalition members both in and out of the realm of veterans’
education benefits. The 1966 G.I. Bill was no different in this regard, though it did
sidestep some of the more contentious debates of the 1952 legislation (centered on tuition
vouchers) by introducing a more immediate conflict: defining the new American veteran.
Whereas both WWII and Korea veterans held active combat experience in common, the
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peacetime veterans could not claim the same effects of active duty service as their
predecessors. Rather, in attempting to define the new American veteran through
compulsory service – but not necessarily combat duty – Cold War G.I. Bill supporters
were drawing a more explicit connection between federal intervention and the mitigation
of inequality.
After Yarborough’s introduction of a Korea G. I. Bill extension in 1959, the
Eisenhower Administration quickly came out in opposition to Yarborough’s proposal.212
Eisenhower in particular was adamantly opposed to the idea that peacetime veterans
would receive the same treatment as those that had been involved in active combat,
telling legislative leaders that he would remain staunchly opposed to any attempts to
include peacetime veterans into the same benefit eligibility category as combat
veterans.213
Eisenhower was not alone in his opposition to the peacetime veteran receiving
education benefits. The Department of Defense also removed its support from the idea of
veteran education provisions with the realization that such a program would adversely
impact its ongoing Cold War operations. The DOD argued that the extension of the
benefits would ultimately pull qualified and trained service personnel in technical fields
out of military careers and into secondary education with guaranteed benefits.214 An
internal 1961 White House memo reiterates that the potential damage to the armed forces
could be severe, as education benefits would lure prospective non-commissioned officers
and commissioned officers out of the service and into education or training programs in
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the civilian sector. More than merely changing the definition of the category of “veteran,”
administration officials were concerned that such a benefit program would negatively
affect the potential of the military to retain quality personnel beyond their term of
compulsory service.215
Senator Yarborough moved forward, undeterred. In 1959, a set of three bills were
introduced in the Senate, only one of which (86 S. 1138) would mirror the provisions of
the previous G.I. Bills in its structure and substance. The legislation was sponsored by 26
senators, among them three of the five members of the Veterans’ subcommittee (of which
Yarborough was chair). Lister Hill (D-AL), who had been a major proponent of the 1952
Korea G.I. Bill and who chaired the Senate Labor and Public Works Committee, as also a
cosponsor and an ally above the subcommittee level. Senator John F. Kennedy was
another Veterans’ Committee member who signed onto the early version of the bill
(though he would later turn away from attempts to pass the legislation as president).
The major provision of the legislation was a combination grant and scholarship
program to replace the original method of funding postsecondary education for veterans.
The bill laid out a plan to make aid to peacetime veterans contingent upon either
successful academic progression during a probationary period (after which they would
continue to receive aid as long as they received good grades), or enrolling in in-demand
programs (essentially earning government grants for their education in desirable fields).
This aid structure replaced the tuition voucher system that had been created during the
1952 bill reforms (and which itself was a corrective to the method of direct payments to
schools in the 1944 legislation).
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The Veterans’ subcommittee and Labor and Public Works Committee successfully
reported it out to the full Senate. Then-Senator Lyndon Johnson called for a limited
debate and no further amendments to S. 1138 on January 1, effectively containing the
debate to only the provisions regarding loans to military personnel in lieu of the federal
grant program.216 The measure passed in the Senate, though the vote was clearly down
party lines with no Republicans voting in favor, and only 10 of the 63 Senate Democrats
voting in opposition (though 4 did vote “present” during the roll call).217
The bill would ultimately die in the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee due to
resistance to the education loan structure. The VA repeatedly came out in opposition to
the structure of the benefit program in S. 1138 (and its parallel bills in both the House and
Senate), actively lobbying House Committee Chair Teague to reject the measure in
committee.218 The proposed structure of the legislation was one of the major sticking
points for House Committee members, who could not reach a consensus on the
establishment of a new system of veterans’ education benefits (paralleling those offered
to civilian students through higher education aid).
The disagreements over the specific elements of S. 1138 would foreshadow a broader
debate about peacetime military service, as a Cold War G.I. Bill took shape that more
clearly resembled the ones passed in 1944 and 1952. The debates about the peacetime
G.I. Bill reforms would not be resolved until the beginning of the Johnson
Administration, at which point a new executive focus on social policy (though not
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necessarily on ones for veterans) would present coalition members with a more
supportive member in the White House and the rhetorical leverage they needed to frame a
peacetime G.I. Bill as a beneficial policy for the entire country.

The Conflict over Specific Reforms
While S. 1138 had been attached largely due to its payment structure, the
underlying question of providing benefits to peacetime veterans would prove to be the
more durable debate in the early 1960s, as select coalition members continued to
advocate for a more inclusive benefit program. Only during the Johnson administration
did coalition members find the tacit executive support they needed to move forward with
a peacetime G.I. Bill; moreover, it would be Johnson’s Great Society initiative that would
help form the basis for appeals to increased government expenditures for former service
personnel (though it was potentially the blowback from other veterans’ policies that led
to Johnson’s support of the Cold War G.I. Bill).
After the failure of his first attempt to pass S. 1138, Senator Yarborough reached
out to his former subcommittee member (and cosponsor on the bill), then-President John
Kennedy, to take up the issue of peacetime veterans’ benefits. Despite the lack of interest
on the part of the Kennedy administration to move forward with peacetime veterans’
benefits in 1960, Yarborough continued to apply pressure after his failed attempt to rouse
interest in 1959 (and a shutout in the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee). In June 1961,
he sent a call to action to White House Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, and Special
Assistants Lawrence O’Brien and Kenneth O’Donnell. “I think these needs more vital for
the preservation of the liberties of this and the succeeding generations of Americans, than
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all the other educational bills pending in the Congress combined, and I am not alone in
the Senate in this opinion.” He closed by declaring, “I am trying to get someone in high
executive office to listen to the facts.” [Emphasis his].219 A memo attached to the letter in
O’Brien’s files notes, “His proposal will certainly be given careful consideration. That
really means we will try to keep it from being adopted.”220
In sharp contrast to the Kennedy administration’s inattention to the peacetime
veteran benefits issue, the Johnson Administration was poised to engage with coalition
members (if not as a full member of the coalition itself). In November 1964, Johnson
directed then-VA Administrator J.S. Gleason to report to the White House on any
measures that would advance the cause of the Great Society. In a memo to Special
Assistant Bill Moyers, Gleason writes, “In light of these remarks [Johnson’s October 25,
1964 speech221], I have re-evaluated the situation and now recommend that the President
sponsor legislation which would extend to peacetime veterans a program of educational
assistance patterned on that provided by the Korean G.I. Bill. Such a program would be a
valuable and feasible step in achieving the Great Society.”222 Unlike the VA, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was cautious about extending full
education benefits to the peacetime veterans in 1964. Assistant Secretary Wilbur Cohen
(who had worked in the Social Security Administration and had a reputation as a social
welfare reformer) noted that the proposal had “considerable merit to providing education
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payments for ex-servicemen,” but that it should “not be a substitute for other desirable
educational proposals (scholarships, student loans, work-study programs, etc.).”223
Though the VA was ready to move ahead with the legislation in 1964, HEW
administrators remained cautious about the possible spillover effects into higher
education policy, and the potentially detrimental results for broad-based postsecondary
education aid.
The Johnson Administration, though willing to entertain peacetime veterans’
benefits as a part of its broader social policy vision, still appeared reluctant to transplant
the veterans’ benefit system into its vision of the Great Society. In a letter to Yarborough
in 1965, White House Associate Special Counsel Lee White noted that, while Johnson
was aware of the Senator’s attempts to move the legislation through committee, he was
publicly committed to universal aid in lieu of veterans-specific policies. White noted that,
“Veterans who have served their nation should be eligible to participate in these
[universal] programs…we are hopeful that this general approach will be favorably acted
upon by the Congress.”224 In fact, the Bureau of the Budget was adamant that not only
would the legislation not make economic sense within the Great Society initiative; it
would actually further anger members of the veterans’ organizations whose attention was
focused keenly on Johnson’s plan to reorganize (and close) several VA hospitals and
regional care centers.
By December 1965, Yarborough’s renewed attempt at the peacetime benefits was
contained within S.9, and Johnson Administration officials were trying to override
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Yarborough’s influence by introducing a new (similar) bill that would keep veterans’
benefits within the realm of the Great Society. However, an internal memo reveals that
Johnson’s advisors were aware that Teague would not support any bill that didn’t
originate in his committee, and an education bill would land outside of his jurisdiction.225
As discussed later in Section 3, Teague would move forward with his committee’s own
version of the legislation, sidestepping the Administration’s plan and establishing a
precedent for peacetime veterans’ benefits.
The conflict over the Cold War G.I. Bill before its ultimate passage is reflective of
a broader schism in the veterans’ benefit coalition. Though the White House was willing
to entertain a peacetime veterans’ education plan, they wanted to do so through an
expansion of HEW resources to accommodate the large number of veterans who, like
their civilian counterparts, had not been engaged in active combat – thus reifying the idea
that the peacetime veteran was more of a civilian than his WWII or Korea counterparts
who had seen active combat. However, pressure from the House – combined with an
incensed veterans’ lobby in the wake of hospital closings – eventually won out over
Johnson’s attempts to stave off the rising tide of VA funding and instead direct the
majority of eligible veterans to HEW higher education grants. Despite the inability of
many coalition members to concede to each others’ policy proposals, the work of
individual legislators once again proved decisive in extending education benefits to Cold
War era veterans.
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Spillover Effects: Higher Education and the Plan of the Great Society
While the effects of policy reform on the veterans’ benefit coalition are
significant, the more important outcome of this process is how it shaped parallel social
policies during the time period. Due to the vested interests of the veterans’ benefit
coalition members, policy advocates were able to effectively siphon momentum away
from broad-based education and training programs and instead divert significant
budgetary resources toward the Cold War G.I. Bill. Additionally, in maintaining a
distinction between veterans and civilians, the veterans’ benefit coalition further insulated
its administrative capacity (through the VA) and established a precedent for veterans’
education benefits regardless of the type of military service. The “spillover” and
“spillback” effects of the 1966 G.I. Bill stunted the development of the Great Society and
further instantiated the veterans’ lobby as a powerful political force in American politics.

Favoring Veterans’ Benefits over Universal Benefits
The Johnson Administration proposed a measure that would effectively change
the intention of S.9 (Yarborough’s more successful iteration of the peacetime veterans’
education benefits legislation). It inserted a clause that would divide the peacetime
veterans between the college assistance program (run through HEW) and the Manpower
Development and Training Act of 1962). Drafted by HEW, the stipulation would mean
that only 10% of the veteran cohort at the time would fall under the proposed
legislation’s provisions (as they had been in active combat situations), while the other
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90% would be funneled into one of the two proposed alternate tracks.226 Additionally,
internal White House memos reveal that the Administration wanted the program to begin
in 1963 (and not 1955, the end of the Korea G.I. Bill program eligibility).227 Teague was
wary of the bill and had “grave reservations,” reluctant to seek presidential endorsement
of the legislation and preferring instead to mirror the Cold War G.I. Bill on the Korea G.I.
Bill.228 Teague moved forward in committee with H.R. 11985, which left behind all of
the Administration’s recommendations and replicated the Korea War G.I. Bill, increasing
the expected budget for the legislation from $100 million to $400 million.229 The Teague
version was supported in both the House and Senate, and arrived on Johnson’s desk less
than a month later.
Upon signing the bill into law in March 1966, Johnson expressed his qualms
about the Cold War G.I. Bill, noting that the legislation did in fact undermine his broader
vision of increasing the accessibility of higher education for the broader population.
“Well, I must be frank. I had felt that we could start the new GI program, and that we
should, by providing special funds for soldiers who served in combat areas. Others could
be provided opportunity grants through the Higher Education Act. In that way, I was
hopeful that we would not ask for more than we could get, or bite off more than we could
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chew in educational costs.”230 Although the Johnson Administration had seen Congress
expand the veterans’ education assistance program beyond the scope that they had
originally considered, Johnson was in no position to veto the bill (especially after the
uproar over the consolidation of VA hospitals the previous year).
While much of the conflict surrounding the Bill was focused between Teague and
Johnson, the veterans’ organizations were also attempting to navigate the conflicted
coalition by appealing to the Great Society language while still protecting their
membership. Veterans’ groups had also couched their requests for veterans’ education
benefits in terms reflective of broader payoffs to the American citizenry via
postsecondary aid for veterans. AMVETS national commander Harold Bere referred to
the renewed attention paid to America’s comparative advantage in economic and
educational fields as a “creeping gaposis” that, while unwarranted in some fields, was
relevant to the discussions of veterans’ benefits broader impacts. Speaking of the need for
postsecondary aid for veterans, Bere claimed that while AMVETS was concerned
primarily for the economic well-being of its own membership, “my secondary and
extended thinkings [sic] relate to any justifiable opportunity which the Government has to
intensify, to diversify, to increase, and to spread as widely as possible educational
opportunities.” This is especially noteworthy because the AMVETS membership would
not have been eligible to receive any of the benefits being discussed for the post-1955
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veterans, but the organization was in favor of the extension of these benefits to the new
veteran cohort on principle.231
The American Legion spoke out against the proposed legislation, claiming that it
paid the veteran less through the VA’s program than the individual would receive
through universal HEW policies. The Legion pointed out that, under the compensation
rates for the working version of the 1966 act, stipends for single male veterans would be
about $100 per month; under the training program as a part of the War on Poverty, the
stipend would be $375 per month. The Legion argued not against the training program,
but that the veterans’ program be given more generous allowances in line with the
civilian sector.232
The concern on the part of the veterans’ groups was not limited to the
establishment of peacetime benefits, though: the groups were also nervous that the Great
Society program itself could siphon political momentum away from progress on the
benefits front for their membership. The VFW became concerned that the Great Society
program could wreak havoc upon the system of veterans’ benefits that had been
established. The 1966 National Resolution noted that the Great Society encompassed a
wide variety of benefits for the elderly and the young, but warned, “there are signposts
along the road indicating that many long-standing veterans’ rights and benefits and
services are in serious jeopardy of being eliminated or drastically curtailed.”233 The
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veterans’ groups, though initially wary of the peacetime veterans’ benefit legislation,
quickly mobilized to protect their members’ interest and advocate in favor of the plan,
rather than submitting veterans to the universal programs that civilians were accessing.
In all, the Johnson Administration was right to be suspicious of Teague and the
veterans’ organizations. A powerful combination of committee leadership and veterans’
lobbies was able to divert significant budgetary resources away from the HEW
postsecondary programs and toward veteran-specific legislation that mirrored its previous
incarnations. The passage of the Cold War G.I. Bill was sufficient to prevent the planned
expansion of HEW and the Manpower Development and Training Act, and instead shift
more funding to the VA (which had argued for its place in the Great Society initiative
through the G.I. Bill). Rather than a complement to universal policies (or a way to
address a small fraction of eligible personnel), the peacetime G.I. Bill supplanted broadbased HEW initiatives and narrowed the scope of higher education aid through its
passage.

Veterans’ Benefits and Insulation from Cross-Pressures
Despite coalition members’ attempts to effectively link the Great Society
initiative to veterans’ education benefits, the two policy spheres remained jurisdictionally
distinct following the 1966 bill. Though, as in the past, calls to better integrate parallel
programs between HEW and the VA were made by various administrators, coalition
members helped insulate veterans’ education benefits from any attempts to change their
centralized administration (through the VA). Thus, the actual administration of the
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veterans’ education benefit system was what remained truly removed from any
reorganization attempts or growing support for addressing inequality through
government-backed education initiatives. This protection of the VA and its system of
benefits fits within the concept of “spillback,” or the prevention of similar policies
through deliberate policy action in a related sphere.
The most vocal opponents of proposals to move the veterans’ education benefits
program into HEW were the veterans’ groups, who has similarly resisted these attempts
during past periods of legislative reform (in 1952). Discussions of moving veterans’
reintegration programs drew ire from the veterans’ organizations, especially the longest
standing groups. Robert E. Hansen, Commander in Chief of the VFW, testified before the
House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs that the VFW would “resist to the last man taking
away veterans programs from the Veterans’ Administration.”234 Likewise, the DAV
“utterly and fundamentally” resisted any attempts to move veterans’ programs out to the
jurisdiction of other departments under the potential reorganizing force of the Great
Society initiative.235
The veterans’ groups at this point were the most powerful proponents of the VA
and its administrative capacity, though prior to the development of the 1966 act their
interests had diverged sharply from those of the Administration. Though veterans’ groups
were more willing to consider the potential for peacetime education benefits than the VA
was, they were still reluctant to move individual programs out from under the VA’s
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oversight, for fear that any leverage that they had in determining the administration of
veterans’ policies would disintegrate.
Much as in the case of the 1952 G.I. Bill reform, legislative recommendations for
the VA to release some of its authority over the veterans’ education benefits program
were sharply opposed by veterans’ organizations. While this opposition represents a
relatively weak test of the groups’ influence in protecting the veterans’ benefit program
(since the suggestions for HEW control never went beyond issues raised in Congressional
hearings), the fact that the VA could not be seriously threatened by attempts to dismantle
its administrative capacity is in itself evidence of the VA’s durability in the face of
threats to its power – and, as a corollary, the benefit system that it was charged with
maintaining.

Conclusion
Overall, the case of the 1966 G.I. Bill reveals important connections between the
policy reform process and the understudied feedback process that can result. By
analyzing relevant archival materials from different actors involved in the policy process,
I am able to analyze a variety of perspectives on a singular process and identify potential
coalitional disagreements or strategic choices.
Here it is important to note that there is partial support for each of the three
hypotheses derived earlier: the process of reforming the G.I. Bill for peacetime veterans
did in fact reveal a fragile coalition (that was further strained by the policy development
process). This unstable coalition was, however, able to siphon political momentum (and
actual material resources) away from broad-based higher education programs and
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maintain the separate jurisdiction of the VA over veterans’ education affairs (even for
those veterans who had not served in active combat).
In expanding the G.I. Bill’s education provisions to peacetime veterans, veterans’
benefit coalition members made critical changes to both public policy and American
political culture. In the policy realm, the 1966 G.I. Bill’s supporters increased the scope
of veterans’ education benefits beyond the original intention of the 1944 or 1952
iterations of the legislation. They also managed to prevent a substantial increase in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and maintain the power of the VA in
keeping the entire program of veterans’ benefits for American service personnel distinct
from social policies for civilians.
Moreover, the establishment of the 1966 G.I. Bill signaled an important
conceptual turning point in American politics. The reality of compulsory service meant
that every veteran was now entitled to the host of benefits formerly reserved only for
those who had been involved in American military engagements. This would prove to be
an important precedent as the country became entangled in warfare in Vietnam and (soon
after) lifted the compulsory service obligation. Counting peacetime veterans as American
veterans – without asterisks or qualifiers – would set the stage for the next iteration of
veterans’ benefit legislation, and one that would test the strength of the veterans’ benefit
coalition – and the extent of its influence – in a way it had not yet experienced.
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CHAPTER 5
THE VIETNAM ERA G.I. BILL AND CONGRESSIONAL TRIUMPH

“That place was cold, man,” commented a Vietnam veteran to a reporter, when
asked about his experience with the Veterans’ Administration after seeking G.I. Bill
benefits in a VA office.236 Indeed, the veterans of the Vietnam era would be faced with a
societal reintegration process that was backed by less generous education benefit
programs than what their WWII or Korean War peers had encountered. Veterans’
education benefits as of the late 1960s had stagnated, remaining at approximately $100
per month for a single veteran, which veterans’ groups argued was not sufficient to keep
pace with rising tuition and education costs.237 However divided the public was
concerning the rationale or process of the war, the political pressure for education
benefits for veterans remained a constant. Vietnam veterans would ultimately receive
comparable benefits to those veterans of older generations, and would have only the
formidable veterans’ benefit coalition to thank for this political victory.
The story of the 1972 Vietnam Era G.I. Bill actually encompasses two decisive
political victories on the part of the veterans’ benefit coalition: an increase in education
allowance benefits in 1970, and the subsequent additional increase under the 1972
legislation. In both cases, the White House resisted the Congressional pressure for
increasing spending for the VA at the outset, ultimately acquiescing to the increased
education provisions under Congressional pressure. Interestingly, the 1972 G.I. Bill case
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presents the first in which the veterans’ benefit legislation appeared to have little
influence on concurrent higher education legislation (namely, the amendments to the
Higher Education Act of 1965 that occurred in 1972, establishing Title IX).
This chapter focuses on the political maneuvering between the veterans’ benefit
coalition and the Nixon Administration between 1968 and 1972. In both the 1970 and
1972 battles over veteran’s education benefits, Congress would once again move to the
foreground as the driving factor within the passage of the bills; namely, individual
legislators with previous success in the realm of veteran’s benefits would continue their
push for more government provisions for returning military personnel. Their own
electoral interests to satisfy veterans in their districts, combined with their past successes
and reputations for popular veterans’ benefit legislation – would drive these legislators’
actions within the House and Senate. Despite the presence of veterans’ organizations and
a new membership cohort of Vietnam era veterans to recruit, legislators were still the
major policy entrepreneurs in the realm of veterans’ education benefits. By the time of
the 1972 legislation, the veterans’ benefit coalition was distilled down into two main
allied groups of Congressional leaders (both Republican and Democrat) and veterans’
organizations.
While previous iterations of the veterans’ benefit coalition had featured a more
diverse and potentially divisive set of entities, the coalition of the 1970s bore little
resemblance to that heterogeneous and complex dynamic. After several successes in the
realm of veterans’ education benefits, the veterans’ benefit coalition was strong, unified
– and, perhaps most importantly, a strong alliance between key legislators and the
growing veterans’ lobbying groups. Key members of Congress would maximize the
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political utility of the popular G.I. Bill program to maintain favor with a critical voting
bloc, and also continue their personal legislative agendas in the field of veterans’
reintegration opportunities. As I argue in Chapters 2 and 3, the veterans’ benefit
coalition’s composition following the 1944 G.I. Bill was tilted much less in favor of
veterans’ group action, and more towards the entrepreneurship of individual legislators
with ties to veterans’ legislation.
This chapter begins with an overview of the political context at the outset of the
Nixon Administration, as well as the composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition.
Beginning first with the political fight over the 1970 education allowance increases, I
outline the tenuous relationship between Nixon’s promises to the nation’s veterans, and
his desires (and those of his party) to hold firm against the excessive government
spending of the Johnson Administration’s Great Society. This first battle sets the stage
for the 1972 Veteran Readjustment Assistance Act, and helps explain the continued
victory of the veterans’ benefit coalition in expanding the veterans’ education benefit
program. Taken together, these two legislative contests provide clear evidence of not
only the influence of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but most importantly, how
individual legislators were able to lead not only their fellow party or even committee
members, but the veterans’ groups themselves on formulating legislation that would
provide postsecondary education access to millions of returning veterans.
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Johnson, Nixon, and Vietnam: Changes in the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition
In one of his final public addresses, President Lyndon Johnson noted that both
President-Elect Richard Nixon and Vice President-Elect Spire Agnew were veterans, and
that he had faith that they would continue the record of success (or at least, success as
the veterans’ benefit coalition had defined it – that the Johnson Administration had.238
The 1968 Democratic Party platform noted the increase in GI Bill benefits for Vietnam
veterans, passed by what the platform described as an “education-minded Democratic
Congress.”239 While the Republican platform made no mention of veterans’ education
benefits, the growing issue of returning veterans was not one that the GOP – or their
newly-elected president – could easily ignore. That same year, the New York Times
reported, “The Veterans Administration is doing a brisk business in G.I. Bill benefits for
Vietnam era veterans who are returning to civilian life at an average rate of 70,000 a
month.”240 This “brisk business” would need to be sustained by an administration that
was willing to continue increasing outlays for veterans’ benefit programs and, ideally,
one that would be able to work better with the veterans’ benefit coalition than the
Johnson Administration had been able to.
However, during Nixon’s first term, the Administration faced concurrent
inflation and a rising unemployment rate, pulling much of the White House’s attention
toward federal spending and job creation programs.241 Meanwhile, the veteran
population in the country was booming. Vietnam veterans were returning at the rate of
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about one million per year between 1969 and 1972 and increasingly laying pressure on
the VA’s education programs to help the bridge the gap between military service and
civilian life. 242 By 1972, there were over 28 million veterans in the United States – a
combination of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam veterans produced by the draft and
America’s military interventions.243 This veteran population would become increasingly
politically important to the Nixon Administration, and would, at the same time, be the
cause of much strife between the White House and Congress (and even within the
Republican Party). The veterans’ benefit coalition would represent this new cohort of
Vietnam veterans, and would force Nixon to make critical decisions in his first term in
office. Nixon’s strategy was a marked difference from the way in which Johnson dealt
with the veterans’ benefit coalition, and the debates over the G.I. Bill in the late 1960s
would establish the framework within which the veterans’ benefit coalition would
attempt to address the returning Vietnam War veteran cohort.

Johnson and Congress: The Afterglow of the 1966 G.I. Bill
Toward the end of President Johnson’s final term, he began to express more
unqualified support for increased veterans’ education benefits. Such a change in rhetoric
is surprising given his resistance to the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill, but in his message to
Congress on January 31, 1967, Johnson recommended an increase in the educational
allowance from $100 to $130 per month.244 It would be this recommendation to which
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veterans groups like the DAV would later refer as their policy proposals for returning
Vietnam veterans.245 He would later relax his pressure for education benefits somewhat,
preferring to focus more on veteran healthcare and hospitalization, an area that had
proved thorny for him during the debate over the 1966 G.I. Bill. In January 1968,
Johnson, in a special message to Congress, called on legislators to do more for job
placement and health (didn’t specifically mention increases to GI Bill funding).246 It
would ultimately be the Nixon Administration that would be tasked with addressing the
rising disparity between veterans’ education benefits and postsecondary education costs,
though Johnson’s public support for increased benefits provided veterans’ groups with
presidential support late in his final term. Upon signing in education extensions to
widows of service members under HR 16025 (PL 82 Stat. 1331) in October 1968,
Johnson remarked that it was a “veterans bill – yes. But most important of all, an
education bill that will not only recognize the veterans’ service, but will enrich the
Nation that he fought and gave his blood to protect.” In his remarks, he also mentioned
two key members of the veterans’ benefit coalition – Senator Yarborough and
Representative Teague – as critical to the cause of veterans’ education benefits writ
large.247
Teague and Yarborough would continue to be instrumental to the cause of
veterans from their positions within Congress, though their experiences negotiating the
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1966 G.I. Bill had somewhat strained their working relationship. Though the two shared
in common their experience as veterans and the same constituency groups in Texas,
Teague’s desire for increased benefits for veterans was tempered somewhat by his fiscal
conservatism.248 Yarborough, meanwhile, was becoming more openly critical of the
Vietnam War (of both Johnson and, eventually, Nixon’s handling of the conflict) and
more willing to back sweeping legislation for service members.249

The Veterans’ Groups Begin to Mobilize for the Vietnam Veteran
Beginning in 1967, the veterans’ groups began paying increasing attention to the
issue of returning Vietnam veterans and the applicability of the Cold War G.I. Bill to
these new veterans’ academic pursuits. The veterans’ groups were unified in their
concern over the gap between rising education costs and the static payment structure
offered to veterans for education expenses, but none of the groups had offered a defined
proposal as to their policy preference.
In testimony before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, American
Legion National Commander John Davis noted that the benefits paid to veterans through
the 1966 legislation were not keeping pace with the dramatic increases in college tuition
that had occurred since the Korea War legislation had been considered. Davis noted the
figures from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that suggested that
postsecondary education expenses had risen 45% in public institutions, and nearly 62%
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in private schools.250 While he conceded that education alone wouldn’t “do the whole
job,” in terms of reintegrating veterans back into society, the Legion remained
committed to the principle of increasing benefits for Vietnam veterans.251 AMVETS
leaders remarked that the GI Bill had once been perceived as a “giveaway program,” but
in reality proved the ability of the VA to administer a broad-scale education program
alongside other veterans’ assistance programs, and as such deserved to be repeated for a
new cohort of veterans.252
The Veterans of Foreign Wars articulated their support in the broader context of
past victories for veterans through the prior iterations of the G.I. Bill. The VFW’s
national resolutions of 1969 mentioned that the education allowances were “for years the
high-water makers of a constructive and progressive society. These programs have
shown the way. This, they must continue to…The merit of sound, valued, social
programs for all citizens, that are underway now, should not be permitted to subordinate
nor submerge the nation’s commitment to its veterans.”253 The VFW’s recognition of the
inherent national value of the veterans’ education benefit program would not be echoed
by the rest of the major veterans’ organizations, as they groups pushed to further detach
veterans from the Great Society programs of the 1960s and retain them in a protected
class (administered solely by the VA). However, in sharp contrast to the effects of G.I.
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Bill reform noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the 1972 G.I. Bill’s legislative process does not
appear to have created consequences for parallel education programs at the time. The
veterans’ groups, however, were still guarded about the potential for moving veterans
into the jurisdiction of other bureaucratic agencies from prior G.I. Bill battles.
It was only the Disabled American Veterans who offered specific policy
proposals in their remarks to Congress concerning veterans’ education benefits. The
DAV supported an increase in the education assistance allowances by 30%, from $100
to $130 per month, for all veterans regardless of service-connected disability. Moreover,
the DAV wanted to amend the education benefit eligibility guidelines – under 1952
Korea G.I. Bill, a veteran could receive 1.5 days of education per day of service; under
the 1966 law, the compensation was one month of education per month of service. The
DAV explicitly recommended in their national guidelines that all Cold War veterans
(that is, anyone who served after the January 1, 1955 deadline for inclusion under the
Korea G.I. Bill) should be covered under the 1.5/1 ratio outlined in the 1952
legislation.254 These early proposals would become the basis of the policy provisions that
would be debated in 1970, and again in 1972, concerning how best to compensate
Vietnam veterans.
The position of the veterans’ benefit coalition heading into 1969 was beginning
to take shape. Veterans’ groups, increasingly aware of the potential membership swell
due to returning Vietnam veterans, combined with media acknowledgement of the
increased pressure of these veterans, were positioned to look for increases in education
payments. No longer concerned with validating the position of the veteran (as they had
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been in 1952 and 1966), the groups were now more clearly focused on making the
existing programs more generous. Likewise, the Johnson Administration had softened its
position slightly on veteran’s benefits though, in handing over the White House to the
Nixon Administration, the role of the President in the veterans’ benefit coalition was
unclear. Would Nixon embrace his campaign promises of fiscal conservatism and try to
reign in VA spending, or would he be forced to acknowledge the popularity of the G.I.
Bill as an institution and continue to renew its promises for the newest group of
veterans? Ultimately, though, the two most important architects of the Cold War G.I.
Bill remained in Congress, and Teague and Yarborough were now adept at dealing with
one another and their respective committees. Their respective reputations as champions
for veterans’ benefit legislation preceded them, and their vested interest in reforming the
G.I. Bill appeared grounded in their past legislative successes and the perception of both
as strong advocates for veterans’ benefits.255 The fight for education allowance increases
in 1970 would be the first test that the veterans’ benefit coalition had faced since the
1966 G.I. Bill, and one that ultimately paved a notably smoother path for the 1972
version of the legislation than the coalition had previously enjoyed.

The 1970 Education Benefit Increases and Nixon’s Predicament
As the Vietnam veteran cohort grew, the White House would be forced to respond
to the pressure of the veterans’ benefit coalition to make substantive changes to existing
policies, especially given the rising unemployment and inflation rates of Nixon’s first
term in office. Nixon’s response revealed his attempt to mitigate the influence of the
coalition by attempting to stall them, before turning toward his fellow Republican on the
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House Veterans’ Committee (Teague) to try to salvage the Administration’s stance
against federal spending. The influence of the veterans’ groups in national policy areas,
combined with the White House’s knowledge of the importance of veterans in electoral
contests, ultimately drove the Nixon Administration to bend to the pressure of the
veterans’ benefit coalition in 1970. Nixon’s predicament over his handling of the
education allowance increases became the policy window that veterans’ supporters
needed to make the changes they had been hoping for since the end of the Johnson
Administration.
By the summer of 1969, the Nixon Administration was fielding increasing
pressure from veterans’ groups for expanded education and healthcare benefits. In
response to calls by the major national groups (such as the VFW and Legion), Nixon
appointed a new VA administrator with strong Legion ties to replace William Driver.
Donald Johnson was the former Legion national commander, and had lobbied before
Congress for the 1966 G.I. Bill, among other pieces of legislation.256 News media began
to question the ability of Johnson to actively restrain the requests of the veterans’ groups,
as requests for expansion of medical services and increased education allowances further
added to the “bloated veterans budget…among a multitude of new proposals that clearly
are not related to sacrifices made on behalf of a nation at war.” The New York Times
suggested that, “the new Administrator’s background as a spokesman for an organization
that has repeatedly made intemperate demands on the public treasury in the name of
veterans is not encouraging.”257 One of Nixon’s first actions with Johnson at the helm of
the VA was to create a special commission to study the veterans’ budget, in the hopes of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
256
257

Robert B. Semple, Jr. 1969. “New V.A. Director Appointed by Nixon,” New York Times, June 6, 1969.
The New York Times. 1969. “Benefits to Veterans.” July 4, 1969, 20.

147!

!

preserving his intention of curbing spending while appeasing veterans’ organizations’
interests.258
In June 1969, Nixon called for the development of the President’s Committee on
the Vietnam Veteran, claiming in a public address that:
Veterans benefit programs…have become an investment in the future of
the veteran and of his country. The time has come for a careful
reevaluation of this investment. Just as there is a difference between the
kinds of battles fought in Normandy in 1944 and in South Vietnam in
1969, so there is also a difference in the kinds of problems faced by the
returning veterans of these battles. Therefore, we must be certain our
programs are tailored to meet the needs of today's veterans.259
Nixon’s attempts to moderate the influence of the veterans’ benefit coalition by delaying
action with an exploratory committee were not sufficient to prevent the veterans’ groups
and Congress from realizing their own vision for the future of the G.I. Bill program. The
issue of the education allowance – the payments made to veterans attending
postsecondary institutions to aid them with expenses – would become the focal point of
the veterans’ benefit coalition that year. The pressure to increase these assistance
payments would come from all members of the coalition, leaving the Nixon
Administration to make difficult decisions about their reactions to the push for increased
benefits.

The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition and Internal Motivations
At the helm of the push for increased education assistance payments for veterans,
much as he was during the fight over the Cold War G.I. Bill, was Texas Senator Ralph
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Yarborough (a full discussion of his efforts with the legislation can be found in Chapter
3). Yarborough was galvanized by his success with the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill and
what he perceived as a pending victory in the upcoming 1970 elections (for his third
term as senator). Yarborough was appointed chair of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, and was widely recognized for championing various causes of
health and public assistance in the Great Society tradition.260 In testimony concerning
S338 (the Senate version of the education allowance increase legislation, offering a 46%
increase in subsidy payments for veterans), Yarborough proclaimed, “It took 8 years to
pass [the Cold War G.I. Bill]. I have been in the Senate 12 years. It was the longest,
hardest fight of my service, because in those 8 years I had the opposition of the three
Presidents with whom I served, of every Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, and, most
of all, the Defense Department and the Bureau of the Budget.”261 Yarborough’s impetus
for championing the cause of the Vietnam veterans was at once based in past success, as
well as his impending reelection in Texas – a state with an increasingly discontented
electorate in the wake of Civil Rights legislation, represented by an explicitly liberal
Democrat (which would ultimately turn away from Yarborough in the 1970 election).262
Yarborough’s attempts to build a strong coalition in favor of an expanded veteran’s
education benefit system was as much a function of his bid for reelection and the
popularity of veterans’ benefits,263 as it was his own personal experience with the Cold
War G.I. Bill.
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In testimony before the House VAC, the leadership of the various veterans’
organizations focused on the alternate legislation (11925) as a more realistic proposition
than the Teague bill. The DAV was more willing to place its support what it identified as
a more “liberal” provision in light of the rising costs of higher education;264 similarly,
the American Veterans’ Commission endorsed HR 11925 because it would bring the
House version of the legislation more in line with Yarborough’s plans for increased
provisions in the Senate.265
The other major veterans’ groups soon followed in step, providing a unified
veterans’ organization voice in favor of increasing the assistance payments for veterans
in college. AMVETS offered its support for the bill, though, as in the case of the 1966 G.
I. Bill, its membership did not stand to reap the same benefits as the newest cohort of
veterans.266 The American Legion, which had offered tempered support for the Cold
War G.I. bill initially, also swung its support behind HR 11925.267 The VFW’s
leadership claimed that the original intent of the 1944 G.I. Bill – to provide college
educations to returning service members – was not being realized in the current form of
the Cold War G.I. Bill provisions: “the GI Bill helps, but the veteran is hurting.”
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Alongside the rest of the veterans’ groups, the VFW offered its endorsement of the more
generous assistance plan.268
Thus, at least at the outset of the negotiations over increased education payments
for veterans, the major coalition members in the Senate (Yarborough and, to a lesser
extent, his colleague Alan Cranston) were able to set the agenda for the discussions of
provisions for increased allowances in the House. Though Teague’s original plan in HR
11959 was less generous, he would be forced to meet Yarborough on his – and the
veterans’ groups – new terms.

The Legislative Process and Conflict in Congress
On June 9, 1969, just days after Nixon’s announcement of his Vietnam Veteran
task force, Teague and Brown introduced HR 11959 in the House, and it was referred to
the House VAC.269 The bill offered an increase the rates of education assistance under
Chapters 31, 34, and 35 of Title 38, United States Code. Ch. 34 is directly related to
those who have served in the military since January 1, 1955 – or out of the eligible group
for the Korea War veteran’s benefits.270 Adair noted that the previous GI Bills had made
the veteran population “better educated, better able to command higher wages.”271
Just days after being sworn in as Administrator of the VA, Johnson appeared before the
House VAC on June 25 to testify on several measures relevant to returning veterans, one
of which being HR 11959. Johnson mentioned the VA’s investigation into the veterans’
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education program, citing it as a reason to move slowly in considering any additional
increases in veterans’ education allowances. The VA “study” was meant to help stall for
an Administration response to the growing push for HR 11959. Donald Johnson
expressed hesitation before the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee at moving too
quickly on the issue of increased funding for education allowances, advocating instead
that the House wait for the report of the President’s Task Force before moving forward
with specific provisions.272

Nixon’s Reaction and an Intermediate Veteran Victory
On August 3, 1969, Olin Teague moved to suspend the rules and pass HR 11959.
Two thirds voted in favor of the motion to suspend the rules and the bill was passed with
its amendments, 404-0.273 Numerous representatives took to the floor during debate on
the measure, citing the need for increasing veterans’ education benefits as a means to
spur growth in the higher education sector and potentially increase veterans’
participation in the G.I. Bill program (to further validate the policy’s usefulness in the
current era). The House’s measure was clearly more generous than the provisions
considered by the White House, and the House was, as Boulton argues, “very selfsatisfied.”274
In early September, Kenneth Cole summed up the White House’s situation
succinctly for Deputy Assistant to the President Darrell Trent: “The whole problem boils
down to this. The Administration does not have an offensive program for veterans. The
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offense has been seized by Olin Teague, and the Veterans Administrator, Don Johnson,
feels that he has been left at the post.” Cole explained further that the White House was
unable to bolster any VA claims to legislative development on the education allowance
issue, because doing so would place Nixon in a difficult position: he would have to
backpedal on this position regarding reining in expenditures in FY 1970.275
In the meantime, the rest of the Nixon Administration was beginning to weight in
on the viability of the veterans’ education allowance increases. In early September 1969,
the HEW sent a memo to Nixon adviser Stephen Hess that apprised him of the
comparisons between HR 11959 and the Yarborough legislation, noting that the
Yarborough plan offered an additional increase of $30 per month (over HR 11959’s
$165 proposal). The memo cited that Cranston, chairing the subcommittee of the Labor
and Public Welfare Senate Committee, was “strongly for” the Yarborough bill and
complementary legislation that would provide additional grants to postsecondary schools
for disabled veterans.276 At the same time, VFW leadership was meeting with White
House officials. A memo to Bryce Harlow (Counselor to the President and a trusted
Nixon adviser) mentioned that the VFW was concerned about veterans being “lumped in
with ‘welfare’ cases” and with Nixon’s seeming intractability on the issue of increases to
veterans’ education allowances up for debate in Congress.277
By October, the Nixon Administration was beginning to voice more strident
opposition to the legislation, at least internally. The Bureau of the Budget warned the
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White House about the potential for the increased education allowances to “strain further
the credibility of the President’s commitment” to holding federal outlays firm (at about
$193 billion) in FY1970. The BOB warned that, “together with other budget overruns,
these amount simply cannot be accommodated within the budget as presently
planned…the Veterans Administration is not now in a position [emphasis original]” to
absorb the costs of the increased allowances by forcing them to cut in other program
areas.278 Nixon adviser Arthur Burns explicitly warned Nixon of the potential
developments in Congress. He noted that the President was likely to receive a “costly
bill” sometime in November, and that he needed to make a decision about how to best
address the proposed increases in the education allowances. Burns warned, “Continued
silence may be construed as acquiescence. Our Republican colleagues in Congress will
then believe that they are free to do whatever they feel is in their own best interests. This
process has already taken place in the House and may soon take place in the Senate.” He
further argued that, while holding firm on a position of no increases would increase
Nixon’s credibility in holding firm against inflation, doing so would not be likely to
mesh with Congress’ willingness to make increases in line with education costs.
Attempting to propose an increase that would come in below the Congressional 46%
level would “be popular with the Congress but it would make a mockery of your fight
against inflation.”279
On October 21, 1969, Nixon sent a letter to Yarborough and appealed to him for
help reining in the House measure, which he argued would increase benefits beyond the
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cost of living increases or the increase in education costs since the 1967 measure signed
in by Johnson.280 After receiving the letter from Nixon, Yarborough called a press
conference to discuss Nixon’s letter with the press.281 The following week, Johnson
reported to the White House on the “G.I. Bill Allowance Hassle,” claiming that Teague
has discussed publicly in the media that Nixon should not be “so naïve as to expect a bill
with less than the 27-percent voted by the House.”282
By November, the VA and White House expected that Teague would call up HR
11959, agree to the Senate amendment, and send it back to the Senate for a vote.283
Teague, however, was willing to work with the White House on keeping the increase in
educational allowances as low as possible. In a memo from Deputy Counselor Richard
Burress to Bryce Harlow, Burress noted that he had met with Teague, who was
amendable to “holding the line,” provided he had “some assistance.” Teague asked the
White House to signal disapproval of the Yarborough plan, so that Teague could push
for acceptance of the House version. Teague conveyed to Burress that doing so would
mean that Senate would push for a conference, which Teague noted would “not be an
easy one.”284 The White House was attempting to remain relatively uninvolved in the
issue, hoping that Teague would be able to hold out in the House and push the measure
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into the second session, effectively reducing some of its momentum. However, Richard
Burress noted that, while Republican John Saylor (a committee member) was willing to
tow the Republican line and resist large increases in education payments, fellow
Republican Teague would probably allow the measure to pass, carrying the other
Republican members of the committee along with him.285
In December 1969, Nixon reached out the House and Senate leadership, appealing
to them to curb spending given the increase in veterans’ program spending.286 The
matter would not be resolved by the end of the year, however, pushing the battle well
into the following winter. In early 1970, Nixon’s budget address to Congress outlined
the 1971 FY budget, with over 40% of federal outlays dedicated to “human resources,”
including the Great Society programs and veterans’ benefits.287 In a memo from Kenneth
Cole to John Erlichman, Cole positioned the VA to formulate a report for Nixon the
political cost and benefit analysis of vetoing HR 11959 (in whatever format the
conference committee would eventually release it). Cole told Erlichman that Teague was
still attempting to “hold out for his 30.8% increase versus the 46% increase
recommended by the Senate.”288 In a memo to Richard Burress, Bryce Harlow
contended that the Republican conferees were unwilling to back the 35% increase, which
kept the Democrats from moving up from the 30.8% increase offered by the House, and
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the 46% increase that the Senate was promoting.289
The White House’s unwillingness to come out with a definitive stance on some
level of increase to the education assistance payments began to attract negative attention
from the veterans’ groups. Bryce Harlow warned Darrell Trent that the veterans’ groups
were becoming agitated with the White House for its resistance to increasing education
benefits. Harlow ominously warned that a veto would mean, “there will be blood knee
deep running down Constitution Avenue. I think this problem needs urgent attention.
The President requires the support of these groups on the ABM fight.”290
Ehrlichman (an Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs) knew that the cost
of vetoing HR 11959 would go far beyond the veterans’ benefit programs. In a memo to
Nixon after the bill was out of conference, Ehrlichman argued that a veto would risk
other key Administration agenda items by isolating the middle class (composed of
veterans and their families), key members of Congress who had thrown their support
behind the education increases, and the veterans’ organizations whose support,
Ehrlichman claimed, “is vital in the legislative battle over the ABM system and other
key legislative proposals.”291
Further, it would give the White House an “anti-education image,” and with broad
bipartisan support, any veto would be overridden anyway. Though vetoing the measure
would “have a moderating effect of Congressional handling of other pending legislation
that may exceed Administration spending requests,” Ehrlichman and Johnson concurred
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that the effects would ultimately be disastrous for the Administration.292 While many of
his advisors were in agreement, Bryce Harlow dissented, arguing that Nixon should
instead veto it symbolically (expecting it to be overridden). Harlow told the President “I
am afraid this action will cost the President heavily later this year.”293
In early March 1970, VA chief Donald Johnson warned Nixon and his staff that
Congress was considering further increasing the allowances to veterans under the G.I.
Bill provisions, warning that their proposals included “increases the President might
view excessive.” Johnson further noted that the Senate was “on the higher side” with a
proposed increase of nearly 46% over the existing educational allowances for single
veterans without dependents.294 The Nixon Administration, faced with increasing
concerns about the viability of pushing ahead on the ABM without the support of the
veterans’ groups, was now backed into a corner: moving in favor of increased education
payments made Nixon backtrack on his promises to rein in federal spending in FY1970,
and also to stem the growing tide of federal intervention that had been constructed
within the Great Society. However, taking an opposing stance to the increased benefits
was increasingly less of a choice for the Administration. The only viable option left in
mid-March 1970 was a veto – one that would, in all likelihood, anger the same veterans’
groups that Nixon was looking to court for support on his ABM legislation. Nixon
reluctantly signed the bill into law on March 26, 1970, granting the veterans’ benefit
coalition a major victory, pushing education allowances up nearly three times what the
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White House had originally advocated.
However, not all of the members of the veterans’ benefit coalition benefitted
equally from the passage of the legislation. Yarborough in particular was unable to
leverage the success of the legislation into an election victory in 1970, and was defeated
in the Democratic primaries by challenger Lloyd Bentsen.295 While the veterans’
organizations celebrated their legislative victory, the coalition would lose one of their
most important allies in the Senate. Additionally, Teague’s inability to hold the
Administration’s line on the amount of benefit increases was indicative of the broader
trend of the House VAC. Though the White House had attempted to use Teague as their
last line of defense against a major increase in payments – and, to an even greater extent,
maintain a semblance of neutrality while not making it seem as if Congress had a free
pass from the President – Teague alone was not in a position to keep the other members
of the veterans’ benefit coalition in line.
The Nixon Administration’s attempts to stunt the power of the veterans’ benefit
coalition also cost the White House a certain amount of credibility when it came to his
ability to negotiate with Congressional leaders and the veterans’ groups. Nixon had
originally proposed that the allowance be increased by 13%, but signed HR 11959
accepting the 34.6% increase as “reasonable,” in the words of press secretary Ronald L.
Ziegler.296 It would be this electoral battle that would set the stage for the 1972 G.I. Bill
debate – one that would once again move the rising costs of higher education to the
forefront, though with a decidedly less contentious political fight over how best to
address the problem.
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The 1972 G.I. Bill: Further Expansions of Veterans’ Education Program Benefits
Unlike the political contest over the 1970 allowance increases, the impetus behind
the 1972 G.I. Bill was actually ensuring that the program was reaching its maximum
eligible population. A newfound focus on the utilization rates of the G.I. Bill pushed
members of the veterans’ benefit coalition into action, to protect the popular approval of
their program and to continue pacing increases in veterans’ benefits with rising inflation.
Also unlike the 1970 legislative process, the White House had learned its lessons from
its battles with veterans’ supporters. Rather than direct opposition or looming threats of a
veto, the White House endorsed increases more in line with the Congressional requests
(and those of the veterans’ groups), making negotiations proceed at a much quicker pace.
The negotiations concerning education increases drew attention to the difference
in education benefit utilization rates among Vietnam veterans. Only approximately 25%
of those veterans who were eligible for the new G.I. Bill benefits were utilizing the
program, a statistic that dismayed many in the VA and the public. Especially
troublesome was the fact that the veterans most disproportionately affected were racial
minorities and those from lower socioeconomic brackets; additionally, an increasing
number of under-education veterans had not completed high school and were ineligible
for postsecondary tuition assistance.297 In his 1972 State of the Union address, Nixon
mentioned the G.I. Bill increases, but spent more time discussing the role of employment
programs and the necessity to assist veterans’ in finding suitable occupations following
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military service.298 It was clear that the Nixon Administration’s answer to the problem of
rising costs was a focus on improving employment options for returning veterans and
not, necessarily, a renewed interest in education allowances. However, the victory of
1970 had given the veterans’ benefit coalition an important lesson in how to interact
with the Nixon Administration, and it would serve the coalition well as they considered
their plan for a renovated G.I. Bill in 1972.

The Push for Increased Allowances
The writing was on the wall, in a sense, when it came to the veterans’ benefit
coalition’s move to increase education allowance payments even further than they had in
1970. The lessons of the previous legislation had been difficult, but they primed the
Nixon Administration to be prepared to not place all of their reliance on Teague’s ability
to rein in veterans’ supporters in the House. In June 1971, VA Chief Donald Johnson
warned Domestic Affairs Assistant John Ehrlichman about the important role that
Teague was likely to play on veterans’ benefit policies in the 1972 Congress. With
proposals on a new G.I. Bill and VA medical care expansion heading toward markups,
Johnson was concerned that Teague was not going to act in defense of the Nixon
Administration’s interests when it came time to negotiate upcoming veterans’
legislation. Johnson noted that Teague, while “a conservative at heart” who had been
“very effective in past years in standing pat…to avoid undue spending or other unwise
measures in the field of veterans affairs,” might still feel slighted after Nixon refused a
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private meeting with him in late 1969.299 The stage was set for the White House to place
less faith in Teague this time around, and instead to attempt to negotiate as best it could
with the veterans’ benefit coalition as a whole.

The White House Response and a Second Victory
As Congress opened in 1972, the issue of increased education payments was on
the agenda, as well as the focus of the Administration. The VA, which had remained
relatively silent on the 1970 allowance increases, was in the midst of an investigation
into the education benefits offered to veterans (prompted by outcries over the low
utilization rates of the 1966 G.I. Bill among returning Vietnam veterans).
The OMB reported on its observations of the VA’s National Task Force on
Education and the Vietnam Veteran to the White House, and realized the impending
increase in benefit levels (and thus federal outlays) if some of the recommendations of
the Task Force were to be made public. Notably, the Task Force’s preliminary proposals
indicated a willingness on the part of two newest veterans’ benefit coalition senators –
Hartke and Cranston – to return to the WWII system of direct tuition payments to
postsecondary institutions. The OMB Assistant Director, Paul O’Neill, revealed that the
VA would prevent the public release of the Task Force’s initial reports so as to not add
fuel to the fire of the veteran’s benefit coalition’s efforts.300
In the weeks that followed, The White House read public opinion as turning
somewhat away from the promise of higher education for veterans. Advisors in the
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Nixon Administration claimed that the president was willing to invest more in vocational
training programs for veterans than to throw its weight behind a traditional G.I. Bill
design (which would privilege postsecondary education in theory, though pay out the
same amounts in benefits to those in vocational education programs).301 Although
moving the discussion about how to best assist veterans would have placed the White
House back on the familiar ground that Nixon had laid out in his prior public addresses,
the coalition – led by Congress – would ultimately push the Nixon Administration back
into a discussion about higher education.
The White House endorsed a $200/month allowance due to the increase in the
Consumer Price Index from 1971 to 1972. The White House went into conference with a
low number, expecting to be forced slightly higher (though not as high as the Senate’s
proposed $225/month). Though Teague was told to hold the line against Hartke’s
increase, he took his own initiative and, White House advisors note, “without our
prompting, delivered the 48 hour ultimatum to Hartke.” Evans warned the President of
appearing to side with the Senate, when Teague had been “loyal and valiant,” and it
simultaneously risked selling out the Republicans on the newly-formed Senate Veterans’
Affairs Committee. Evans recommended inaction on the part of the White House to give
the semblance of Congressional gridlock – and, in particular, what Evans suggested
could be framed as “the insensitive Senate.”302 Ken Cole noted ominously in his
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comments, “We’re headed for trouble here.”303
The role of the new Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the Senate – created in 1970
– was as yet untested, and remained a point of uncertainty for White House advisors.
Evans pointed out that the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee was a “new animal” with
a new staff that was not yet accustomed to engaging in conference deliberations with the
House Committee’s staff.304 A new committee –though headed by senators who were
amenable to increasing education payments for veterans – was unpredictable in
conference negotiations, and placed even more weight behind Teague’s willingness to
support the line of the Administration.
Meanwhile, Congressional pressure for higher allowances was building from
inside and outside the VACs. Twelve Republicans and six Democrats signed onto a
letter to Teague and Hartke, urging them to agree on a $250 allowance deal in
conference. The White House immediately went on the offensive, contacting the
Congressional Republicans and reaching out to veterans’ group lobbyists to contact the
Democrats on the letter, telling them “that the Senate version is the wrong place to be.”
John Evans, in a memo to Bill Rhatican (who worked under Colson in the Office of
Special Counsel), argued that those who signed onto the letter were not necessarily
apprised on the importance of the issue, let alone the official position of the White
House.305
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After coming out of conference – and under the threat that the house Rules
Committee would not put legislation without clear consensus (coming out of conference)
up for a vote – the White House was prepared to accept the $220 offer. Nixon’s advisors
contended that there was “no particular need to kick Hartke, the Senate or Congress on
the eve of a compromise.”306 On October 24, Nixon signed the bill into law, ushering in
another victory for the powerful veterans’ benefit coalition.

Conclusion
During Nixon's first term, Congress increased GI education benefits for a single
veteran with no disabilities enrolled in college by 34.6 per cent. In 1969 a single veteran
enrolled in a VA-supported college program received $130 per month. Beginning
October 1, 1972, he received $220 per month.307 The sharp increase in benefits for
Vietnam veterans was not at the direct action of the White House, however. Rather, it
was a concerted effort on the part of Congressional leaders – members of the veterans’
benefit coalition – to realize personal agendas in a particular policy area that held
potential electoral benefits for them.
While earlier versions of the veterans’ benefit coalition had been large and
diverse, the newest iteration of the coalition was small, and distilled down to a few key
categories of members: veterans’ organizations, members of Congress, and the Veterans’
Administration. While this arrangement of the coalition exemplifies the “iron triangle”
in its purest sense, the coalition politics inherent in the debate over veterans’ education
benefits highlights a powerful feedback dynamic as well as inequalities in the levels of
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influence that each member enjoyed. Though veterans’ groups supported the education
allowance increases of 1970, they were led toward this goal largely by Congressional
leaders who, acting with the tacit consent of the Johnson Administration, were willing to
consider further increasing the scope of the veterans’ benefit program.
Moreover, the 1972 G.I. Bill highlights the changing role of the White House in
the veterans’ benefit coalition. Though rhetorically on the side of the veterans, the Nixon
Administration was, like Republican and Democrat administrations before it, hesitant to
provide veterans with a blank check for postsecondary education. Despite Nixon’s
endorsement of changes to higher education funding, he remained resistant to the idea of
granting major increases to Vietnam veterans for education alone (especially when both
public and private statements revealed that his Administration would have been more
comfortable focusing on the importance of job growth amidst rising unemployment).
Additionally, the 1972 G.I. Bill process sheds light on the temporal element of
policy development, specially how feedback processes can generate new political
contexts for similar policies moving forward. The victory of the veterans’ benefit
coalition in 1970 established that strong Congressional leadership – with or without a
major show of force by the veterans’ organizations – could effectively set the agenda for
changes to veterans’ benefit policy.
What is absent from the process of the 1972 G.I. Bill is its affects on related social
policies. While some veterans’ groups (like the American Veterans’ Committee) noted
that the expanding role of the veterans’ benefit system might be best integrated with
broader welfare policies – there was no major effects on parallel social policy efforts
during this timeframe. The veterans’ benefit coalition, in reducing down to a small but

166!

!

powerful group of members, appeared to have lost its interest in affecting parallel social
policies alongside veterans’ benefits. While an expansion in veteran’s education
allowances was, at least rhetorically, tied to the broader budget (and social welfare
policies in particular), there were no attempts by veterans’ benefit coalition members to
actually engage parallel welfare state policies in the legislative battles of 1970 or 1972.
Instead, coalition members focused almost exclusively on negotiating within their own
terms, and pushing the White House toward their desired course of action.
Overall, the 1972 G.I. Bill case highlights the evolving abilities of the veterans’
benefit coalition in maximizing their leverage against countervailing forces. The
coalition maintained its power throughout its struggle for increased education benefits,
and actually improved its chances for its version of the 1972 G.I. Bill due to its success
in 1970.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The G.I. Bill enjoys a prominent role in American political history, due to the
scope and magnitude of its effects on the economy, society, and politics. The Greatest
Generation’s existence is attributed to the legislation’s ability to help ease readjustment
for returning veterans, and ultimately relax some of the class barriers that had existed
prior to the start of World War II. Moreover, the legislation is used as a prime case study
for explanations of policy feedback theory, suggesting that the policy generated positive
effects in the civic engagement of a growing American middle class.308 Despite an
understanding of the positive effects that the original G.I. Bill had on those who utilized
its benefits, political scientists are left with two separate, but interrelated questions: how
did the 1944 G.I. Bill establish a potential policy feedback loop for the other iterations of
the legislation (and under whose direction); and, how did these moments of policy
development in the field of veterans’ benefits affect parallel processes occurring in social
policy aimed at the civilian American population?
In analyzing the four iterations of the G.I. Bill’s education provisions between
1943 and 1973, I contend that the architect of these bills is in fact a fractured coalition of
diverging political interests and sharply contrasted members. Moreover, despite the
veterans’ benefit coalition’s membership including major veterans’ interest groups
(which were credited with the mobilization behind the passage of the 1944 legislation),
largely individual legislators championed the subsequent versions of the tuition assistance
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programs within the G.I. Bill. The inability of the coalition to agree completely on policy
provisions – combined with individual member interests in opposition with one another –
created a loose organization that was only thinly connected under a common goal of
increased educational assistance provisions for veterans.
Additionally, I argue that the divided membership of the coalition led to
demonstrable effects for the development of several parallel social policies during the
time periods in which the G.I. Bill revisions were being debated. More specifically, G.I.
Bill politics were able to constrain broad-based reintegration programs in the immediate
post-war era, replacing other policy proposals for large scale training and unemployment
compensation programs. Moreover, G.I. Bills reforms in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s
maintained the student-veteran within a privileged class, minimizing the potential of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, while at the same time imposing accreditation
requirements for federal education funding (via the 1952 G.I. Bill). Taken together, the
heterogeneous coalition was able to effectively shape American welfare state
development (via education and training policies), presenting and foreclosing particular
options depending upon the coalition’s attempts to maintain VA jurisdiction over the
veterans’ benefit regime. Interestingly, these effects did not extend into the case of the
1972 G.I. Bill, although concurrent higher education policies were also being formulated
alongside the veterans’ benefit legislation. This case study presents important findings
not only in the substantive realm of policy studies, but also makes an important
theoretical contribution to the policy feedback approach long used to explain G.I. Bill
development.
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The case study of the G.I. Bill lends support to existing policy feedback models,
suggesting that the political process for future reforms of a policy can be shaped by the
previous legislative battles that have occurred. The original G.I. Bill did affect the
subsequent iterations of veterans’ education benefits, and not only by establishing a
precedent for a system of tuition assistance; the 1944 G.I. Bill defined the way in which
supporters of veterans’ benefits would approach the extension of those programs, and
how these advocates would interact with each other, Congress, and the White House. The
G.I. Bill case presents two important refinements to many of the existing policy feedback
models, however: (1) that interests may not be reified by a policy, but rather broken down
by it; and (2) that the feedback effects may not be limited solely to the same policy area.

The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition: Fracture and Imbalance
The first important addition to the policy feedback model (via the case study of
veterans’ education benefits) is the incorporation of the literature on coalition politics.
Rather than presupposing a united or homogenous interest group behind a particular
policy – and which is strengthened through the successful adoption of its proposed
legislation – a coalition-politics approach allows scholars to better understand the internal
dynamics of the interest groups within the feedback process. Opening up the “black box”
of these vested interests within the model affords researchers the ability to make finegrained observations on intra-group dynamics, leading to more substantiated claims
concerning group strategies and (following policy adoption), the true effects of the policy
process on these organized interests.
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In the case of the G.I. Bill reforms, the coalition’s politics showed an interesting
pattern between the 1944 G.I. Bill and its later iterations. The original legislation was the
product of intense veterans’ organization lobbying, so much so that the American Legion
was able to essentially write the final version of the Bill on its own. While there may
exist an assumption that further G.I. Bills were the result of a similar process, I argue that
the historical analysis does not bear out such an argument; rather, the veterans’ benefit
coalition distilled down into a loose arrangement between veterans’ organizations, the
VA, the White House (infrequently), and, most important of all, individual legislators
willing to take up the cause of veterans’ education benefits in the absence of coalition
accord. These members of Congress – concentrated within the House Committee on
Veterans’ Affairs and, in the Senate, the disparate committees of Labor and Public
Welfare and Finance which predated the standing committee – were motivated, I argue,
by electoral incentives as well as personal agendas concerning New Deal era social
policies to advance veterans’ education benefits. These legislators were able to gain
legislative momentum in this arena due to the extant social construction of veterans’
benefits in the country as entitlements for the “deserving,” and with broad public support.

Heterogeneity in Interest Groups Surrounding Policy Development
In highlighting the complex composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition, I argue
for the inclusion of heterogeneous groups within extant policy feedback models. In each
instance of G.I. Bill development following WWII (and to the end of conscription in
1973), veterans’ benefits were supported by a loosely-tethered group of individual
members of Congress, veterans’ organizations, the Veterans’ Administration, and (at
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times) presidents themselves. The ability and willingness of individual legislators to
advance the cause of G.I. Bill reform within the framework of the broader coalition
suggests that individual actors within a political alliance may shift responsibilities and
cause power imbalances. These shifting group arrangements could aid scholars in
identifying reasons for particular coalition strategies, as well as the source of particular
policy proposals or legislative initiatives from coalitions that have a semblance of unity
or homogeneity.
Moreover, the case study of the veterans’ benefit coalition may help explain the
composition, strategies, and legislative successes (as well as failures) of similarly-situated
groups that are united behind common policy goals. Understanding the ways in which
political actors with little else in common beyond a singular legislative preference
interact with one another – and what can cause them to stop working together
harmoniously – provides both academics and policy analysts with new lenses to
appreciate particular strategic choices within those coalitions.
A more recent example of a political coalition with contrasting interests is found
in recent work on the American homeschooling movement. Behind the push for federal
and state regulations that are more amendable to families educating children within their
homes (and not through school attendance), a deeply divided coalition has found a
common ground. Ideologically, supporters of homeschooling are more likely to be either
libertarian-conservatives (members of the Tea Party, for example), or extremely
progressive liberals. Despite their political differences in a host of other social, economic,
and political issues, this divided constituency has found a common (and tenuous)
connection in their shared policy preferences regarding education children at home. Such
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a coalition, though addressing policy on a smaller scale than that of veterans’ benefits,
still presents an important case study of an evolving political debate concerning the limits
of government intervention.309

The Influence of the Coalition on Social Policy Development
The second major observation that can be drawn from the case study of veterans’
education benefits is centered on the effects of policy reform on parallel policy spheres.
The investigation into the G.I. Bill reform process suggests that concerted efforts on the
part of political actors – specifically, invested legislators – can affect policies in
connected areas, either through establishing provisions later used in other policy areas, or
constraining policymakers’ abilities to broaden existing policies (at the risk of important
administrative or programmatic powers being annexed by other agencies). The case study
of the postwar G.I. Bills presents a compelling argument for the inclusion of veterans’
benefits in discussions of American social policy development writ large, as well as the
reasons for the current complexion of the American welfare state.
The fact that the G.I. Bill was able to have long-term effects on reintegration
policy – effectively supplanting broad-based unemployment compensation and labor
policies – following WWII was only the beginning of the program’s influence. The
establishment of accreditation requirements ushered in by the 1952 G.I. Bill created a
decentralized system of qualifications for the receipt of federal education funds
(following disagreement within the veterans’ benefit coalition), a requirement that exists
to this day in the much-debated issue of student loans for postsecondary education (and
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the increasing rates of student-loan debt in America). With the average college graduate
owing $16,000 in loan debt (and an average of $40,000 owed by those with graduate
degrees),310 combined with concerns about for-profit colleges and returns on educational
investment, the influence of the 1952 G.I. Bill was indeed a significant one. The same
system of accreditation that was an attempt to inoculate against G.I. Bill corruption is the
very same one that remains under careful investigation as student loan debt continues to
rise.
Later versions of the G.I. Bill – under the careful crafting of select legislators
within the veterans’ benefit coalition – also left their mark on higher education policy.
The 1966 and 1972 G.I. Bills continued to exclude veterans’ postsecondary education
benefits from the realm of Health, Education, and Welfare Department oversight, in line
with VA demands to maintain all veterans’ benefit programs on its own. Moreover,
attempts to incorporate veterans into the Higher Education Act of 1965 met with the firm
resistance of the veterans’ benefit coalition, which preferred to maintain the distinction
between veterans and civilians (even under conditions of peacetime, as is evidenced in
the debate concerning the 1966 G.I. Bill).
Thus, the veterans’ benefit coalition was able to not only continuously reform G.I.
Bill education benefits, but were also capable of protecting the veterans’ benefit regime
within the purview of the VA and limit the ability of competing agencies to co-opt the
veteran population within their policy spheres. By relegating veterans to the sole control
of the VA, the feedback effects of the G.I. Bill reform process constrained reintegration
(and, later, higher education) policy, shaping the contours of the American welfare state.
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Beyond the observations gleaned from the veterans’ education benefit case, however, the
current investigation presents an important amendment to the policy feedback model
concerning the direction and scope of feedback effects.

Spillover and Spillback Effects in the Policy Feedback Model
Although extant policy feedback models explicate the connections between the
politics of policy reform and their effects on changes in political contexts, existing
research focuses much of its analyses on effects within the same policy spheres.311
Consequently, investigations into the veterans’ benefit system (and other social policy
regimes) have not focused sufficient attention on the potential “spillover” or “spillback”
effects, in which policies may influence (positively, or in the case of veterans’ benefit
influence on welfare state development, negatively) related policies in parallel issue
areas. The reform process can generate its own inherent political clashes, as policy
interests compete in a “zero sum” system of finite resources.312 The “policy windows”
created by changes to related policies – in the case of the current case study, the
expansion of veterans’ education benefits to new cohorts of military personnel – may
allow policymakers to influence not only their own realm of issues, but to establish the
conditions under which related policies may be examined, debated, and legislated.313
The case of veterans’ education benefits suggests that policymakers – motivated
by electoral interests as well as personal predispositions towards federal intervention in
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education and labor issues – were able to directly restrict the policy options available to
proponents of a more generous higher education policies at the federal level.
Additionally, the provisions built into G.I. Bill education benefits were used as blueprints
for policies directed at the civilian population, once again establishing veterans’ benefits
as a prototype of large-scale policy initiatives (as Skocpol argues it had been following
the Civil War pension system).314 Perhaps most influential for current political analysis,
the veterans’ benefit coalition members were successful at delineating veterans’ benefits
as a discrete policy regime that, though it could extend its influence outward, could not
be the object of influence from other spheres of policy development, being sufficiently
shielded by the VA’s exclusive administration.
As much as the current case study provides critical insights into the historical
development of G.I. Bill benefits, this research also has important implications for
current veterans’ benefit politics. The most recent iteration of the veterans’ benefit
regime is a direct reflection of the legislative processes that created it; therefore, inquiries
into the rationale behind current policy proposals or administrative configurations should
begin with an appreciation of the historical context within which the current veterans’
benefit system developed.

Current Scandals and Future Research in Veterans’ Education Benefits
Understanding the way in which the subsequent G.I. Bills were formulated, as
well as their impact on parallel programs, carries important implications for political
scientists and policymakers alike. The current composition of the VA (and the most
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recent version of the veterans’ benefit coalition) is as much a function of current political
realities as it is the historical foundations of the coalition’s interactions and policy goals.
The state of veterans’ benefits in America – as well as the broader welfare system – can
be best understood through a perspective that incorporates the coalition politics and
feedback effects discussed within the previous chapters.

Current Scandals and Potential Lessons
Analyzing the veterans’ benefit regime is of critical importance in contemporary
American politics, as the VA has under increasing scrutiny for mismanagement and poor
administrative practices beginning in 2012. At the center of the VA scandal has been a
failing healthcare program, which has allegedly left thousands of veterans waiting for
appointments (and dozens potentially dying before they could access care), in addition to
as many as 600,000 veterans with backlogged medical disability claims.315 Former
Secretary of the Veterans’ Administration Eric Shinseki stepped down in May 2014, as
allegations of gross waiting times for veterans at VA hospitals gained public (and
Congressional) attention).316 As the investigations into the VA’s management continue,
increasing public and political scrutiny will be placed on the VA and how the agency has
been developed its current administrative practices.
The medical branch of the VA is not the only part of the agency gaining criticism
for its administration of veterans’ benefits, however. Recently, the education benefit
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system has gained attention for delays in the disbursement of tuition payments to
postsecondary institutions that caused problems for veterans’ enrollment at those schools.
The VA Inspector General revealed that over $60 billion was delayed in payments for the
tuition and fees of some 80,000 veterans on campus, causing issues for the students as
they began the new school semester.317 These concerns come on the heels of the recent
healthcare and disability payment investigations at the VA, and though the scope of the
mismanagement is far different, the reports still raise concerns about the VA’s ability to
manage several policy arenas simultaneously. These critiques echo the overshadowed
(but present) critiques of the VA following the 1944 G.I. Bill, at which time various
interest groups and individual legislators questioned the capacity of the VA to direct
education programs alongside what was already a large-scale healthcare and disability
pension operation.
Additional critiques have been leveled at the VA for the widespread use of G.I.
bill benefits at for-profit colleges and universities; Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) revealed
in a recent Senate report that 8 of every 10 G.I. Bill dollars awarded as education benefit
payments go to for-profit schools.318 This statistic is a far cry from the debates
surrounding the 1952 and 1966 G.I. Bills, in which veterans’ benefit coalition members
argued about whether public or private schools would hold the enrollment advantage,
depending on direct versus indirect tuition payments. Once again, the veterans’ education
benefit system will be under close review to determine the capability of the VA to
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administer the program, as well as the extent to which the scale and cost of the education
program is providing a favorable return on the nation’s investment.
In all, the recent critiques of the VA reinforce one of the most important areas of
spillover from the investigation of the 1944-1972 G.I. Bills: the relative insulation of the
VA from reorganization efforts. Despite large-scale investigations into corruption
surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill – and through Health, Education, and Welfare bids to
incorporate veterans into higher education assistance programs in the 1960s and 1970s –
the VA has been able to effectively maintain a jurisdictionally-distinct sphere of
administration and influence. The most recent investigations into VA management should
call political scientists to question the extent to which the institution’s past management
of the G.I. Bill education (alongside its other policy spheres) might be one of the reasons
for its current backlog and issues with benefit management.

Veterans’ Benefits and the American Welfare State
More broadly, though, the lessons of the earliest iterations of the G.I. Bill – and
its effects on parallel social programs – invites historians, political scientists, and policy
analysts alike to revisit the role of the veterans’ benefit regime in the development of the
American welfare state. The depiction of the “laggard” American welfare state often
obscures the role that veterans’ benefits play in adding to the country’s outlays for social
welfare programs.319 However, the earliest forms of American welfare policy was based
on entitlements to Revolutionary War and Civil War veterans for their service.320
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Although benefits were distributed across different socioeconomic groups, it was the
selective apportionment of benefits for the wealthy that had been officers in the military
that drew the harshest criticisms from opponents. These opponents forecasted that the
generous entitlements given to the more wealthy citizen-soldiers for their service, as
officers would effectively establish a precedent for how much particular groups in
American politics would become entitled to benefits. Jensen writes, “As the original
opponents of Revolutionary officers’ pensions predicted, selective entitlements fostered
the concentration and purposeful application of central state capacity to privilege
particular interest at the expense of more collective concerns.”321 There concern was
valid: during the early twentieth century, veterans’ benefits were one of the largest
government expenditures: in 1913, for example, payouts for veterans’ benefits reached a
staggering 18% of all federal expenditures.322 These first iterations of veterans’ benefits
would lay the groundwork for the future G.I. Bills, and form a political context in which
veterans’ benefits were an acceptable, popular, and politically successful element of the
patchwork American welfare state.
The G.I. Bill’s creation further instantiated veterans’ benefits within the
framework of welfare politics in the postwar era. The comprehensive nature of the G.I.
Bill and the success of its initiatives mean that this single piece of legislation, directed at
a jurisdictionally distinct subset of the American population, could function as a more
widely-applied set of benefits than it was intended to be. Addressing the needs of a
demobilized population of citizen-soldiers meant that the federal government could
intervene in issues of welfare in a separate sphere from contested New Deal policies,
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while still accomplishing many of the same goals as those policies. Because the G.I. Bill
was able to accomplish what some parts of the New Deal were not – and because it had a
broad base of support for its myriad programs – it was able to modify other social
policies in development, shaping them in contrast to the established veterans’ benefit
policies that had long been an established part of the American political landscape. That
later iterations of the same legislation were able to shape and constrain higher education
policy is a testament not only to the work of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but to the
embedded nature of veterans’ education policies in the comprehensive system of
American social policy throughout the 20th century.
Such a role for the veterans’ benefit regime fundamentally alters the existing
narrative of American welfare state development. Veterans’ benefits – and their
advocates – are not accountable for the current construction of American welfare policy;
there are a myriad of reasons for the country’s position behind its more generous
industrialized peers. However, the fact that veterans’ education benefit supporters were
able to advance their agenda for veterans – while at the same time constraining policies
for the civilian population, especially in the fields of education and training – suggests
that the absence of veterans’ benefit politics in a full discussion of 20th century welfare
policy development misses a critical component.
The ability of the veterans’ benefit coalition to continue to advance the scope and
magnitude of the veterans’ benefit regime – even in the face of heavy political opposition
– suggests that not all welfare policies may be subject to ideological contest or efforts at
retrenchment. Indeed, the American welfare state has used veterans’ benefits as a
prototype, and the case study of the G.I. Bill proves that the country is in fact able to
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sustain large-scale social policies aimed at improving income stability, labor force
participation, and social mobility. America’s most successful version of its welfare state –
its veteran welfare state – may already be a political reality, and one that will continue to
direct

the

politics

of

social

policy
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